

SOVIET INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES

1. The avowed basic intention of the USSR is to engage in "competition" with the US until the US is destroyed, or forced to capitulate. The Soviet concept of "competition" with the US is -- demonstrably -- to wage a relentless, unceasing struggle in which any weapon or tactic which promises success is admissible.

Appreciation of the fundamental nature of this struggle is often confused by preoccupation with the question of whether the USSR plans at a given moment to launch an all-out military attack on the US. The fact that the USSR has not resorted to a Pearl Harbor-type of military move, or to a formal "declaration of war," or does not necessarily intend to, should not be allowed to obscure the fact that the struggle does not differ in its potential effect on the US (the enemy) from what is usually considered "war." While the struggle is limited for the moment in that military weapons are eschewed, it is not limited from the standpoint of finality or all-inclusiveness of the ultimate objective. It consequently cannot be described as merely a "political struggle," or a "cold war," or a "limited war." In the eyes of the Kremlin, it is war in the broadest sense of the term, a war to the death.

The failure to employ military weapons is merely a case of adhering to the old strategies of choosing one's ground and weapons so as to maximize one's resources as against those of the enemy. Given a situation where the use of armed action promised decisive results, it can be assumed that Soviet leaders would resort to armed action. While Soviet leaders have shown a definite preference for attempting to achieve their ends by other than military force, nothing about their conduct since 1918 suggests that they have an aversion to the use of armed force per se. To the contrary, they have shown a ready willingness to resort to force when particular conditions appeared decidedly favorable, or no other course was open.

I. There is no prospect that the USSR will abandon its struggle against the US on its own volition.

The USSR is motivated by a combination of factors springing from its unique world position. As a state in a system of states, the USSR pursues a policy conditioned by the need to safeguard its national interests. As the successor to the Russian Empire, the USSR inherits a tradition of expansionism apparently inherent in its historical and geographic position. As a totalitarian dictatorship, the USSR is ever driven to new conquests, internal and external. As the center of the world Communist movement, the USSR is irrevocably identified with an increasing struggle for world revolution.

The USSR thus joins together a national center of state power with an international crusading ideology. Without either the state power or the crusading ideology the world position and policy of the USSR would be decisively changed. The peculiarly dangerous nature, however, of Soviet aggression -- its persistence, intensity, and scope -- is principally a product of the association of the USSR with Communism.

Soviet leaders profess to believe that the downfall of capitalism and the world triumph of Communism is a historical necessity that will inevitably result from the workings of immutable laws of social science. Because Soviet leaders adhere to this doctrine, it cannot be assumed that they regard their role as a passive one, one of sitting back and waiting for the fruits of victory to fall automatically into their laps. On the contrary, Soviet leaders and Marxists generally believe that the overthrow of capitalism and the institution of proletarian rule are inevitable because of what humans do, not irrespective of what they do. Individuals are driven by the force of natural laws to act in a certain way, but it is only because they act in this way that changes are effected. Thus, Communists have no choice under terms of Marxism but to militantly seek, not wait for, power.

The position of Stalin on the issue of "building socialism in one country" has often been construed as a kind of insular socialism, implying the withdrawal of the USSR from the world revolutionary struggle. Actually, Stalin always looked on the USSR as the base of world revolution. He argued that the solidification of Communist rule in this base was the greatest immediate contribution which could be made to the ultimate spread of proletarian rule. But he always insisted victory of socialism could be effected only as the remainder of the world was brought under proletarian rule. Thus "quietism" and "passivity" are automatically rejected for Communists possessing state-power, as well as for Communists aspiring to state power. The militant activity of the USSR in extending the revolution is, for all Marxists, taken for granted.

It is not alone because of this strictly ideological demand, however, that Moscow's association with Communism makes it necessary for it to follow a policy of unceasing aggression. The world power position of the USSR is in large measure derived from the world Communist movement. The Kremlin cannot permit either a diminution in the strength of world Communism or a relaxation of its own control over the movement.

Since Communism above all is a militant ideology, Soviet leaders are compelled to pursue an aggressive policy to preserve the Communist ideology as a vital force. For a relaxation of Soviet militancy -- any subduing of the class struggle motif -- serves to soften the rank and file of foreign Communist Parties and to breed conditions which make for restlessness over the Kremlin's iron mastery. Only by keeping active the concept of permanent conflict between Communists and non-Communists can Moscow retain a militant foreign organization willing to undertake direct action in the interest of the USSR. Even a temporary rapprochement, as with the "United Front" of the 1930's or the war-time alliance, weakens the movement and reduces the effectiveness of Moscow's control. Any genuine reconciliation between the USSR and

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the capitalist powers would completely disrupt, if not disintegrate, world Communism, and accordingly undermine the power position of the Soviet Union. Thus, unless the Kremlin should become willing to sacrifice international Communism, it must remain involved in a perpetual process of deliberately generating friction with non-Communists, thereby intensifying non-Communist counteraction, which in turn creates a greater urgency for the USSR and its Communist followers to increase their militancy. Moscow cannot even pause for an extended period to consolidate its gains, despite the increasing need to consolidate as its empire grows. Success in one instance of aggression only creates added pressure for new aggression.

III. The over-all capabilities of the Soviet Union to achieve its ultimate aim of bringing about the defeat or capitulation of the US and its allies appear on the basis of a surface examination shockingly inadequate.

Even granting optimistic Soviet reports of production, the total economic strength of the USSR compares with that of the US as roughly one to four. This is reflected not only in gross national income (1949: USSR \$65 billion; US \$250 billion), but in production of key commodities in 1949:

	US	USSR	USSR and European Orbit Combined
Ingot steel (million met. tons)	80.4	21.5	28.0
Primary aluminum (thousands met. tons)	617.6	130-135	140-145
Electric power (billion kwh.)	410	72	112
Crude oil (million met. tons)	276.5	33.0	38.9

Even if there were added to Soviet and orbit capacities those of all Continental Europe, the balance would still strongly favor the US -- without taking account of

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the resources which the US could certainly command in various other parts of the world.

The discrepancy between over-all Soviet economic strength and over-all US economic strength is likely to remain for the foreseeable future. Although Soviet leaders can be expected to continue their forced drive for expanding production and although their specific goal will still be to equal US levels, neither Soviet resources nor past performance justify an assumption that the USSR can substantially reduce present US superiority. It is even inconceivable that the repercussions of a major depression in the US would drastically narrow the gap.

In event of a full-scale military contest between the USSR and the US, the discrepancy in over-all economic strength would precipitously widen. The USSR today is on a near maximum production basis. No matter what stringent efforts Moscow might make, only a relatively slight change in the rate of increase in over-all production could be brought about. In the US, on the other hand, a very rapid absolute expansion could be realized.

In other fields -- scientific development, general technological competence, skilled labor resources, productivity of labor force, etc. -- the gap between the USSR and the US roughly corresponds to the gap in production.

IV. The ability of the USSR to achieve success in a life-and-death struggle with the US cannot, however, be determined on the basis of a comparison of over-all strength in economic and related fields. Its actual capabilities far exceed its apparent capabilities.

a. The Soviet Government can bring to bear on a particular effort a very large share of its total strength. Since the Soviet economy has not been developed to serve consumers' needs, and has not brought about a basically complex economic and social structure, an unusually large proportion of its industrial production is not

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above the conventional requirements of the people and can be devoted to extraordinary purposes without appreciable adverse effects. Consequently, the USSR with even its existing economic strength can sustain a mammoth war effort for a prolonged period. It prosecuted the last war with an annual steel availability of less than 10 million tons. It is estimated that in a future all-out military conflict it could successfully equip and supply the maximum number of men it could put in the field with a total steel production appreciably less than the present rate. The same is true of other commodities, except fissionable materials about which the situation is not known.

b. For the type of struggle now under way, and even more for the initial stages of an armed contest, the USSR enjoys an advantage in that it is already in a state of virtual mobilization for war, both organizationally and in the allocation of labor and materials. Organizationally, the Soviet planned economy makes possible quick production shifts as the changing situation demands. The government not only has retained a large number of men under arms, but has kept its entire labor force, comparatively free before the Second World War, in a state of mobilization by retaining almost intact the strict labor laws of 1940.

c. Many social, political, historical, and geographical factors increase the capabilities of the USSR. The population is large (200 million) and youthful -- as of 1939 more than half had been born since 1917. The population is hardly, habituated to deprivation, and able to live off the land. Soviet women can and do perform heavy labor reserved for men in other countries; they have, in fact, shown themselves able to participate directly in military operations. Psychologically the Soviet citizen is accustomed to discipline. He is conditioned to accept the idea of war as inevitable and is provided with an elaborate rationale for fighting. Russian fatalism and callousness toward suffering has military value. Military train

ing, including intensive indoctrination as the militant vanguard of the world revolution, is given to approximately half the male population. In addition, an extensive network of quasi-military organizations habituates the Soviet people to the idea of war and trains them for specific military tasks. The geographical location of the USSR, which occupies one-sixth of the earth's land surface and, except along its southwestern border, is hermetically sealed by a system of satellite buffer states, gives it a strategic advantage almost without parallel. Soviet industry is widely dispersed and difficult to attack. While about three-quarters of Soviet industrial and agricultural production comes from the European part of the USSR, including the Ural Mountains area, this region comprises over 2 million square miles.

d. The USSR enjoys certain unique capabilities as a result of its identity with the Communist ideology.

(1) Soviet interests benefit from the mere existence of the idea of Communism which not only produces a splitting effect on Western society, but also attracts foreign support to the USSR as the citadel of this secular faith. Communism's emphasis on inflaming resentment among the underprivileged -- segments of the working class, minorities, colonial subjects -- and on undermining confidence among the privileged by constantly charging inequalities, abuses, and hypocrisy is designed not only to facilitate the building of Communist Parties as instruments of Soviet power, but to set class against class and country against country, to create confusion, and to cast doubts on the validity of the very principles that underlie the non-Communist way of life. In turn Communism promises the discontented a Utopian society. The bright prospects offered by Communism are enhanced by its universalist appeal (unlike Nazism); its apparent plausibility and ostensible altruism; its persistent self-assurance and messianic fervor; and its constant claims to be scientific and infallible because it allegedly harmonizes with the predetermined pattern of world history.

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(2) In its organizational aspect, Communism has led to the creation of mass political parties in many countries and underground organizations in others with an estimated total membership of some 10 million persons. These parties, by their influence in both the political and economic life of foreign countries, cause division and operate as an open pressure group in support of Soviet policy. In addition, the hard core of the Communist Parties is available as a disciplined and fanatic force for espionage, sabotage, and subversion on behalf of the USSR.

(3) Parallel with the Communist Parties, a variety of national Communist-front organizations, ostensibly dedicated to peace and international friendship, serve to rally foreign sympathy for Soviet policy or at least to create doubts and fears over US policy. Similarly Communist infiltration of national liberal organizations has often served to divide and discredit the non-Communist left. On the international level, the USSR has developed trade union, women, and youth organizations that have been particularly employed to court colonial peoples.

e. The Soviet Union operates under the dictatorial control of a small clique that is able to make quick decisions and support them by the arbitrary concentration of national capabilities without reference to general public opinion or special interest groups. By the same token the Soviet leadership can operate with little regard for ethical values and accepted international norms. In contrast to Western governments, the USSR thus is not limited in its choice of tactics, but can resort to any approach that appears potentially effective.

f. The Soviet Union and, to a lesser yet increasing extent, its satellites possess an almost complete monopoly on influencing the thinking of their peoples. All domestic information media and educational systems are Communist-controlled. Local inhabitants are forbidden to travel abroad, and only selected foreigners are permitted to enter. Soviet jamming now blocks out about 90 percent of foreign

broadcasts. Western publications are generally not available to the Soviet public. As a result the Soviet Government has virtually a free hand to mold for its people the picture of the world that it wants them to have. This also assists the USSR in perpetrating its myth of a Communist Utopia by preventing a first-hand comparison between Soviet claims and reality. At the same time Moscow is able to make the efforts of foreign powers to obtain information concerning the USSR an increasingly critical problem. Foreign press correspondents are being increasingly refused admission into the Soviet orbit. Western diplomatic missions are being steadily restricted in their operations, and Bulgaria's declaration of Minister Heath as persona non grata may mark a systematic campaign to end diplomatic representation in the satellites. Contact between local people and Westerners is curtailed by omnibus state secret laws and by police surveillance.

g. Moscow's monopolistic control of the means of shaping internal public opinion and its world-wide apparatus of Communist Parties and front organizations places it in a unique position in psychological warfare. In addition, as the first government to develop propaganda as a major peace-time weapon it has fashioned effective techniques marked by simplicity, repetition, and black-and-white analysis. Moscow's propaganda strategy of always identifying the USSR with progress and the US with reaction, appropriating "liberation of peoples" and the "defense of peace" as exclusively Soviet symbols, and utilizing the traditional liberal formulas of "democracy" and "freedom" can at least confuse its audience, if not convince it.

h. An intangible yet nevertheless real factor benefitting the USSR is the reluctance of non-Communists, despite their growing realization of the meaning of Communism, to admit that the standards and aims of the USSR are different from theirs and that the Soviet program carries with it a terrifying menace to their way of life, if not their existence. History and Communist statements together clearly demonstrate

the fate that ultimately awaits any group that believes in the possibility of lasting coexistence with the Communists. Since non-Communists are understandably reluctant to accept this dire conclusion, the USSR is able to benefit from non-Communist proneness to rely upon a difficulties-will-work-themselves-out philosophy, and to fail to take adequate counter means.

V. Soviet capability to prosecute successfully its struggle against the US is subject to a number of vulnerabilities. The USSR has shown that it is acutely aware of these vulnerabilities and has taken extreme precautions to guard against them. they cannot, therefore, be expected spontaneously to produce results. They are, however, of such nature as to suggest that systematic exploitation through external pressure might bring about a decisive weakening in the Soviet power position, or a reversal in Soviet policies.

a. The USSR is immediately most vulnerable in connection with the maintenance of control over its expanding empire. The Soviet imperial system by its very nature permits of no flexibility in the degree of Moscow's mastery. Any departure from complete subservience simultaneously constitutes, in the eyes of the Kremlin, an inadmissible doctrinal heresy and a dangerous breach in the line of authority.

This rigidity benefits the USSR by making extremely difficult the development of any opposition operation. But it also necessarily breeds conditions that magnify enormously antipathy toward external domination. It virtually precludes a real consolidation of Soviet rule, assuming that real consolidation requires firm roots among the population. More than this, it creates a prospectively explosive situation, one wherein there is especial susceptibility to pressures and one wherein an all encompassing blow can be quickly, though not easily, dealt the Russian masters. In particular it lays the basis for the following types of conflicts:

(1) Opposition of the subject state, as a state, to the master state. The

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USSR makes no effort to disguise the fact that its relationship to its satellites is that of superior to an inferior. Recognition of the primacy of the USSR is set forth as the "holy duty" of all Communists -- i.e., Communist heads of states as well as others. In no instance to date has Moscow failed to press its own national interests at the expense of conflicting satellite interests, and it has given no indication that it ever will. Moscow has shown no hesitancy over disregarding the cultural and religious sensibilities of its subject peoples, and has systematically and ruthlessly exploited them. This state-to-state relationship which Moscow has deliberately established has laid the foundation for a state-to-state reaction (e.g., Yugoslavia).

(2) The instrument through which Moscow exercises its control in satellite states -- national Communist Parties reenforced by Soviet agents -- creates the possibility of conflicts developing between peoples and their governments. The satellite governments are not only unrepresentative of the populations, but are in large measure alien to them. None has achieved even popular acceptance, much less support. All depend on undisguised and unfettered force for their retention of power and even among the instruments of force -- the police and the armies -- loyalty to the government is questionable.

(3) The rigidity of Kremlin control makes difficult accommodations and adjustments among competing personalities within the leadership of the satellite Communist Parties and thus creates situations highly favorable to schisms and conflicts which, under certain circumstances, might destroy the entire Soviet control mechanism. Moscow demands of what it considers the dominant group in the Party adoption and strict adherence to a fixed line. Dissidents are required either to come over or fall into the rank of "enemies." The result is to create in every satellite element in Party leadership which, given opportunity, might be willing to turn against the

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dominant Moscow group.

b. The USSR is also vulnerable with respect to its domination of Communist Parties in still independent countries. Pressures for individual or group deviationism have always existed within the international Communist movement and have contributed to an annual loss of a heavy percentage of Party membership. Since the war, pressures have increased because of the crowding of Party rolls by poorly screened and indoctrinated members; the sharper revelation of the clash between local nationalist aspirations and Soviet demands; Moscow's demand that Party members publicly announce their intent to support the USSR against even their own countries in event of military conflict; and, finally, the example of Tito.

Moscow has shown grave concern over these inherent dangers. It has set as the first task of all Parties the establishment of safeguards against them. So far, no actual weakening of Soviet domination is known to have taken place in any national Party. Yet in France, Italy, and Japan the immediate potential for deviationism is high. In other countries, prospects are less bright, but everywhere, given developments which would intensify existing pressures, significant challenges might be made to Kremlin mastery.

c. The magnitude of the economic task which the USSR has assumed in the creation of its Eurasian empire cannot help but cause considerable difficulties under the best of circumstances. Under systematic pressure it might well result in widespread repercussions. Although the USSR is still in the early stages of industrialization and faces severe limitations on its ability to accelerate its development, it has, at least in an economic sense, taken on responsibility for large areas and populations that are poor in resources, backward in development and no longer free to benefit from normal economic ties with Western countries. It has thus created an economic vacuum which it, with a per capita consumption of \$200 per year is powerless to fill.

Apart from its general economic deficiencies, the Soviet orbit -- including the USSR -- faces a number of particular shortages which, if exploited through such devices as export controls, might interfere with even the maintenance of present levels of production in important sections of the economy. Among raw materials, the most important shortages are tin, crude rubber, and certain non-ferrous metals. Among industrial items are spare parts for the large quantities of machinery and equipment secured from the West; precision instruments; complex machine tools; special purpose bearings; and electrical equipment. Railway equipment is also short.

d. The Soviet system of internal control contains seeds which, given opportunity, could produce real difficulty. The dictatorial police methods have inspired fear and subservience -- perhaps even respect -- but not devotion and willing support. The very attributes that make the Soviet Government alien to its own peoples, however, are attributes that have proved extraordinarily effective in keeping the people in hand. During periods of great crisis, the Kremlin, no matter what its other deficiencies, demonstrated a masterly, if ruthless, ability to cope with any internal threats to its own power. Appeals to the people against the government might somewhat widen the existing schism, but the only circumstances which could conceivably cause it to develop into an open break are great external pressure, or a conflict among the individuals who hold governmental power.

There is ample evidence that within the Communist hierarchy there is almost constant struggling and jockeying for position by individuals and factions. But these are struggles for advantage within the existing leadership, that of Stalin. So long as Stalin remains active there can hardly be a challenge to his absolute authority, nor a break in the external solidarity of the Politburo. With Stalin's death or incapacitation, the situation may become different. It may prove impossible to transfer Stalin's mantle to a successor or successors without the occurrence of disruptive incidents, regardless of what provisions may be made to handle Stalin's succession. A contest might conceivably develop which would so

weaken the central power that the basic antagonism of the people toward the governmental system would come into play and produce a decisive change.

On the basis of known evidence, however, this is improbable. The situation in the Politburo is today less conducive to a complete split than it was on Lenin's death when there were two leading claimants to leadership -- Stalin and Trotsky -- and when a number of fundamental questions as to the basic course to be followed were still unresolved. Moreover, it must not be forgotten that the Communist Party even then proved strong enough to sustain the shock of prolonged internal discussion without being forced to relax in the slightest its iron control mechanism.

e. The miserably low standard of living which the Soviet population endured during the war years has not been raised appreciably since the return of peace and causes widespread dissatisfaction among the people. The uplift of morale experienced after the successful conclusion of the war was further strengthened by Stalin's promise in February 1946 that de rationing would take place in the "nearest" future, that the postwar Five-Year Plan would increase the supply of consumers' goods, and that prices would be lowered. Subsequent events, however, tended to dash the raised hopes. In the autumn of 1946 prices on rationed food and clothing were nearly trebled. Rationing was not ended until December 1947 and even then prices were reduced only slightly. Moreover a sacrifice was demanded from the people in the form of devaluation of the ruble. This struck most heavily the peasants who had accumulated stocks of cash from private transactions during the war. Peasants also received severe blows through a 1948 increase in taxes on their private activities, new restriction on opportunities to market their privately-held produce, and mounting attacks on the small individual holdings of land and stock still left to them. Workers meanwhile have continued to be subjected to the harsh labor laws adopted as war-time necessities, and in certain industries their production norms were raised 20 to 25 percent in 1947 without a commensurable wage increase.

Soviet intellectuals probably have had better material conditions in the postwar period than either the workers or peasant. Nevertheless, they have been subjected to special demoralizing restrictions. The relative freedom for expression that they enjoyed during the war was ended in 1946. Since then they have been subject to a constant badgering campaign and allowed to produce only what accords with current Politburo doctrine.

Another potentially troublesome condition is the separatist and nationalist feeling among the many minority peoples of the USSR. Over 40 percent of the Soviet population is non-Russian, and many of these are basically antagonistic toward Great Russian rule. Soviet policy toward minority peoples is to allow the trappings of autonomy while maintaining real power centralized in Moscow. That this policy has not proved entirely successful is evident from World War II experiences when a number of minority groups, including large elements from among the Ukrainians, proved unreliable.

Despite their discontent minority peoples will continue powerless by themselves to translate their discontent into effective actions under normal circumstances. With foreign assistance and encouragement, or under stress of a great internal crisis, the minorities would without doubt take maximum advantage of any opportunities offered them. Otherwise they appear to have no choice but to continue their submission to Kremlin control.

f. A major threat to the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda and indeed to the very appeal of Communism is the discrepancy between Soviet myths of a Communist Utopia and Soviet reality. Moscow has managed to preserve its myths to a large extent by strict control of travel to and from the USSR and by its worldwide propaganda apparatus. Since the war, however, the revelations of Soviet escapees and disillusioned foreign Communists, the exposure of Soviet methods by Tito, the anti-national acts of foreign Communist Parties, and the policy of the USSR itself have seemed to create an increasingly greater understanding in the non-Communist world

the true meaning of Communism. Moscow's acute sensitivity to this vulnerability has been clearly demonstrated. It attempts to guard against it by always taking an offensive line, forcing non-Communists to concentrate upon defending their own system. But the progress already achieved suggests that intensified efforts may well produce important effects.

VI- Moscow's basic strategy is geared to take advantage of its unique capabilities and to minimize the dangers of its vulnerabilities. Consequently the USSR has shown that under existing conditions its immediate intention is to employ means short of committing Soviet armed forces to military action.

This does not mean that Moscow eschews the use of military force. Communist armies or guerrillas have operated in China, Indochina, Greece, Korea, and Indonesia. Soviet troops by their presence have assisted Soviet strategy in Eastern Europe, Germany, Austria, and Iran. In the future, Moscow also looks forward to the indirect and direct use of force. Soviet armed strength, substantially enhanced by the development of an atomic weapon, continues to be increased. Authoritative Communist spokesmen openly prescribe armed struggle as the only correct strategy in colonial areas and call for revolution as the ultimate tactic in industrial countries.

Continued use of military force by local Communists can thus be expected, but there is no evidence that the USSR deliberately plans to employ its own armed forces in an all-out assault against the West in the near future. It is always possible, however, that the increased confidence recently shown by Soviet leaders might lead to miscalculation of Western determination and capacity to resist. Consequently the chance of an unplanned military conflict appears to be increasing.

Soviet preference to use its special capabilities rather than its own armed forces results not only from an awareness of the unfavorable inequality between present Soviet and Western power potential, but also from a pragmatic estimate that the less risky and less costly means are proving successful. The USSR's basic strategy of constantly exerting pressure on all areas where Western capacity or will to

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assist is limited -- whittling away at the extremities of the Western power position and simultaneously seeking to undermine the centers of power -- not only serves to strengthen the USSR for any military war with the West, but presents the dangerous possibility that the Kremlin can achieve its aim of forcing the ultimate defeat of the US without ever having to resort to direct military involvement with the US.

The success of this strategy thus far is clear. In addition to the war-time absorption of 280,000 square miles of territory, the new Soviet empire now ranges from the Elbe to the South China sea. The USSR has suffered setbacks in Europe and Asia, but except for Yugoslavia, these setbacks consisted of failures to make new gains, and not the loss of what Moscow actually possessed. Obviously neither those gains nor setbacks are necessarily permanent. Yet in the world situation at this moment, the possibility of the USSR sustaining further losses is decidedly less than its chance of making additional gains.

That the USSR itself is operating on this premise is demonstrated by the mounting militancy that characterizes recent Soviet moves in Asia and Europe. This hardening of Soviet policy not only toward the Atlantic powers, but also toward the satellites, foreign Communist parties, and the Soviet people themselves arises from Moscow's eagerness to exploit the new opportunities presented by the expansion of the Soviet empire and its determination to preserve and extend control over its previous gains.

a. In Asia the USSR faces the problem of insuring control over Communist China. This is made difficult by the absence of Soviet troops in China, the development of the Chinese Communist apparatus by Mao rather than directly by the USSR, the inability of the USSR to provide substantial economic aid, and already existing antipathy toward the USSR among the Chinese people, including some Chinese Communists. Yet at the present time the prospect of the Chinese Communists striking out on a course independent of Moscow's desires is not supported by available evidence.

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Prospects for further Communist expansion in Asia appear brightest in Indo-China, where Moscow by its recognition of Ho Chi Minh at least implied support for his military action.

Soviet recognition of Indonesia and Moscow's conciliatory gestures toward India and Pakistan indicate an effort not only to strengthen the existing reluctance of the Asian countries to become directly involved in East-West differences, but also to capitalize on their sentiment of restricting Asia for the Asians. That this is only a temporary tactic is demonstrated by the statements in Soviet journals that conditions in colonial areas are now favorable for accelerated Communist action. Continued fighting in Indochina, Burma, Malaya, and the Philippines, the susceptibility of China's neighbors to Chinese Communist pressure, the serious friction between India and Pakistan and Afghanistan and Pakistan, the enormity of the economic and social problems that confront the new governments of Southern Asia all combine to keep this area in an essentially fluid situation. To prevent stability Moscow's strategy calls for aggravation of differences among individual Asiatic states, including those of the Near East, so as to forestall any formation of an actual bloc, and intensification of internal frictions to hamper political and economic development. While Communist and non-Communist guerrilla action in Southeast Asia is causing direct disruption, Communists in the Near and Middle East are still largely in a preliminary stage of organization and agitation, but the conditions under which Communism thrives remain without any clear prospect of imminent improvement.

b. In Europe during the five post-war years the USSR has succeeded in cementing control over its Eastern European satellites, with the highly significant exception of Yugoslavia. The local governments have been reorganized to exclude leaders not completely subservient to Moscow. All anti-Communist organizations, including the church, have been severely curtailed or eliminated. Despite the conflict between Soviet interests and satellite interests and the basic antipathy of the satellite peoples toward Communism, neither the satellite leaders, if they were willing, nor

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the people have the capabilities alone to lead their country out of the Soviet orbit. Even in Albania, isolated from the rest of the satellites as a result of Tito's defection and subject to Greek and Yugoslav pressures, the Communist regime has increasingly strengthened its position.

Tito's defection with the resultant adverse repercussions for Soviet policy represents for Moscow a continuing challenge that it finds increasingly difficult to handle. External economic, political, and psychological pressures and attempted internal sabotage and subversion have failed, so that for Moscow the only remaining alternative to overthrow Tito is to resort to military force.

In the rest of Europe, Soviet strategy is immediately directed at nullifying US efforts to achieve a greater unity of action among the Western powers. Moscow clearly indicates that it considers Germany the keystone. With Stalin's conciliatory message to the Germans last October, the USSR embarked on a policy of openly appealing to German nationalism. Without committing itself, the USSR is holding out to the Germans prospects of a unified country, a peace treaty, and the end of the occupation in return for German support of Soviet policy. Moscow's aim is not only to drive a wedge between the Western Germans and the Western powers, but also to divide the Western powers over the question of whether a recovered Germany is to be welcomed as a potential ally or feared as a potential military threat and economic competitor.

Present Soviet capabilities in Western Germany are limited, although Moscow is seeking to compensate for the weakness of the Communists by directing them to pursue an increasingly militant line. Soviet prospects at present are less likely to be improved by Communist promises than by the failure of the Bonn government to provide an adequate standard of living for the Western Germans.

In Western Europe, Soviet capabilities have declined. French and Italian Communists remain politically isolated, and, despite their mass party and continuing
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control over large segments of organized labor, they have been unable to carry on effective political action by themselves. As in Germany, they have turned to a more militant line that involves attempts to hamper MDAF shipments and threats to sabotage local armament production. In essence Moscow has discounted the possibility of Western European Communists coming to power through parliamentary means, and has committed them to a course of action that is likely to reduce further their local political standing, yet possibly increase their disruptive effect on US plans.

Although Communist expansion in Western Europe has been blocked by the initial effects of ERP and by the commitment of US power under the Atlantic Treaty, Moscow gives evidence that it considers these obstacles only short-term. Given a continued failure to correct the disparity between prices and wages and provide agricultural reforms, or the cessation of US economic assistance, or the development of a general depression, Moscow is prepared to capitalize immediately on resultant new opportunities.

a. With respect to the United Nations, Moscow has demonstrated that it will be treated with increasing cynicism. A complete break with the UN does not now appear planned, but future Soviet participation will more than ever be limited and directed in such a manner as to achieve maximum benefit for particular tactical moves which the USSR is making in various parts of the world.

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August 2, 1946

CONFIDENTIAL: The following supplement to the preliminary Report of the Joint Chief of Staff's Evaluation Board for the Atomic Bomb Tests, MUST BE HELD IN CONFIDENCE until released.

NOTE: Release is for 4:00 P.M., E.S.T., today, August 2, 1946. The same hour of release applies to radio commentators and news broadcasters.

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CHARLES C. ROSS
Secretary to the President

PRELIMINARY REPORT FOLLOWING THE SECOND ATOMIC BOMB TEST

Report by the Joint Chiefs of Staff Evaluation Board
for the Atomic Bomb Tests

30 July 1946

In compliance with your directive of 27 February 1946, the Evaluation Board presents a second preliminary report of the atomic bomb tests held at Bikini Atoll.

Section I

Supplement to Preliminary Report on Test "A"

In general, the observations on ship damage presented by this board in its first report were confirmed by engineering surveys. The location of the bomb burst, accurately determined from photographs, was such that only one ship was within 1,000 feet of the surface point over which the bomb exploded. There were about 20 ships within half a mile, all of which were badly damaged, many being put out of action and five sunk. It required up to 12 days to repair all of those ships left afloat sufficiently so that they could have stemmed under their own power to a major base for repair.

It is now possible to make some estimate of the radiological injuries which crews would have suffered had they been aboard Test "A" target vessels. Measurements of radiation intensity and a study of animals exposed in ships show that the initial flash of principal lethal radiations, which are gamma-rays and neutrons, would have killed almost all personnel normally stationed aboard the ships centered around the air burst and many others at greater distances. Personnel protected by steel, water, or other dense materials would have been relatively safe in the outlying target vessels. The effects of radiation exposure would not have incapacitated all victims immediately, even some of the most severely affected might have remained at their stations several hours. Thus it is possible that initial efforts at damage control might have kept ships operating, but it is clear that vessels within a mile of an atomic bomb air burst would eventually become inoperative due to crew casualties.

Section II

Observations on Test "B"

The Board divided into two groups for the observation of Test "B". Four members, after surveying the target array from the air, witnessed the explosion from an airplane eight miles away at an altitude of 7500 feet. The other three members inspected the target array from a small boat the day before the test and observed the bomb's explosion from the deck of the USS HAVEN, 11 miles at sea to the east of the burst.

The Board reassembled on the HAVEN on 26 July, and the members have since examined photographs, data on radioactivity, and reports of other phenomena, and have inspected some of the target vessels. They have also consulted with members of the Task Force Technical Staff.

As scheduled, at 0835 Bikini time on 25 July, a bomb was detonated well below the surface of the lagoon. This bomb was suspended from LSM-60, near the center of the target array. The explosion was of predicted violence and is estimated to have been at least as destructive as 20,000 tons of TNT.

To a degree which the Board finds remarkable, the visible phenomena of explosion followed the predictions made by civilian and service phenomenologists attached to Joint Task Force One. At the moment of explosion, a dome, which showed the light of incandescent material within, rose upon the surface of the lagoon. The blast was followed by an opaque cloud which rapidly enveloped about half of the target array. The cloud vanished in about two seconds to reveal, as predicted, a column of ascending water. From some of the photographs it appears that this column lifted the 26,000-ton battleship ARKANSAS for a brief interval before the vessel plunged to the bottom of the lagoon. Confirmation of this occurrence must await the analysis of high-speed photographs which are not yet available.

The diameter of the column of water was about 2200 feet, and it rose to a height of about 5500 feet. Spray rose to a much greater height. The column contained roughly ten million tons of water. For several minutes after the column reached maximum height, water fell back, forming an expanding cloud of spray which engulfed about half of the target array. Surrounding the base of the column was a wall of foaming water several hundred feet high.

Waves outside the water column, about 1000 feet from the center of explosion, were 80 to 100 feet in height. These waves rapidly diminished in size as they proceeded outward, the highest wave reaching the beach of Bikini Island being seven feet. Waves did not pass over the island, and no material damage occurred there. Measurements of the underwater shock wave are not yet available. There were no seismic phenomena of significant magnitude.

The explosion produced intense radioactivity in the waters of the lagoon. Radioactivity immediately after the burst is estimated to have been the equivalent of many hundred tons of radium. A few minutes exposure to this intense radiation at its peak would, within a brief interval, have incapacitated human beings and have resulted in their death within days or weeks.

Great quantities of radioactive water descended upon the ships from the column or were thrown over them by waves. This highly lethal radioactive water constituted such a hazard that after four days it was still unsafe for inspection parties, operating within a well-established safety margin, to spend any useful length of time at the center of the target area or to board ships anchored there.

As in Test "A", the array of target ships for Test "B" did not represent a normal anchorage but was designed instead to obtain the maximum data from a single explosion. Of the 84 ships and small craft in the array, 40 were anchored within one mile and 20 within about one-half mile. Two major ships were sunk, the battleship ARKANSAS immediately and the heavy-hulled aircraft carrier SARATOGA after 7½ hours. A landing ship, a landing craft, and an oiler also sank immediately. The destroyer HUGHES, in sinking condition, and the transport FALCON, badly listing, were later beached. The submerged submarine APOGON was sent to the bottom emitting air bubbles and fuel oil, and one to three other submerged submarines are believed to have sunk. Five days after the burst, the badly damaged Japanese battleship NAGATO sank. It was found impossible immediately to assess damage to hulls, power plants and machinery of the target

B

ships because of radioactive contamination. Full appraisal of damage will have to await detailed survey by engineer teams. External observation from a safe distance would indicate that a few additional ships near the target center may have suffered some hull damage. There was no obvious damage to ships more than one-half mile from the burst.

Section III

Observations and Conclusions, Both Tests

The operations of Joint Task Force One in conducting the tests have set a pattern for close, effective cooperation of the Armed Services and civilian scientists in the planning and execution of this highly technical operation. Moreover, the tests have provided valuable training of personnel in joint operations requiring great precision and coordination of effort.

It is impossible to evaluate an atomic burst in terms of conventional explosives. As to detonation and blast effects, there the largest bomb of the past was effective within a radius of a few hundred feet, the atomic bomb's effectiveness can be measured in thousands of feet. However, the radiological effects have no parallel in conventional weapons. It is necessary that a conventional bomb score a direct hit or a near miss of not more than a few feet to cause significant damage to a battleship. At Bikini the second bomb, bursting under water, sank a battleship immediately at a distance of well over 500 feet. It damaged an aircraft carrier so that it sank in a few hours, while another battleship sank after five days. The first bomb, bursting in air, did great harm to the superstructures of major ships within a half-mile radius, but did only minor damage to their hulls. No ship within a mile of either burst could have escaped without some damage to itself and serious injury to a large number of its crew.

Although lethal results might have been more or less equivalent, the radiological phenomena accompanying the two bursts were markedly different. In the case of the air-burst bomb, it seems certain that unprotected personnel within one mile would have suffered high casualties by intense neutron and gamma radiation as well as by blast and heat. Those surviving immediate effects would not have been amazed by radioactivity persisting after the burst.

In the case of the underwater explosion, the air-burst wave was far less intense and there was no heat wave of significance. Moreover, because of the absorption of neutrons and gamma rays by water, the lethal quality of the first flash of radiation was not of high order. But the second bomb threw large masses of highly radioactive water onto the decks and into the hulls of vessels. These contaminated ships became radioactive steves, and would have burned all living things aboard them with invisible and painless but deadly radiation.

It is too soon to attempt an analysis of all of the implications of the Bikini tests. But it is not too soon to point to the necessity for immediate and intensive research into several unique problems posed by the atomic bomb. The poisoning of large volumes of water presents such a problem. Study must be given to procedures for protecting not only ships' crews but also the populations of cities against such radiological effects as were demonstrated in Bikini lagoon.

Observations during the two tests have established the general types and range of effectiveness of air and shallow underwater atomic-bomb bursts on naval vessels, army material, including a wide variety of Quartermaster stores, and personnel. From these observations and from instrumental data it will now be possible to outline such changes, not only in military and naval design but also in strategy and tactics, as future events may indicate.

L. H. BIERETON
B. DEWEY
T. F. FARRELL
J. H. HOOVER
R. A. OFSTIE
J. H. STILWELL
K. T. COMPTON, CHAIRMAN

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F

INTERIM COMMITTEE

L O G

9 May 1945.

The first informal meeting of the Committee was held in the S/W's office for the purpose of explaining to the members the function of the Committee and to give them the general background of the project, the Quebec Agreement, the Combined Policy Committee, and the Combined Development Trust. The Secretary of War explained that the Committee had been established by him, with the approval of the President, to study and report on the matter of temporary war-time controls and publicity and to make recommendations on post-war research, development, and control, and on legislation necessary for these purposes. The Committee's recommendations were to be submitted to the S/W, and through him to the President. The full membership was announced as follows: The Secretary of War, Chairman; Hon. Ralph A. Bard, Dr. Vannevar Bush; Hon. James F. Byrnes; Hon. William L. Clayton; Dr. Karl T. Compton; Dr. James B. Conant; and Mr. George L. Harrison, Alternate Chairman. All were present except Dr. Conant. Mr. Bundy was present by invitation.

(See notes of Meeting)

14 May 1945.

Bard, Bush, Byrnes, Clayton, Harrison, and General Groves (by invitation) were present at the second meeting.

The Committee agreed that a Scientific Panel should be established to advise the Committee not only on technical matters but also on any other phase of the subject on which the Panel might care to express its views. Membership was designated as follows: Drs. A. H. Compton, E. O. Lawrence, J. R. Oppenheimer, Enrico Fermi.

It was suggested that a Military Panel might be organized with membership drawn from high levels in the Army and Navy. The Committee agreed that the views of representatives of those industries most directly concerned with the project should be obtained particularly with reference to the potentialities of industrial mobilization in this field in other countries, but that no Panel should be formalized.

At the suggestion of Harrison it was agreed that Lt. R. G. Arneson should be appointed Secretary of the Committee.

It was agreed that William L. Laurence, a science editor of the New York Times, now under contract with the Manhattan District, should work up drafts of public statements that would have to be made after the use of the weapon. Page was to review the drafts before presentation to the Committee.

(See Notes of Meeting)

18 May 1945.

At the third meeting Bard, Byrnes, Clayton, Conant, and Harrison were the members present. Arthur Page and General Groves

were present by invitation. Consideration was given to the draft statements of publicity, it being agreed that publicity concerning the test should be kept to a minimum, that following actual use the President should make only a short announcement to the effect that the weapon had been employed and the S/W should release a longer statement giving the general story of the project. Other releases should be made later concerning the details of the program.

It was understood that under the terms of the Quebec Agreement the U. S. was obligated to secure U. K. consent to use the weapon against a third party, no prior consent being necessary, however, in conducting local tests.

Harrison reported that the British were considering the establishment of a similar committee to consider publicity and post-war controls.

(See Notes of Meeting)

19 May 1945

Page was assigned the job of preparing the Presidential statement; Arneson, a draft of the S/W's statement.

22 May 1945

Bundy discussed with the S/W the desirability of inviting certain representatives of industry to discuss with the Committee their experiences in connection with the project. The S/W agreed that they should be heard.

24 May 1945.

Bundy received from Roger Makins a copy of a letter proposing the establishment of a parallel British committee. Views forthcoming of problems involved. Letter shown to Harrison for his information.

25-29 May 1945.

Arrangements completed for meeting with representatives from industry and with the scientific panel.

31 May 1945.

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All members were present at meeting with the four scientists. General Marshall, General Groves, Bundy, and Page present by invitation. (See Notes of Meeting)

1 June 1945.

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All members were present at meeting with the representatives of industry, these being George H. Bucher, President of Westinghouse; Walter S. Carpenter, President of Du Pont; James Rafferty, Vice President of Union Carbide; and James White, President of Tennessee Eastman. General Marshall, General Groves, Bundy, and Page were present by invitation. (See Notes of Meeting)

Copies of A. H. Compton Report were given to Committee members.

7 June 1945.

Harrison discussed with S/W the recommendations of the Committee agreed at the 31 May and 1 June meetings: (1) the

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present program, including Chicago, be continued at present levels for the duration of the war; (2) the bomb be used without prior warning against Japan at earliest opportunity, the targets to be a military target surrounded by workers houses; (3) a Military Panel be established, and (4) work be started promptly on legislation. The S/W was in agreement on (1) and (2). He did not favor establishing a Military Panel. With regard to (4) the S/W wanted first priority given to legislation for domestic control, with the problems of international relations and controls to be dealt with by the Permanent Post-War Commission that would be established by law.

12 June 1945.

Arneson met with A. H. Compton concerning a memorandum prepared by certain of the Chicago scientists on "Social and Political Problems."

13 June 1945.

Arneson delivered to, and discussed with, Byrnes copy of Quebec Agreement and other documents dealing with negotiations leading to the Agreement, with particular reference to exchange of information concerning plant and construction data. Documents revealed that no interchange was made on plant and construction information.

15 June 1945.

Arneson reported to Harrison on his discussions with Compton and Byrnes. Harrison decided that the Scientific Panel

and not the Committee should consider the memorandum from the Chicago scientists. ✓

Arneson turned over to Harrison the first draft of the proposed public statement of the S/W.

16 June 1945.

Harrison talked with A. H. Compton by telephone concerning the Chicago memorandum, stating that he thought the Committee should consider it only after the Scientific Panel had made its comments. Compton agreed and promised to have available for Committee consideration at the next meeting the views of the Panel on the subject memorandum. He also agreed to submit the Panel's recommendation as to the disposition of the Chicago group after the war.

18 June 1945.

Copies of draft statements for President and S/W sent to Groves' office for comment.

20 June 1945.

Arneson discussed with Considine suggested changes in statements. Some changes accepted and incorporated in redrafts. Suggestion that references to CPC and CDT be omitted in S/W statement was held in suspense pending consideration by the Committee.

21 June 1945.

All members, except S/W, present at sixth meeting of Committee. Groves, Bundy, and Page present by invitation. The draft statement for the President was approved with minor changes. It was agreed that specific references to CPC, CDT, and the Quebec Agreement should be omitted *in S/W statement.*

It was agreed that releases that would be necessary after the statement of the S/W was made public should be handled by Groves' organization in cooperation with Page.

(For other matters discussed see Notes of Meeting)

25 June 1945.

Discussions with the British led to the conclusion that the most appropriate manner in which to record British assent to our use of the weapon against Japan would be to make it a
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minute of the CPC.

26 June 1945.

Draft statements incorporating changes made in accordance with Committee decisions taken 21 June presented to the S/W by Harrison and Bundy. S/W approved both statements with minor verbal changes and authorized Bundy to make copies available to Makins.

Harrison presented a memo to the S/W outlining the Committee's view that the President, after consultation with the Prime Minister, should be prepared to tell the Russians at

the Conference that we were working on the weapon and expected to use it on Japan, but that he should not open up the question of international control for the present. S/W approved this recommendation and authorized Bundy to make a copy of this memo available to Makins.

Bundy handed copies of the Presidential and S/W statements and copy of memo to Makins.

27 June 1945.

Harrison wrote A. H. Compton informing him that Committee felt that the Scientific Panel should not be enlarged at this time to include Urey but that the Scientific Panel should hold itself free to receive any views that any scientists on the project might wish to present.

1 July 1945.

Bundy received from Makins certain suggested changes in the draft statements. Changes in President's statement were minor and were incorporated in a redraft. In the S/W's statement it was felt that the section dealing with the history of nuclear physics leading up to the war was incomplete and therefore inaccurate, that no mention should be made of the successfulness of several processes, and that Tolman, Chadwick, and Mackenzie should be cited as Scientific Advisers to CPC Members.

2 July 1945.

Arneson delivered to Byrnes copies of President's and S/W's statements, British suggestions, Harrison memo to S/W on Russia, Harrison to S/W transmitting Bard memo, and Bard memo to S/W concerning warning to Japan.

5 July 1945.

Arneson turned over to Kyle for delivery to Bundy at Potsdam sealed package containing copies of Quebec Agreement, Combined Development Trust Agreement, compilation of documents leading up to Quebec Agreement, President's statement, S/W's statement, and British suggestions.

6 July 1945.

At the seventh meeting of the Committee Bush, Compton, Conant, Harrison, and Groves (by invitation) were present. The British suggestions on the President's statement were accepted in toto. With regard to the S/W's statement, it was agreed to omit reference to processes by name; it was felt however that no purpose would be served by omitting reference to the fact that several processes had proven successful. It was also agreed to make only very general mention of the world wide interest and work in nuclear physics before the war started, without giving the names of any of the scientists who contributed during that period. Certain verbal changes were also accepted.

(See Notes of Meeting)

Harrison saw Makins at 3:00 P.M. and showed him the

changes we had made in line with the British suggestions.

7 July 1945.

Arneson delivered to Makins copies of the redrafts containing suggested British changes.

10 July 1945.

Further British suggestions received from Makins. Largely in the nature of changes consequential to the original amendments which we had accepted, these were incorporated in toto.

11 July 1945.

Redrafts incorporating further British suggestions delivered by Arneson to Makins' secretary. It was understood that Makins would make known to the Chancellor our acceptance of the suggestions.

16 July 1945.

At 8:00 A.M. E.W.T. Groves called Harrison reporting success of the test. At 9:00 A.M. Groves called in further details. Results even better than expected. Harrison prepared a cable to send to the S/W which he turned over to Pasco to prepare for transmittal. At 9:30 A.M. Harrison showed a copy of the cable to Lovett and then to Patterson. After Patterson's approval, Harrison authorized dispatch of cable at 11:15 A.M.

At 1:00 P.M. Consodine came over to show Harrison a copy of the statement that had been released to the local press in New Mexico at 11:00 A.M. M.W.T.

Harrison had tried to get in touch with Makins during the morning. At 3:00 P.M. Makins came over and was shown the telegram. Harrison told him about the press release that had been issued in New Mexico to cover the curiosity that had been aroused locally. It was agreed that Makins should inform Halifax immediately but only in very general terms to the effect that the test had been successful and that results had exceeded expectations. It was understood further that Chadwick's report would be transmitted to Makins through Groves.

17 July 1945.

Groves called Harrison from Nashville at 2:00 A.M. E.W.T. reporting that he would arrive in Washington about 1:00 P.M.

Harrison advised Bard of the success of the test at 9:00 A.M.; K.T. Compton, at 9:30 A.M.; Page, at 1:00 P.M.

At 2:00 P.M. with Page, Consodine, Mrs. O'Leary and Arneson present, Groves reported to Harrison the results of the test in some detail. All evidence points to much greater success than had been expected. No casualties occurred and the speculation aroused locally was successfully taken care of by the local press release. Consodine stated that he thought the story was of only one day's interest and would not give rise to any difficulties later.

Groves said that he felt a news story should be released in New Mexico after actual use giving information in general terms about the test. He also suggested a minor verbal change in the President's statement.

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By E.R.C. M.H. date 5-18-73

~~TOP SECRET~~
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In the presence of the group Harrison prepared a cable to the S/W in line with Groves report. Cable given to Pascoe at 4:15 P.M. for dispatch.

18 July 1945.

General Royall and Marbury met with Harrison and Arneson. The bill which Royall and Marbury had drafted was read and discussed in general terms. It was learned that General Groves has had two young lawyers, Lts. George S. Allan and George L. Duff, working on legislation for some period and that they had compiled a most useful document of background material which Royall and Marbury have found most useful. Harrison called Groves to suggest that Allan and Duff should sit in on the meeting on the 19th during discussion of draft. Groves agreed to have them present.

19 July 1945.

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At the ninth meeting of the Committee Bush, Compton, Conant, and Harrison were the members present; Groves, Royall, Marbury, Allan and Duff were present by invitation. The principle topic for consideration was the draft bill.

(See Notes of Meeting)

Makins handed to Harrison a proposed statement to be made by Churchill after use of the weapon with a request for comment and criticism. Groves and Harrison went over the statement

together and concluded that they had no objection to it provided present conditions did not change.

20 July 1945.

In accord with the decision of the Interim Committee at the 19 July meeting the memorandum drafted by Bush and Conant for dispatch to the Scientific Panel from the Committee was sent out to the members of the Panel with certain verbal changes incorporated. A letter of appreciation and congratulations was also sent to Oppenheimer by Harrison on behalf of the S/W and the Committee.

Harrison met with Makins to report that he and Groves saw no objection to the proposed statement of the Prime Minister, provided present conditions did not change, and that he was prepared to recommend that the S/W approve the release if it was finally decided by the British that they wanted to use it. Harrison requested that final approval of our public statements be cleared promptly in view of the fact that the time is growing short. Makins promised to report our wishes to London immediately. As regards the scientific release Makins indicated that while his government did not like the idea of a scientific release it was willing to consider the rules of release approved and raise no objection to the statement provided Chadwick certified

that it came within the rules.

Bush indicated his dissatisfaction with the Royall/Marbury draft and suggested that his comments and a copy of the Foundation bill should be sent up to Allan and Duff for their consideration. Arneson arranged for this to be done. Allan and Duff explained to Arneson when he called them that Royall had given them only a limited objective to work on, namely, that they were to make only minor changes in the draft along the general lines of the discussion of the Committee on 19 July without changing the basic approach of the document. On being informed of this, Bush expressed the view that further discussion concerning the basic approach would be necessary, but that in any event his comments and the Foundation bill should be sent up to Allan and Duff for their use before they returned on Monday. Allan and Duff indicated to Arneson over the telephone that they had some doubts about the basic approach of the Royall/Marbury bill and proposed to submit a memorandum on that point to Royall when they came down on Monday.

25 July 1945.

Makins saw Harrison this morning. He explained that the situation with regard to the clearance of the public statements of the President and the Secretary of War as reflected in Harrison's memorandum of 20 July remained unchanged. He had cabled London

of our desire to secure speedy clearance and had received a reply stating that while the Prime Minister's advisers approved the statements Churchill might want to discuss the matter at Potsdam. Harrison pointed out that the time was growing short and that he was prepared to recommend release of the statements without the specific approval of the Prime Minister should the "use" date make this necessary. Makins remarked that if he were in Harrison's place he would do the same under the circumstances. Harrison suggested that the British should also feel free to release their statement without specific approval from our highest level if events make this necessary after our statements had been made public.

As regards the "scientific" release Makins stated there was nothing new to report. Accordingly, it is assumed that the decision taken by the Combined Policy Committee at its last meeting stands unaltered.

Harrison suggested a minor change in the draft letter to Halifax concerning the agreement concluded with Brazil. This change states that "the interest of the United Kingdom was disclosed to the Brazilian Government at these negotiations." Makins stated that he was in agreement with the proposed change. Harrison said that he wished to await the return of the Secretary of State or at least the Secretary of War before giving final clearance to the exchange of letters.

Marbury turned over to Harrison copies of the third draft of a bill to establish a Commission on Atomic Energy. He explained that perhaps 75 percent of Bush's objections had been met in the redraft. A copy was sent to Bush for further comment. One was also sent to Groves' office for dispatch to Conant. Bard saw a copy this afternoon and returned it without comment.

Considine discussed with Arneson the mechanics of releasing the statements. He suggested that the President's statement should be turned over to the President's press secretary, Charles Ross, for any final changes that might be deemed necessary and for distribution to the press. The S/W statement can be mimeographed on machines being arranged for by Considine.

27 July 1945.

Considine reported that arrangements have been¹ made through Col. Matthews (temporarily assigned to Groves' organization from BPR) to release the S/W statement through BPR, and that a specially guarded mimeograph room of the AGO can be used to run off copies.

Arneson discussed with Harrison an addition to the S/W statement, suggested by Matthews and Moynahan, to the effect that the War Department was to be the sole releasing agency for information on the project. Harrison agreed to bring this point up in going over changes with the S/W.

Pago and Arneson made certain changes in the Presidential statement which gear into the Potsdam proclamation of 26 July. These changes were approved by Harrison.

28 July 1945.

Makins reported to Harrison by telephone this morning that the proposed statement of the Prime Minister had not been approved in London. In view of the election results it was assumed that certain changes would need to be made. It was expected that the changes when made would be cabled to Washington.

Makins had no further word on our two statements but assumed that Bundy would be able to report on this matter when he returned.

As regards the scientific statement, Makins stated that both he and Chadwick were much concerned about the amount of information it revealed.

*Summary
Report* →

R.G.A.

20 July 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

The attached document was handed to me yesterday afternoon by Mr. Roger Makins. It is a draft of a statement prepared for release by the Prime Minister after "Use Day" and he thinks it is now in the possession of the Prime Minister at Potsdam. He wanted to know if I had any comments or criticism to make. I told him I would like to go over it carefully and see him today.

In the meantime I showed it to General Groves and we both agreed that there is no objection to it as we could see in the light of present conditions. Accordingly, when Mr. Makins came to see me this afternoon I told him that neither General Groves or I saw any objections to the draft and that if the Prime Minister decided he wants to use it I would be glad to recommend to Secretary Stimson that he give his consent or that he attempt to procure consent from higher levels if that is the consent of the Quebec Agreement. *(initials)*

Mr. Makins said that was very satisfactory to him and he would advise London that General Groves and I have read it, that we see no objection and that we will be prepared to recommend favorably (if present conditions are not changed) if we hear further from him that the Prime Minister decides that he wants to use the statement.

In this connection I told Mr. Makins as I understand it we have not received any formal approval of our draft of statement for the President and Secretary Stimson, that the time may be getting short and that I hoped I would be able to clear the record so there would be no question about

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"mutual" consent as to the statements. He said the statements have been approved by the British here in Washington and by Sir John Anderson and that he has no doubt that for all practical purposes they are finally approved. But as Ambassador Halifax said at the last meeting of the Policy Committee the Prime Minister himself might want to consider them and that he, Mr. Makins, would not therefore want to say right now that they were consented to by the British. He stated, however, in view of our desire to clear the record as to those two statements he would cable London in the hope that we could get a formal consent from whomever it may be necessary to receive such consent.

As to the third statement which I proposed to issue, the so-called "Scientific Statement", I reminded Mr. Makins that in accordance with the action of the Policy Committee all that is necessary is a certificate from Sir James Chadwick that the statement comes within the rules with British and Americans concerning such a release. He indicated that the memorandum which he left with me yesterday and which I delivered to General Groves today was intended to indicate that while the British did not like the idea of a scientific release nevertheless if we decided to issue it they would consider the rules approved so that the only question remaining is whether Sir James Chadwick will certify that the proposed statement comes within the rules.

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MEMO FOR THE RECORD

August 6, 1945.

When the four o'clock news release came out, Mr. Harrison called General Surles and told him he was surprised to see so many releases on the big bomb. Mr. Harrison told General Surles that it was his opinion that only the President's and the Secretary's releases were to have been issued today. General Surles stated that there had been several, in addition, that had come over from General Groves' office. He instructed General Surles to issue no more statements until he had cleared with the Secretary or Mr. Harrison.

Mr. Harrison then called General Groves and expressed surprise at the number of releases. General Groves stated that he was surprised also and that he agreed that no more should be put out. Mr. Harrison issued instructions to General Groves that no more releases would be issued until they had been cleared with the Secretary or Mr. Harrison in the Secretary of War's absence. Mr. Harrison also talked to Colonel Consodine and gave him the same orders.

W.H.K.

W.H.K.

18 August 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

I showed the attached letter[✓] and memorandum to Secretary Byrnes and emphasized that the subject matter in Paragraph 1B was a matter which would probably require early consideration and decision by the Administration, especially in view of the Oppenheimer letter addressed to Secretary Stimson and dated August 17 which he read. He was so interested in it that he asked me to leave a copy with him; this I did. Secretary Byrnes was definitely of the opinion that it would be difficult to do anything on the international level at the present time and that in his opinion we should continue the Manhattan Project with full force, at least until Congress has acted on the proposed Bill. He also said that we should continue our efforts and negotiations in behalf of the Combined Development Trust. In his opinion the whole situation justifies and requires a continuation of all our efforts on all fronts to keep ahead of the race. For that reason, he said that he would ask the President to sign a memorandum which Mr. Warbury and General Groves are to prepare requesting Mr. Snyder, Director of Mobilization, formally to approve a continuation of all necessary expenditures by the Manhattan District or by the Combined Development Trust.

Secretary Byrnes felt so strongly about all of this that he requested me to tell Dr. Oppenheimer for the time being his proposal about an international agreement was not practical and that he and the rest of the gang should pursue their work full force. I told Secretary Byrnes that I understood from Dr. Oppenheimer the scientists prefer not to do that (superbomb) unless ordered or directed to do so by the Government on the grounds of national policy. I thought, however, work in the Manhattan District could proceed the way he wants in improving present techniques without raising the question of the "super" at least until after Congress has acted on our proposed Bill.

GEORGE L. HARRISON

29 August 1945.

Harrison met with the Secretary of State at 9:30 and left with him the following papers:-

1. History of Negotiations Leading to the Quebec Agreement.
2. The Quebec Agreement.
3. The Combined Development Trust Agreement.
4. Minutes of the Combined Policy Committee.
5. Aide Memoire between F.D.R. and W.C.
6. Membership and Terms of Reference of British Advisory Committee on Tube Alloys.

R.G.A.

September 8, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES:

Mr. McCloy went to the State Department this morning to see Mr. Acheson at 9:00 o'clock. Before leaving, I asked him please to press Mr. Acheson on starting the Atomic Energy bill on its way. I emphasized how important it is and especially in view of the fact that other Congressmen, both Senators and Representatives, are preparing, or talking about preparing, their own individual bills.

I reminded Mr. McCloy of our conversation with Secretary Byrnes last Sunday, September 2, when it was understood between us all (Mr. Acheson being present) that the State Department would carry the ball rather than the Interim Committee or the War Department.

I also told Mr. McCloy of my two conversations with Mr. Acheson during this week when I urged upon him the necessity of prompt action. Mr. Acheson seemed to think that he needed more authority from the Secretary of State but I reminded him that in our conversations with Secretary Byrnes it seemed to be clearly understood that the State Department would proceed with the introduction and handling of the bill in the Congress. On the second day I spoke to Mr. Acheson (September 6, 1945) I called to his attention the fact that the newspapers were already talking about individual Members of Congress introducing their own bills and

that I thought it very important that we proceed as fast as possible. Mr. Acheson said to me that he would look into it and see what he could do about hurrying it.

When Mr. McCloy returned this morning he got exactly the same impression that I did, that Mr. Acheson was very timid about it, that he doesn't know what committee to turn to or to whom he should go for the introduction of the bill. Mr. McCloy reminded him that that was now the State Department's job but that if he wanted any advice or help from any of us over here, either the Interim Committee or the War Department would be glad to give it to him. This was in accordance with our agreement with Secretary Byrnes.

GEORGE L. HARRISON

11 September 1945.

Herbert Marks, an assistant to Mr. Acheson, came over to see Arneson at 4:15 P. M. He had been unable to find at the State Department certain of the documents which Harrison had taken over to Secretary Byrnes on 29 August. Marks read in Arneson's office the Quebec Agreement, the Combined Development Trust Agreement, the 8 March 1945 Minutes of the Combined Policy Committee, and certain of the papers in the Brazilian file. These documents cleared up any doubts he had about the joint participation of the United Kingdom in our agreement with Brazil and he saw no reason why the exchange of letters between the British and ourselves should not go forward. He stated, however, that Mr. Acheson probably would want the transmittal letter signed by the Secretary of War and redrafted to include a paragraph tying the exchange of letters with the British into the Quebec Agreement, The Combined Development Trust Agreement, and the Minutes of the Combined Policy Committee. He proposed to redraft the letter along these lines and send it over for the Secretary of War's signature.

As to legislation, Marks stated that Acheson wanted to discuss the proposed bill with Harrison at some length and that Marks would probably want to discuss it with Arneson in the next day or so.

A.

12 September 1945.

Harrison spoke with the Secretary of War this morning concerning relations with Russia on the atomic bomb and the problem of securing action on the proposed legislation. Harrison handed the Secretary Dr. Oppenheimer's letter which strongly argues for a positive approach to Russia. With regard to legislation, Mr. Harrison gave the Secretary a memorandum setting forth the present status and expressing concern over the failure of the State Department to take action. In elaboration of his memorandum, Harrison pointed out that General Groves is having difficulty retaining his best scientists because of continuing uncertainty as to the future course of the government in this field and attractive employment offers from universities. The Secretary made a note of this point on the memorandum from Harrison which he took with him to the White House.

The Secretary discussed both of these matters with the President at 3:00 P.M. and left with him the memorandum on relations with Russia, the Oppenheimer letter, and Harrison's memorandum on the legislative situation.

Captain Davis, who has been working with Harbury on the bill, and Lt. Arneson met with Marks from the State Department at 3:15 P.M. to brief him on the background of the legislation. When he left Marks stated that he felt he had an adequate picture of the thinking that had gone into the various provisions of the bill but

gave no indication when he thought action would be taken by the State Department. He expressed the opinion that the next step probably would be for the President to call in the Secretary of War and the Acting Secretary of State to talk the matter over.

R.G.A.

September 14, 1945.

MEMORANDUM for the files:

At the request of the Secretary, I called on Mr. Acheson at 2:30 P. M. yesterday, September 13th, to give to him a copy of the Secretary's memorandum on the atomic bomb and Russia as well as a copy of his covering letter to the President. Incidentally, I brought at the same time the Secretary's letter to Mr. Acheson on British participation in the Brazilian contract.

Mr. Acheson said that he agrees with the Secretary's position vis-a-vis Russia. He still is concerned about introducing the proposed bill because it will raise international questions which are still officially undecided so far as he is concerned. I told him that in the circumstances as long as the President and Mr. Byrnes and the War Department are all in agreement that the bill should be introduced at once, perhaps it would be wise for him to talk to the President himself if he feels he needs further authority or background. He said he might do that. It was clear, however, that he is now impressed with the necessity of quick action.

Concerning the letter of Mr. Stimson to him on the subject of the Brazilian contract, he asked whether I thought it would be necessary for him to get the approval of the President before he signed it. I said that was a matter for him to decide but that if he wanted my personal opinion, I would think it was unnecessary

inasmuch as the arrangement for participation with the British has been definitely included in accordance with the records referred to in Mr. Stimson's letter. Both he and Mr. Marks, who was present during part of the conversation, agreed that that was probably right. At any rate, they indicated that they would not take it up with the President. Mr. Marks telephoned me later in the afternoon to ask whether it would not be possible for the State Department to have the use of Lt. Arneson in the matter of handling the bill. I told him there was no need of any formal assignment of that kind, that Mr. McCloy and I had already told Mr. Byrnes that the War Department would be glad in any way possible to help in the matter of the bill if the State Department wanted us. Mr. Marks said that was quite satisfactory.

GEORGE L. HARRISON

REF

14 September 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

A copy of the Agreement entered into between the United States Government and the Government of Brazil was transmitted to the British Embassy by letter dated August 27 from Secretary Byrnes to Mr. J. Balfour, Charge d'Affaires. On September 5 Mr. Harrison discussed with Mr. Acheson by telephone the need for an exchange of letters with the British recording their joint participation in this Agreement under the terms of the Combined Development Trust Agreement and the decisions taken at the Combined Policy Committee meetings of March 8 and July 4, 1945. In accordance with this conversation, the attached * letter dated September 5 was sent to Mr. Acheson from Mr. Harrison transmitting the draft letter to be sent to the British Ambassador. Copies of the basic papers pertinent to this matter, namely - the Quebec Agreement, the Combined Development Trust Agreement, Aide-Memoire of Hyde Park conversations, History of negotiations leading to the Quebec Agreement, Minutes of the CPC, and membership of British Advisory Committee on tube alloys - had been handed to Secretary Byrnes by Mr. Harrison on August 29. Presumably Mr. Acheson and Mr. Marks, his assistant, were unable to find these materials in the State Department files. Mr. Marks came over to discuss the question with Mr. Harrison and on September 11 met with Lt. Arneson to go over the basic documents in order to fix in mind the nature of our agreements with the British on joint acquisition of certain materials. The upshot was that the letter of September 5 was redrafted in the State Department to include references to the Quebec Agreement, the Combined Development Trust Agreement, and the decisions of the CPC on British participation in the Agreement with Brazil. This letter as finally signed by the Secretary of War and dispatched to the State Department is attached. *

R. Gordon Arneson

R. GORDON ARNESON
1st Lieutenant AUS.

Original with attachments
in S-1 BRAZIL file.

D.G.A.

B F

September 18, 1945.

MEMORANDUM:

I had a long talk with Dr. Conant about the letter from him dated August 24th* when he was in town on September 12th. I told him that I personally was fearful of publication of statements on the political aspects of the bomb at this time. My reason was largely that the Secretary was even at that time trying to "sell" a point of view to the President, a point of view with which I knew that he and the scientists would agree. I pointed out that there were others in the Administration, however, who felt differently, and for him, Conant, to make a public statement just now might have the adverse effect of appearing to take sides.

With this point of view, Dr. Conant was in complete agreement. He was very pleased to know of the Secretary's position and especially pleased that he was taking it up with the President.

Later on in the afternoon when the Secretary saw Dr. Conant and Dr. Bush he told them of the apparent success of his mission to the President. They were delighted.

Incidentally, I told him of Oppenheimer's letter and the enclosed memorandum of his Mexico group urging an immediate political settlement. They asked that the Interim Committee authorize its public release. My position was - and Conant agreed with this too - that it was not a function for the Interim Committee to approve the release. In view of what I had already said to him, he thought that it would be a mistake in any event. I told him that I would talk with Oppenheimer and his group this week when they come to Washington.

GEORGE L. HARRISON

* Letter in "Interim Committee - Publicity" file.

18 September 1945.

Marks called Harrison this morning and reported that Acheson would like to see Oppenheimer when he comes to Washington toward the end of the week. If possible, Acheson said he would like to meet with the entire Scientific Panel in the event they are available in Washington. Harrison said he would look into the matter. Harrison wants to check with General Groves before he gives an affirmative reply to Acheson.

R.G.A.

R.G.A.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES:

Dr. Oppenheimer and I called on Acting Secretary of State Acheson yesterday afternoon (September 24th) at 2:30 P.M. Mr. Marks was present. At the beginning of the meeting, we went over Mr. Acheson's proposed statement to the President on the matter of negotiations with Russia concerning the control of the atomic bomb. On the whole, it was an excellent statement and, for our records only, was in substance a paraphrase of Secretary Stimson's statement.

He went pretty far in stating that the evidence seems to be that sooner or later it will be possible to improve the bomb to a point of world destruction, igniting the atmosphere, etc. Both Oppenheimer and I thought this was unnecessarily drastic as the evidence thus far merely indicates that perhaps that might some day be true but it is not likely.

A good part of the discussion, which lasted over two hours in all, related to the possibility of separating the types of information which might be given to the Russians. Query: Is it possible to say that we will give them virtually all of the scientific data but none of the technical information regarding the manufacture of material or the production of the bomb? Dr. Oppenheimer said he thought that it was possible to make this distinction; although, to be fair, he said he believed that sooner or later, these processes or other processes would also be available to the Russians by their own effort.

However, I pointed out that for practical and political reasons it was both possible and wise to draw the line of distinction between the two classes of information. As to this, both Oppenheimer and Acheson agreed.

Dr. Oppenheimer philosophized at great length about the work of the scientists, their objectives, their prejudices and their hopes. There is a distinct opposition on their part to doing any more work on any bomb -- not merely a super bomb but any bomb. However, as he pointed out in the letter which he had previously sent to the Secretary of War and a copy of which was given to Secretary Byrnes, if the Government, for political or security reasons, thought such work was necessary they would, of course, comply. He says that much of the restiveness in his laboratory is not so much due to the delay in legislation as to a feeling of uncertainty as to whether they are going to be asked to continue perfecting the bomb against the dictates of their hearts and spirits. This is true particularly in terms of a better one, but the feeling persists even as to continuing the manufacture of the present one. Mr. Acheson seemed much interested in this. Dr. Oppenheimer did point out, however, that the introduction and passage of the legislation would no doubt be helpful in the sense of giving some direction and certainty as to the future of their work and research.



GEORGE L. HARRISON

25 September 1945.

Mr. Harrison and Dr. Oppenheimer had a meeting with Secretary Patterson at 9:30 A. M. in order for the Secretary to get the views of the scientists.

The Secretary showed Dr. Oppenheimer a copy of his letter to the President. Dr. Oppenheimer was in complete accord with the views expressed and suggested only one minor change which the Secretary accepted. This suggestion was that in the last paragraph the phrase "industrial processes" be changed to "secret ordnance procedures", the point being that the former phrase is too broad and would cover many peaceful commercial aspects of the program concerning which it probably would be found desirable to divulge information.

Mr. Harrison suggested that the Secretary would probably want to see General Groves and obtain his views which are quite different from those of the scientists.

B F

1 October 1945

Secretary Patterson and Mr. Harrison met with Judge Rosenman at 5:00 P.M. Secretary Patterson recommended the short form of message but stated that, if it were the opinion of the Congressional leaders that the long form would be better, he would raise no objection.

October 3, 1945.

With the approval of the President and in accordance with arrangements made by Secretary Patterson, a meeting was held in the office of Speaker Rayburn at 4:00 P.M. yesterday. There were present Speaker Rayburn, Senator Barkley, Under Secretary Acheson, Judge Rosenman, Secretary Patterson and myself. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the President's message on atomic energy. More specifically it was to determine whether the so-called long form of message, that is, the one which included a discussion of the international aspects as well as the bill itself, would delay or expedite the passage of the bill. All agreed that early enactment was essential. The only question was whether the last two or three pages of the message dealing with the international aspects of this field would unnecessarily delay the legislation. Both Mr. Patterson and I stated specifically that we were in favor of the President's general position on the international situation and that we had no substantial objections to the paragraphs dealing with this phase as written in the long form of the message.

After reading the bill over twice in detail, both Senator Barkley and Speaker Rayburn said that they felt that discussion and debate on the foreign aspects of atomic energy, and especially the bomb, have proceeded so far that it would be impossible to isolate discussion in either the House or the Senate and confine it to the

enactment of a bill aimed only at domestic control. In other words, they both felt that the long form of message would probably help rather than hurt the passage of the bill.

Secretary Patterson stated that this decision satisfied him entirely, that his only hesitation was on the enactment of the bill itself, that he did not differ with the views expressed in the last paragraphs per se, and that if they, the Congressional leaders, felt that it was better to handle it the way they proposed he had no further question about it.

After the meeting broke up at 5:15 P. M., Senator Barkley and Speaker Rayburn suggested that Secretary Patterson and I call on Senator Johnson, who is now the ranking member of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, and tell him that the message and the bill will both be coming up today. This we did. Senator Johnson was very cooperative and helpful and said he would be pleased to introduce the bill precisely in the form that it is sent to him and that he would do so immediately after the message was delivered.

GEORGE L. HARRISON

3 October 1945

Mr. Harrison talked with Dr. Bush and Dr. Conant by telephone this morning and informed them of the current situation with regard to the introduction of the legislation. He reviewed for them the state of affairs as reflected in Mr. Harrison's memorandum for the record of this date.

3 October 1945

At the request of General Greenbaum, Lt. Arneson sat in on a meeting in General Greenbaum's office with Paul Tobenkin, a labor reporter from the New York Herald Tribune, who had a labor story concerning the Manhattan Engineer District which he wanted to publish. General Greenbaum stated that the War Department would very much prefer that the story not be published until the bill going before Congress today had been passed by both Houses, for fear that to inject any labor problems into the picture at this stage might possibly cause delay in the bill. Mr. Tobenkin agreed to this.

Mr. Tobenkin raised the question whether security considerations would continue to be controlling over any program of unionization in these plants after the bill became law. General Greenbaum replied that while security would be relaxed

it would certainly remain an important factor but that he did not know to what extent it would affect the labor situation.

General Greenbaum arranged for copies of an exchange of correspondence with Mr. Herzog, Chairman of NLRB, to be sent to Mr. Tobenkin from which he can quote in his article when it is released. This was checked by telephone with Mr. Herzog, who had no objection.

4 October 1945

Secretary Forrestal called Secretary Patterson yesterday to inquire why the Navy Department had not seen the bill before it went to Congress. Commodore Strauss raised the same question with General Greenbaum. On being asked about this, Mr. Harrison explained that Mr. Bard, as a member of the Interim Committee, had been in on all discussions of the bill and had been given copies of several of the various drafts. This log shows, for example, that a copy of the third draft was given to Mr. Bard by Mr. Harrison on July 25 and that Mr. Bard returned this copy the same day without comment. It should be pointed out that at this time Mr. Bard was no longer Under Secretary of the Navy but at the request of Secretary Forrestal he continued to be a member of the Interim Committee. Mr. Harrison explained to Secretary Patterson further that at about this same time he suggested to Mr. Bard that he, Mr. Harrison, see Secretary Forrestal to bring him up to date on the bill and the project generally. Mr. Bard reported back that Secretary Forrestal saw no necessity for so doing and felt that Mr. Bard could keep him adequately informed. Accordingly the matter was dropped.

The foregoing was explained to the Navy by Secretary Patterson and by General Greenbaum yesterday. Today Secretary Forrestal called Secretary Patterson and stated that this recital of facts was correct and that the complaint of the previous day was unjustified.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES:

I went over to the State Department with Judge Patterson and at his request reviewed the situation concerning the Combined Policy Committee: first, the lack of an American Joint Secretary; second, changes in U. S. membership; and, third, the request of the British for a meeting, if possible, on Saturday of this week.

Judge Patterson raised the question whether now is not the time to consider revamping or doing away with the Quebec Agreement. Forrestal was of the opinion that this should be done (though I think he has never seen the Quebec Agreement). Byrnes was a little hesitant, feeling, as I did, that there may be some advantage in not changing the Agreement just now. My argument was that the period during which we were obliged to comply with the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Agreement was now over, and that paragraph 4, which gives us all the commercial advantages and rights except to the extent that the President might make specific arrangements with the British with respect thereto, might be favorable to us during a period of discussion of the international situation. All present agreed with this point of view. It was suggested, however, that we consider what, if any, changes might be recommended at the meeting next Saturday.

All present felt that it was important that there be representation of the State Department in the American membership. Secretary Byrnes said he would like to be a member himself, and that he would be glad to attend the meeting next Saturday as suggested by the British.

11 October 1945.

Secretary Patterson spoke to me this morning about the report in the newspapers of the action of the Oak Ridge scientists in urging Congress to give much time and study to the pending bill before taking action. They proposed, I think, that it be referred to a special joint committee of the two Houses. I told the Secretary that while I had not seen the article I had talked with Dr. Conant, who was much concerned and who felt that we ought to have a meeting of the Scientific Panel if only to give them the opportunity to try to bring the scientific group together. Mr. Patterson felt that this was an excellent idea and asked me if I wouldn't call Oppenheimer with a view to having the Scientific Panel meet here in Washington with him and then to discuss ways and means of presenting their views to Congress and of dealing with the recalcitrant members of the scientific group in Oak Ridge and Chicago. I called Dr. Oppenheimer and told him that we were much concerned by the publicity this morning and asked him whether he did not think it was a good idea to have a meeting. He agreed that it would be and that he thought it might be helpful if, as I suggested, some of the panel could go to Oak Ridge after the meeting to have a confidential talk with the group there as a whole. He said that he had heard last week before he left Washington that the outburst was to come, that he had told General Groves

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of it and of his conversation with Szilard, who apparently is the leader of the objectors. I asked what Szilard's objectives were. He said that Szilard feels that it is his personal obligation to tell all the Senators and Congressmen he can find of his views, that he feels that the meeting in Chicago last month gave him the assignment of propagandizing Washington in favor of his views. I asked Oppenheimer what those views were. He said that his principal objective was to be sure that the doors in the international field were not closed. After the President's message to Congress the doors seemed fairly wide open, so Szilard changed his tune to one of concern about the extraordinary powers which the bill contains, heavy penalties, the possibility of competing corporations, etc. Oppenheimer says he regards Szilard's objections as being trivial, except possibly his complaint about the extensive powers.

I then asked Oppenheimer if in the circumstances he would be willing to send a telegram on behalf of the Scientific Panel, giving his views about the legislation and the urgency for early passage. He said he would be glad to do that though he wasn't sure of Fermi's views, but that he would either send a telegram representing the views of all four or of the individual members who feel as he does. I then talked about the need for an early meeting of the panel as a whole to discuss what steps might be taken to straighten out the situation at Oak Ridge.

Oppenheimer thought this a good idea, especially as he feels that Szilard really doesn't represent the views of the Oak Ridge group as a whole and that the Scientific Panel might have considerable influence as against Szilard in setting them straight.

About Noon, I called General Groves and told him of the problem of the Oak Ridge group and that Secretary Patterson, Conant and I thought it was necessary to convene the Scientific Panel fairly promptly for the purposes outlined above. General Groves said he thought the situation was serious and that it was an excellent idea to get a statement from the Panel and to have them convene, if possible, with a view to discussing ways and means of bringing the whole group more nearly together.

I called Oppenheimer again and told him of my conversation with Groves and that we would like to have a statement from the Panel by telegram as promptly as possible; that if it were not possible to get the Panel as a whole to agree to such a statement that we would like to have individual statements from them, especially Oppenheimer, Lawrence and Compton. Oppenheimer said that he would be very glad to try to accomplish this by telephone; that in any event he would send me a telegram from himself if he couldn't do more. I then said that in view of the fact that he has to be in New Mexico Tuesday and back in Washington on Wednesday, I wouldn't ask him to bring the group together in Washington before next Wednesday. He was very appreciative and said that he would attempt to do this.

Later in the afternoon, Dr. Lawrence telephoned me from Berkeley, California, saying that Oppenheimer had been in touch with him, that he was glad to sign a statement about the importance of early passage of the bill, and that either Oppenheimer would send a telegram for both of them or each of them separately, depending on how circumstances developed. He stated that he did not know whether Dr. Compton or Dr. Fermi would join in a statement. In discussing the importance of the meeting of the Panel he said that, if we really wanted him to, he would be glad to be here next Wednesday when Oppenheimer arrives.

Telephone conversation with Oppenheimer
at 4:00 P.M., October 11, 1945.

Oppenheimer: I am sorry to bother you again. But let me report to you. First, all members of the Panel will be in Washington by Wednesday evening and they will meet there with anyone you want on Thursday.

Harrison: First rate, and I am very grateful.

Oppenheimer: If there should be any change in the situation I think that you should let the Panel people know, or let me know, because for several of them it is not very convenient.

Harrison: I shall do that.

Oppenheimer: Lawrence and Fermi are glad to send a

telegram along the lines we wanted to send. Compton says that he is not sufficiently aware of the reason for haste to be willing to sign but he would look into this matter next week. Under these circumstances, shall I sign the telegram with the three names and leave the fourth off?

Harrison: Well, I should think so.

Oppenheimer: I thought so but I wasn't quite certain whether the absence of a single name would be disturbing.

Harrison: That is all right.

Oppenheimer: Lauritzen called me from Pasadena and said he has been asked to approve a message urging delay and deliberation by Hutchins' organization and he called me in great agitation. He is sending them a wire saying he doesn't approve and he wanted me also to support this telegram. I wasn't sure whether it would be appropriate for me to do this.

Harrison: Well, I think it wouldn't be best to associate him with your telegram, because we can say these are three members of the Panel.

Oppenheimer: All right, I will send out the wire in a few minutes.

16 October 1945

The columnist, Marquis Childs, called Mr. Harrison concerning an communication alleged to have been sent by "40 scientists" to the War Department protesting against the Johnson-May bill. Mr. Harrison explained that he had no knowledge of such a protest and had been unable to find anyone in the War Department who did. Mr. Childs stated that he had no real information on the matter but that he was simply trying to track down a rumor.

16 October 1945

Mr. Harrison had a talk with Secretary Patterson this morning on the question of reopening the House Committee hearings on the bill. Mr. Harrison stated his conviction that the War Department should not object to the reopening of hearings. He felt that there would be considerable advantage in taking a little more time in the House for it would probably save much time later in the Senate. With this view, Secretary Patterson strongly concurred.

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17 October 1945

Dr. Oppenheimer, Dr. Fermi, Mr. Harrison, General Groves, General Royall, and Lt. Arneson met with Secretary Patterson from 2:30 to 3:30 P.M. to discuss the growing disaffection of the scientists to the Johnson-May bill and to consider means of securing their support. Dr. Oppenheimer stated that he thought the differences in viewpoint among the scientists were not major. He very much preferred to talk with Szilard, Anderson, and Urey before they testified on Thursday to try to get some basic agreement on the bill rather than run the risk of a public wrangle with them at the Hearing.

Secretary Patterson pointed out that those scientists who are opposed to the bill did not realize that by delaying action and raising all sorts of objections to the present bill they may very well end up with a much more stringent measure than is now before the Committee. The temper of Congress and of the country is in the direction of even more controls and the preservation of the so-called "secrets". As to the argument that the international control situation should be considered first, Secretary Patterson pointed out that this was an impossibility, that domestic control was imperative before we would be in a position to consider the international questions involved. He pointed out further that the President and the Secretary of State would be more alive to the need for international arrangements than Congress.

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Dr. Fermi expressed concern about the muzzling of private research which he saw inherent in the bill in its present form. To this point Gen. Royall replied that he thought there were adequate safeguards now in the bill to prevent the Commission from interfering with private fundamental research which did not constitute a national hazard, but that certain clarifying amendments which would put the matter more positively had been drawn up and would be presented to the Committee. These amendments were adapted from the suggestions made by Dr. Dubridge and his associates and would be presented to the Committee by Gen. Royall on Friday when it meets in executive session. In so doing, Gen. Royall said he would tell the Committee that these amendments were very much wanted by the scientists, that they would go a long way toward getting the support of the scientists, and that the War Department had no objection to them.

It was agreed that Dr. Oppenheimer should talk to the scientists who planned to testify against the bill and try to head off a public dispute. It was felt by all present that the proposed amendment would help in doing this and that Dr. Oppenheimer should discuss these amendments with them. If it were not possible to secure a relatively united front with these scientists, Secretary Patterson felt that Dr. Oppenheimer should be prepared to testify on Thursday.

The meeting then adjourned to Mr. Harrison's office where the amendments were considered in detail. It was generally agreed that the amendments were a major improvement in the bill and would help meet the more reasonable objections that had been raised by the scientists.

1 November 1945

Secretary Patterson sent a letter to Secretary Byrnes strongly urging that the State Department undertake a thorough examination of the international phases of atomic energy in preparation for the Attlee conference. He mentioned particularly the problem of the war-time Quebec Agreement and its relation to the post-war situation. While stating that this was a State Department matter, he offered the assistance of the War Department in pulling the facts together.

Following up this letter, Secretary Patterson had an hour's conference with Secretary Byrnes this afternoon, during which he reiterated his view that there should be prompt and thorough preparation for Attlee's visit. Secretary Byrnes was non-committal.

2 November 1945

Late this afternoon when he was discussing with Dr. Bush the forthcoming conference with the British and the Canadians, Secretary Patterson called in Lt. Arneson and asked him to prepare a study of the current situation under the Quebec and Combined Development Trust Agreements and a tentative set of U. S. proposals for discussion. It was agreed that the proposals should follow the lines of Secretary Stimson's memorandum of September 11, and Secretary Patterson's of September 26 and should outline the

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several stages of negotiations, viz.: revision of agreements with the British and the Canadians, approach to Russia, and finally an approach to the UNO. It was agreed further that Dr. Bush's memorandum to the President of September 25, which went into some detail, should be used as a guide in the preparation of the study. Secretary Patterson remarked that while the study might never see the light of day, it should be ready in the event it was called for. Even though it might not be wanted by ^{Secretary} ~~Byrnes~~ it would, in any event, serve to tell Secretary Patterson's thinking on the subject.

7 November 1945

Lt. Arneson's study was given to Secretary Patterson this morning. It consisted of two volumes: Volume I, Part A, analysed the current situation vis-a-vis the British and Canadians and action taken under the Quebec and CDT agreements; Volume I, Part B, outlined the U. S. position that might be taken as a basis for discussion in carrying through the negotiations in several stages; and Volume II was a compilation of the basic documents supporting the recital of Volume I, Part A. The U. S. proposals were admittedly tentative and were put forward merely as a point of departure for further consideration by the Secretary and his advisers.

10 November 1945

On the basis of the discussion they had had with Secretary Patterson the day before, General Groves, Dr. Bush, and Mr. Harrison met in General Groves' office this morning to revise *the U.S. proposal for discussion*. ~~Volume I, Part B of the study.~~ Lt. Volpe and Lt. Arneson were present. The revision spelled out in greater detail our proposals for continuation of cooperation with the British and the Canadians and suggested only in general terms the nature of the approach which the three governments might agree the United States should make to Russia. The further step of setting up an organ of the UNO to control the field of atomic energy was stated as an ultimate objective, to be achieved, however, only after a considerable period and only after the effective cooperation of Russia had been proven in practice. As regards our relations with the U.K. and Canada, the recommendations made it clear that in exchange for the abrogation of Clause IV of the Quebec Agreement in any new agreement that might be arrived at the U.K. should undertake to bring under the control of the CPT and subject to allocation by the CPC on an actual use basis all uranium and thorium ores situated anywhere within the British Commonwealth. [TAB B]

11 November 1945

Mr. Harrison and Lt. Arneson saw Secretary Patterson briefly this morning to give him a copy of the revised study, which

Mr. Harrison pointed out represented the unanimous views of General Groves, Dr. Bush, and himself.

12 November 1945

The members of the Interim Committee were today informed by letter from the Secretary of War that, in view of the fact that the Interim Committee had completed its assignments, it was being terminated effective this date.

14 November 1945

Mr. Makins and Mr. Rickett met informally with General Groves, Mr. Harrison, and Lt. Arneson at 3:15 p.m. to exchange views concerning what should be done on the question of revising the Quebec Agreement during the Truman-Attlee-King conference.

Mr. Harrison reported that, as indicated in a memorandum which Dr. Bush had written to President Truman recapitulating his understanding of the conclusions reached at the White House on the evening of the 13th, ^(T, B, C) the principals desired that Secretary Patterson and Sir John Anderson and their advisers consider together what should be done with matters of collaboration covered by the Quebec Agreement.

There was general agreement that whatever was done with the Quebec Agreement and its specific provisions, it was clearly desirable to continue the Combined Policy Committee, perhaps

with different membership, to act as the coordinating body for whatever degree of collaboration might be decided upon and to continue the CDT as the agent of the CPC for the acquisition of ores.

General Groves suggested that each of them should study the Quebec and Combined Development Trust Agreements in detail and to raise points which should be considered in working out revisions. It was agreed that this should be done in preparation for the meeting in the Secretary's office scheduled for 10:00 a.m. the next day.

15 November 1945

The following met with the Secretary of War in his office at 10:00 a.m. to discuss revision of existing agreements:

Sir John Anderson, Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland-Wilson, Malcolm MacDonald, General Groves, Mr. Harrison, Mr. Dennis Rickett, Mr. Roger Makins, and Lt. Arneson.

Sir John stated that the British were anxious to know what decision the United States was likely to make with regard to Clause IV of the Quebec Agreement, for the U.K. had hoped in the near future to build pilot plants and would want to know how the matter of commercial rights stood. The United Kingdom recognised that the decision on Clause IV rested with the United States and would, of course, accept whatever decision

was made. To this Secretary Patterson replied that as far as he was concerned he was prepared to recommend that a solution be found which would not place the U.K. at a disadvantage.

There was general agreement that the CPC should be continued to supervise such arrangements as were mutually agreed upon and that the CDT should also be continued to handle the acquisition of ores, but that it would probably be desirable to terminate the Quebec Agreement, in toto, and replace it by a new agreement which would properly reflect the post-war situation.

Sir John felt that consideration should be given to full interchange of personnel in any new agreement that might be signed. General Groves felt that the quid-pro-quo for this would have to be an undertaking whereby the U.K. would bring all uranium and thorium ores situated in the British Commonwealth under the control of the CDT for allocation in accordance with demonstrated demand. In agreeing with this point, Sir John pointed out that the U.K. would have to proceed with caution in some cases, as for example, South Africa. General Groves expressed the view that South Africa would probably agree to sell its ore to the Trust. Sir John agreed that since South Africa had no establishments built she would probably be willing to sell and that the U.K. or the U.K. and U.S. jointly might approach her soon.

It was agreed that Sir John's advisers and Secretary Paterson's advisers should prepare a Memorandum of Intention which would set forth the basic policies to be followed in writing a new agreement. It was agreed further that the CPC should be given the assignment of writing the new agreement in line with these basic policies. Another meeting was called for 9:00 a.m. the next day to consider the memorandum.

After the meeting in the Secretary's office, General Groves, Mr. Harrison, Mr. Rickett, Mr. Makins, Lt. Volpe, and Lt. Arneson met in Mr. Harrison's office to arrive at some preliminary understanding as to the form and content of the Memorandum of Intention. It was the view of General Groves and Mr. Harrison that there should be prepared for consideration on Friday (1) a short directive to the CPC for signature by the President and the Prime Ministers instructing the CPC to prepare for their consideration a new agreement envisaging the continuation of the CPC and the CDT, and (2) a longer memorandum, also for signature by the President and the Prime Ministers or at least by the Secretary of War and Sir John, setting forth the basic policies to be considered by the CPC in drawing up a new agreement. Mr. Rickett and Mr. Makins did not dissent from this view.

The Quebec Agreement was then examined point by point and amendments proposed. When this had been done, it was suggested that Mr. Makins and Mr. Rickett on the one hand and Lts. Volpe

and Arneson on the other should prepare separate drafts of the Memorandum of Intention for comparison and further discussion later in the day, and that the British should also prepare a the draft of short directive to the CPC.

Mr. Makins, Mr. Rickett, General Groves, Lt. Volpe, and Lt. Arneson met again at 6:00 p.m. at which time the short directive to the CPC which had been prepared by the British for signature by the President and the Prime Ministers was agreed to. The directive stated in substance that the signatories desired that cooperation in the field of atomic energy among the three Governments should continue, that the CPC and the CDT should be continued in suitable form, and that the CPC should recommend appropriate arrangements to accomplish this. As to the longer paper, there appeared some divergence in point of view. The British wanted the memorandum to be quite informal, more in the nature of a very general statement of broad principle rather than a specific set of basic points by which the CPC would be guided in its work. General Groves wanted the memorandum to be quite specific on the basic issues of policy and binding on the CPC when adopted by the Anderson-Patterson sub-committee of the conference. No agreement was reached on this question of procedure and it was decided to hold it over for consideration the next day and to concentrate that evening on the content of the memorandum.

Lts. Volpe and Arneson met with Mr. Makins and Mr. Rickett at the British Embassy at 10:00 p.m. and came to agreement on the

*Groves:
Don't give
an inch, but
be polite
about it.*

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basic points of policy to be laid down in the memorandum with the exception of the point on interchange of information. The more restrictive U.S. formula for interchange of information was written into the draft with the understanding that the British would put forward an alternative formula for consideration the next day.

16 November 1945

The following met with the Secretary of War in his office at 9:00 a.m.: Sir John Anderson, Field Marshal Wilson, General Groves, General Ian Jacob, Mr. Harrison, Mr. C. D. Howe, Dean MacKenzie, Mr. Neville Butler, Mr. Makins, Mr. Rickett, Lt. Volpe, and Lt. Arneson. Agreement was reached promptly on the joint directive to the CPC for signature by the President and the Prime Ministers. One change was agreed to which might prove most significant. This was the proposal made by Sir John that the words "full and" be inserted before the phrase "effective cooperation" in the first sentence.

After some discussion, it was agreed that the Memorandum of Intention should be addressed to the CPC and signed by Sir John Anderson for the U.K. and by General Groves for the U.S. and that it would serve only as a general guide and not as a set of basic policies binding on the Committee in the writing of a new agreement.


While Sir John, Mr. Makins, Mr. Rickett, General Groves, Mr. Harrison, and Lt. Volpe reassembled in Mr. Harrison's office to arrive at a final draft of the memorandum, Secretary Patterson

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accompanied by Lt. Arneson proceeded to the White House with copies of the joint directive which was signed by President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee at approximately 10:15 a.m. It developed that Prime Minister King who was not available at the moment wanted to consult with Mr. Howe before signing. Since Mr. Howe had already left for Ottawa, it was decided that the three copies signed by the two heads of state would have to be sent to Ottawa for signature there by Prime Minister King after he had conferred with Mr. Howe.

The Memorandum of Intention was agreed upon by noon and was signed in eight copies by Sir John and General Groves before Sir John departed for Ottawa at 3:00 p.m. As signed, the memorandum contained a series of recommendations to be considered by the CPC in the preparation of a new document to replace the Quebec Agreement and all other understandings with the exception of the Combined Development Trust Agreement which was to be revised in conformity with the new arrangements. No mention was made of post-war commercial rights, but the memorandum recommended that all ores that may be acquired, by purchase or otherwise, by the CDT, including all that may be secured throughout the British Commonwealth, should be held jointly subject to allocation by the Combined Policy Committee to the three Governments "in such quantities as may be needed, in the common interest, for scientific research, military, and humanitarian purposes," provided that the unallocated portion not so needed be held by the CDT for disposal at a later date "in the light of then existing conditions and on

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a fair and equitable basis." As regards interchange of information, the memorandum recommended that there should be full and effective cooperation in the field of basic scientific research, while in the field of development, design, construction, and operation of plants, cooperation, recognised as desirable in principle, should be regulated by ad hoc arrangements through the CPC. T A 13

Notes of an Informal Meeting
of the
Interim Committee
Wednesday, 9 May 1945, 9:30 A.M. - 12:30 P.M.

PRESENT:

MEMBERS

Secretary Henry L. Stimson, Chairman
Hon. Ralph A. Bard
Dr. Vannevar Bush
Hon. James F. Byrnes
Hon. William L. Clayton
Dr. Karl T. Compton
Mr. George L. Harrison

BY INVITATION

Mr. Harvey H. Bundy

I. STATEMENT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

Secretary Stimson outlined the nature of the project and expressed his views as to the purposes and functions of the Committee. Appointed by the Secretary with the approval of the President, the Committee was established to study and report on the entire problem of temporary war-time controls and later publicity, and to survey and make recommendations on post-war research, development, and control, and on legislation necessary for these purposes. It was termed an "Interim Committee" in view of the fact that, at the proper time, Congress would probably establish by law a permanent body to supervise, regulate, and control the entire field. It was pointed out that reports and recommendations made by the Committee

would be submitted to the Secretary, and through him, to the President.

The full membership of the Committee is as follows:

Hon. Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, Chairman.

Hon. Ralph A. Bard, Under Secretary of the Navy.

Dr. Vannevar Bush, Director, Office of Scientific Research and Development.

Hon. James F. Byrnes, Special Representative of the President.

Hon. William L. Clayton, Assistant Secretary of State.

Dr. Karl T. Compton, Chief, Office of Field Service, OSRD.

Dr. James B. Conant, Chairman, National Defense Research Committee.

Mr. George L. Harrison, Special Consultant to the Secretary of War, Alternate Chairman.

[at 11:15 A.M. the Committee took leave of the Secretary and re-assembled in Mr. Harrison's Office under his chairmanship]

II. GENERAL ORIENTATION:

As further background on the subject, General Groves' memorandum of April 23, 1945, to the Secretary of War, which was presented earlier to the President by the Secretary, was read to the Committee and discussed at some length. The Quebec Agreement was also read and discussed. In discussing the nature and functions of the Combined Development Trust, the Committee strongly expressed the view that all possible steps should be taken as promptly as

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possible to build up our supplies of uranium and thorium.

III. NEXT MEETING:

The next meeting of the Committee was called for Monday,
May 14, 1945, at 10:00 A.M.

R. Gordon Arneson

R. GORDON ARNESON
2nd Lieutenant, AUS
Secretary.

Notes of an Informal Meeting
of the
Interim Committee
Monday, 14 May 1945, 10:00 A.M. - 12:30 P.M.

PRESENT:

MEMBERS

Hon. Ralph A. Bard
Dr. Vannevar Bush
Hon. James F. Byrnes
Hon. William L. Clayton
Mr. George L. Harrison, Acting Chairman
(in the absence of the Secretary of War)

BY INVITATION

Maj. Gen. Leslie R. Groves

I. PANELS.

1. Scientific Panel.

It was agreed that the membership of the Scientific Panel should be as follows:

Dr. Arthur H. Compton
Dr. Ernest O. Lawrence
Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer
Dr. Enrico Fermi

It was agreed further that the Secretary of War or Mr. Harrison, on his behalf, should write to these four scientists inviting them to become members of the Panel. In line with suggestions made by Dr. J. B. Conant and Dr. Vannevar Bush, it was the sense of the meeting that the Scientific Panel should be free not only to discuss technical matters but also

to present to the Committee their views concerning the political aspects of the problem.

2. Military Panel.

After some discussion the Committee concluded that the Secretary of War should discuss with General Marshall and Admiral King the desirability of establishing a Military Panel and secure their recommendations as to membership. The Committee was of the opinion that the Panel, if constituted, would be most effective if its membership were drawn from high levels of the Army and Navy and, accordingly, expressed agreement that the following membership would be desirable:

For the Army:

General of the Army George C. Marshall
Lt. General Thomas T. Handy
Maj. Gen. Leslie R. Groves

For the Navy:

Admiral of the Fleet Ernest J. King
Admiral Richard S. Edwards
Rear Admiral William R. Purnell

3. The question was raised whether an Industrial Panel should be established to advise on the potentialities of industrial mobilization in this field in other countries. The Committee took the view that no panel on this question should be organized at this time, but that such men as Mr. James A. Rafferty of Union Carbide and Mr. A. K. Chapman of Eastman Kodak should be invited to sit in with the Committee to discuss this question.

II. PUBLIC STATEMENT.

The inclusiveness of a public statement concerning the weapon was felt to be dependent upon the outcome of the test to be made in July. In the event that the test showed poor results, it would suffice to have only a brief notice made public by the theater commander to the effect that a dump of high explosives had blown up. If, however, the results that are now confidently expected are borne out by the field test, a more complete public statement would be necessary. Such a statement should be made by the President and should indicate the general nature of the weapon, trace the history of its development and of the controls, both national and international, that are contemplated.

It was agreed that William L. Laurence, a science editor of the New York Times, now under contract with the Manhattan District, should be brought in to work up drafts of these two alternative statements and that Arthur Page should review these statements before their presentation to the Committee for consideration.

III. INTERNATIONAL SITUATION.

The international aspects of the program were discussed at some length, the Quebec Agreement and the operations of the Combined Development Trust being stressed. Copies of a memorandum from Drs. Bush and Conant on this question were distributed to

the Messrs. Byrnes, Bard, and Clayton, and General Groves for further study after the meeting. Copies of a memorandum from certain scientists addressed to Dr. Arthur Compton were also distributed to the Messrs. Byrnes and Bard for further study.

IV. LEGISLATIVE CONTROLS.

The matter of controls and the legislation necessary to effectuate such control were discussed in general terms; no attempt was made, however, to arrive at any definite conclusions.

V. THE CHICAGO SCIENTISTS.

General Groves and Dr. Bush outlined the nature of the work being carried on by the Chicago Group and raised the question as to its future status. It was agreed that the group should continue its work for the present and that the question of future status should be taken up later after the weapon was put to offensive use.

VI. APPOINTMENT OF SECRETARY.

On the recommendation of the Acting Chairman it was agreed that Lieutenant R. Gordon Arneson, Assistant to Mr. Bundy, should be appointed as Secretary of the Committee.

VII. NEXT MEETING.

The next meeting of the Committee was set for 2:30 P.M., Friday, 18 May 1945.

R. Gordon Arneson

Notes of an Informal Meeting
of the
Interim Committee
Friday, May 18, 1945, 2:30 P.M. - 4:30 P.M.

PRESENT:

MEMBERS

Hon. Ralph A. Bard
Hon. James F. Byrnes
Hon. William L. Clayton
Dr. James B. Conant
Mr. George L. Harrison, Acting Chairman

BY INVITATION

Mr. Arthur Page
Maj. Gen. Leslie R. Groves

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To
By authority of: *SEC. ARMY*

By TAC per 710554

Date *9/29/71 WHC - NARS*

I. MEETINGS WITH THE PANELS.

It was agreed that the Scientific Panel should be invited to meet with the Committee on Thursday, May 31, and, if possible, the Military Panel and representatives of industry should be brought in for discussions the same weekend. It was suggested that, in addition to inviting Mr. Rafferty of Union Carbide and Mr. Chapman of Eastman Kodak to discuss with the Committee the industrial aspects of the problem, Mr. Carpenter of du Pont might be invited to discuss the problems faced by du Pont in gearing its operations to the project.

II. DRAFT PUBLIC RELEASES.

The Committee considered the draft statements which had been prepared by Mr. Laurence. With respect to the type of

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release that might be made by the Commanding Officer, Almagordo Air Base, when the test is run, the Committee was in general agreement on the content of Forms A and B. Forms C and D were considered undesirable because of the mention therein of experimentation on new weapons.

The consensus of the Committee relative to the proposed statement to be made by the President after a successful test was that the President should make only a short announcement over the radio, or possibly to the Congress, concerning the general nature of the weapon and its military and international implications. This announcement should be followed by a more complete press release containing a history of the program, a discussion of the technical phases of the project, some indication of our cooperation with the British, and of the intention to take the necessary legislative steps to secure adequate control. It was contemplated that other releases dealing with further details of the program would be issued following these original announcements.

It was agreed that Mr. Page and Mr. Laurence should re-work the draft releases along the general lines indicated, bearing in mind that the nature of the statements would depend in large measure on the results of the test and of actual use, and that changes might later be necessary in terms of the international situation existing at the time of release.

III. BUSH-CONANT MEMORANDUM.

In discussing the points made in the Bush-Conant memorandum, the question was raised concerning our obligations under the Quebec Agreement. This Agreement required that the weapon cannot be used against a third country by one signatory without the agreement of the other. Accordingly, before the United States can use the weapon against any country, it must secure the consent of the United Kingdom. However, it was pointed out that no prior consent is involved in conducting local tests.

The Acting Chairman reported that the British are considering the establishment of a committee similar to the Interim Committee for the purpose of studying problems of publicity and domestic controls. It is likely that in the near future the British group will wish to get in touch with the Interim Committee to coordinate parallel action; however, it was the thought of the Acting Chairman — and his view was concurred in by the Committee — that it would be unwise to arrange for any interchange at this time.

IV. NEXT MEETING.

The next meeting was scheduled for Thursday, May 31, 1945, at 11:00 A.M. in the Office of the Secretary of War.

R. Gordon Arneson

R. GORDON ARNESON
2nd Lieutenant, AUS
Secretary

NOTES OF THE INTERIM COMMITTEE MEETING

THURSDAY, 31 MAY 1945

10:00 A.M. to 1:15 P.M.- 2:15 P.M. to 4:15 P.M.

PRESENT:

Members of the Committee

Secretary Henry L. Stimson, Chairman
Hon. Ralph A. Bard ✓
Dr. Vannevar Bush ✓
Hon. James F. Byrnes ✓
Hon. William E. Clayton ✓
Dr. Karl T. Compton ✓
Dr. James B. Conant ✓
Mr. George L. Harrison

Invited Scientists

Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer
Dr. Enrico Fermi
Dr. Arthur H. Compton
Dr. E. O. Lawrence

By Invitation

General George C. Marshall
Major Gen. Leslie R. Groves
Mr. Harvey E. Bundy
Mr. Arthur Page

I. OPENING STATEMENT OF THE CHAIRMAN:

Secretary Stimson explained that the Interim Committee had been appointed by him, with the approval of the President, to make recommendations on temporary war-time controls, public announcement, legislation and post-war organization. The Secretary gave high praise to the brilliant and effective assistance rendered to the project by the scientists of the country and expressed great

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NOTES OF THE INTERIM COMMITTEE MEETING

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10:00 A.M. to 1:15 P.M.- 2:15 P.M. to 4:15 P.M.

PRESENT:

Members of the Committee

Secretary Henry L. Stimson, Chairman
Hon. Ralph A. Bard ✓
Dr. Vannevar Bush ✓
Hon. James F. Byrnes ✓
Hon. William E. Clayton ✓
Dr. Karl T. Compton ✓
Dr. James B. Conant ✓
Mr. George L. Harrison

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appreciation to the four scientists present for their great contributions to the work and their willingness to advise on the many complex problems that the Interim Committee had to face. He expressed the hope that the scientists would feel completely free to express their views on any phase of the subject.

The Committee had been termed an "Interim Committee" because it was expected that when the project became more widely known a permanent organization established by Congressional action or by treaty arrangements would be necessary.

The Secretary explained that General Marshall shared responsibility with him for making recommendations to the President on this project with particular reference to its military aspects; therefore, it was considered highly desirable that General Marshall be present at this meeting to secure at first hand the views of the scientists.

The Secretary expressed the view, a view shared by General Marshall, that this project should not be considered simply in terms of military weapons, but as a new relationship of man to the universe. This discovery might be compared to the discoveries of the Copernican theory and of the laws of gravity, but far more important than these in its effect on the lives of men. While the advances in the field to date had been fostered by the needs of war, it was important to realize that the implications of the project went far beyond the needs of the present war. It must be controlled if possible to make it an assurance of future peace rather than a menace to civilization.

The Secretary suggested that he hoped to have the following questions discussed during the course of the meeting:

1. Future military weapons.
2. Future international competition.
3. Future research.
4. Future controls.
5. Future developments, particularly non-military.

II. STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT:

As a technical background for the discussions, Dr. A. H. Compton explained the various stages of development. The first stage involved the separation of uranium 235. The second stage involved the use of "breeder" piles to produce enriched materials from which plutonium or new types of uranium could be obtained. The first stage was being used to produce material for the present bomb while the second stage would produce atomic bombs with a tremendous increase in explosive power over those now in production. Production of enriched materials was now on the order of pounds or hundreds of pounds and it was contemplated that the scale of operations could be expanded sufficiently to produce many tons. While bombs produced from the products of the second stage had not yet been proven in actual operation, such bombs were considered a scientific certainty. It was estimated that from January 1946 it would take one and one-half years to prove this second stage in view of certain technical and metallurgical difficulties, that it would take three

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years to get plutonium in volume, and that it would take perhaps six years for any competitor to catch up with us.

Dr. Fermi estimated that approximately twenty pounds of enriched material would be needed to carry on research in current engineering problems and that a supply of one-half to one ton would be needed for research on the second stage.

In response to the Secretary's question, Dr. A. H. Compton stated that the second stage was dependent upon vigorous exploitation of the first stage and would in no way vitiate the expenditure already made on the present plant.

Dr. Conant mentioned a so-called "third stage" of development in which the products of the "second stage" would be used simply as a detonator for heavy water. He asked Dr. Oppenheimer for an estimate of the time factor involved in developing this phase.

Dr. Oppenheimer stated that this was a far more difficult development than the previous stages and estimated that a minimum of three years would be required to reach production. He pointed out that heavy water (hydrogen) was much cheaper to produce than the other materials and could eventually be obtained in far greater quantity.

Dr. Oppenheimer reviewed the scale of explosive force involved in these several stages. One bomb produced in the first stage was estimated to have the explosive force of 2,000 - 20,000 tons of TNT. The actual blast effect would be accurately measured when the test was made. In the second stage the explosive force

was estimated to be equal to 50,000 - 100,000 tons of TNT. It was considered possible that a bomb developed from the third stage might produce an explosive force equal to 10,000,000 - 100,000,000 tons of TNT.

III. DOMESTIC PROGRAM:

Dr. Lawrence expressed his great appreciation for the fact that the leaders of the Government had been willing to take the chances inherent in the development of this program. He expressed a view that if the United States were to stay ahead in this field it was imperative that we knew more and did more than any other country. He felt that research had to go on unceasingly. There were many unexplored possibilities in terms of new methods and new materials beyond thorium and uranium. In fact, all heavy elements held potentialities for exploitation in this field. He thought it might be possible one day to secure our energy from terrestrial sources rather than from the sun. Dr. Lawrence pointed out that there was no real doubt about the soundness of the program. Any failures that had occurred or would occur in the future were nothing more than temporary setbacks and there was every reason to believe that such setbacks would be quickly overcome.

Dr. Lawrence recommended that a program of plant expansion be vigorously pursued and at the same time a sizable ^{and material} stock pile of bombs/should be built up. For security reasons

plants that were built should be widely scattered throughout the country. Every effort should be made to encourage industrial application and development. Only by vigorously pursuing the necessary plant expansion and fundamental research, and by securing adequate government support could this nation stay out in front. With this view Dr. A. H. Compton expressed complete agreement.

Dr. Karl T. Compton, summarizing the views expressed above, suggested the following program:

1. Expand production under the first stage to produce bombs for stock pile and to furnish material for research.
2. Intensify "second stage" research.
3. Build necessary "second stage" pilot plants.
4. Produce the new product.

Dr. Oppenheimer pointed out that one of the difficult problems involved in guiding a future domestic program would be the allocation of materials as between different uses. Dr. Karl T. Compton added further that every effort should be made to encourage industrial progress in order that our fundamental research program would be strengthened.

The Secretary summarized the views of the group concerning our domestic program as follows:

1. Keep our industrial plant intact.
2. Build up sizable stock piles of material for military use and for industrial and technical use.
3. Open the door to industrial development.

IV. FUNDAMENTAL RESEARCH:

Dr. Oppenheimer felt that the work now being done under war pressure was simply a process of plucking the fruits of earlier research. In order to exploit more fully the potentialities of this field, it was felt that a more leisurely and a more normal research situation should be established. Dr. Oppenheimer strongly urged that numbers of the present staff should be released to go back to their universities and research laboratories in order to explore the many ramifications of this field, to avoid the sterility of the present orientation to specific problems only, and to develop cheaper and simpler methods of production. Dr. Bush expressed the view that while it ^{was} ~~is~~ imperative in war time to concentrate on specific problems such a narrowing of the field in peace time was completely wrong. He agreed with Dr. Oppenheimer that only a nucleus of the present staff should be retained and that as many as possible should be released for broader and freer inquiry. Drs. A. H. Compton and Fermi reenforced this view by emphasizing that we could never be sure of the tremendous possibilities in this field until thorough fundamental research could be brought to bear.

V. PROBLEMS OF CONTROL AND INSPECTION:

The Secretary inquired what other potentialities beyond purely military uses might be exploited. In reply Dr. Oppenheimer pointed out that the immediate concern had been to shorten the war. The research that had lead to this development had only opened the

door to future discoveries. Fundamental knowledge of this subject was so wide spread throughout the world that early steps should be taken to make our developments known to the world. He thought it might be wise for the United States to offer to the world free interchange of information with particular emphasis on the development of peace-time uses. The basic goal of all endeavors in the field should be the enlargement of human welfare. If we were to offer to exchange information before the bomb was actually used, our moral position would be greatly strengthened.

The Secretary stated that an understanding of the non-military potentialities was a necessary background to the consideration of the question of interchange of information and international co-operation. He referred to the Bush-Copant memorandum which had stressed the role of science in securing a policy of self-restraint. This memorandum had recommended that in any international organization which might be established complete scientific freedom should be provided for and the right of inspection should be given to an international control body. The Secretary asked what kind of inspection might be effective and what would be the position of democratic governments as against totalitarian regimes under such a program of international control coupled with scientific freedom. The Secretary said that it was his own feeling that the democratic countries had fared pretty well in this war. Dr. Bush indorsed this view vigorously, pointing out that our advantage over totalitarian states had been tremendous. Evidence just in from Germany

revealed that she was far behind us in the technology of this field and in other scientific fields. He said that our tremendous advantage stemmed in large measure from our system of team work and free interchange of information by which we had won out and would continue to win out in any competitive scientific and technological race. He expressed some doubt, however, of our ability to remain ahead permanently if we were to turn over completely to the Russians the results of our research under free competition with no reciprocal exchange. Dr. Karl T. Compton felt that we would hold our advantage at least to the extent of the construction lag, but, in any event, he felt that secrets of this nature could not be successfully kept for any period of time and that we could safely share our knowledge and still remain ahead.

Dr. A. H. Compton stated that the destructive applications of these discoveries were perhaps easier to control than the constructive ones. He referred to the nucleonics prospectus prepared some time ago in which were indicated certain other potential uses in such fields as naval propulsion, health, chemistry, and industrial development. He pointed out ^{that} Faraday's hopes and predictions in the field of electro-dynamics were realized by Edison only after the lapse of several decades. Such a lag in this field with as yet uncharted possibilities seemed likely. He stressed the impossibility of keeping technological advances secret, as witness the experience of industry. The fundamental knowledge in this field was known

in many countries and a policy of restraint, of the nationalization of scientific ideas could not work. Unless scientists were able to keep abreast of advances in the field throughout the world they would probably lose out on many developments.

Dr. Conant felt that international control in this field would require the power of inspection and that international arrangements among scientists would be by a means of strengthening this power. Dr. Oppenheimer expressed doubts concerning the possibility of knowing what was going on in this field in Russia, but expressed the hope that the fraternity of interest among scientists would aid in the solution.

General Marshall cautioned against putting too much faith in the effectiveness of the inspection proposal. Mr. Clayton also expressed considerable doubt on this point.

VI. RUSSIA:

In considering the problem of controls and international collaboration the question of paramount concern was the attitude of Russia. Dr. Oppenheimer pointed out that Russia had always been very friendly to science and suggested that we might open up this subject with them in a tentative fashion and in the most general terms without giving them any details of our productive effort. He thought we might say that a great national effort had been put into this project and express a hope for cooperation with them in this field. He felt strongly that we should not prejudge the

Russian attitude in this matter.

At this point General Marshall discussed at some length the story of charges and counter-charges that have been typical of our relations with the Russians, pointing out that most of these allegations have proven unfounded. The seemingly uncooperative attitude of Russia in military matters stemmed from the necessity of maintaining security. He said that he had accepted this reason for their attitude in his dealings with the Russians and had acted accordingly. As to the post-war situation and in matters other than purely military, he felt that he was in no position to express a view. With regard to this field he was inclined to favor the building up of a combination among like-minded powers, thereby forcing Russia to fall in line by the very force of this coalition. General Marshall was certain that we need have no fear that the Russians, if they had knowledge of our project, would disclose this information to the Japanese. He raised the question whether it might be desirable to invite two prominent Russian scientists to witness the test.

Mr. Byrnes expressed a fear that if information was ~~were~~ given to the Russians, even in general terms, Stalin would ask to be brought into the partnership. He felt this to be particularly likely in view of our commitments and pledges of cooperation with the British. In this connection Dr. Bush pointed out that even the British do not have any of our blue prints on plants. Mr. Byrnes

expressed the view, which was generally agreed to by all present, that the most desirable program would be to push ahead as fast as possible in production and research to make certain that we stay ahead and at the same time make every effort to better our political relations with Russia.

VII. INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM:

Dr. A. H. Compton stressed very strongly the need for maintaining ourselves in a position of superiority while at the same time working toward adequate political agreements. He favored freedom of competition and freedom of-research activity to as great an extent as possible consistent with security and ^{the} international situation. To maintain rigid security over this project would result in a certain sterility of research and a very real competitive disadvantage to the nation. He felt that within the larger field of freedom for research it would still be possible to maintain close security of the military aspects of the field. We could maintain our technical advantage over other nations only by drawing on the free interchange of scientific investigation and curiosity. He urged the view, expressed earlier by General Marshall, that we should secure agreements for cooperation with other like-minded nations and at the same time work toward solidifying our relations with the Russians.

Dr. A. H. Compton recommended that roughly the following program should be adopted for at least a decade:

1. Freedom of research be developed to the utmost consistent with national security and military necessity.
2. A combination of democratic powers be established for cooperation in this field.
3. A cooperative understanding be reached with Russia.

The meeting adjourned for luncheon at 1:15 P.M. and resumed at 2:15 P.M. All who attended the morning session were present with the exception of General Marshall.

VIII. EFFECT OF THE BOMBING ON THE JAPANESE AND THEIR WILL TO FIGHT:

It was pointed out that one atomic bomb on an arsenal would not be much different from the effect caused by any Air Corps strike of present dimensions. However, Dr. Oppenheimer stated that the visual effect of an atomic bombing would be tremendous. It would be accompanied by a brilliant luminescence which would rise to a height of 10,000 to 20,000 feet. The neutron effect of the explosion would be dangerous to life for a radius of at least two-thirds of a mile.

After much discussion concerning various types of targets and the effects to be produced, the Secretary expressed the conclusion, on which there was general agreement, that we could

not give the Japanese any warning; that we could not concentrate on a civilian area; but that we should seek to make a profound psychological impression on as many of the inhabitants as possible. At the suggestion of Dr. Conant the Secretary agreed that the most desirable target would be a vital war plant employing a large number of workers and closely surrounded by workers' houses.

had been discussed
There was some discussion of the desirability of attempting several strikes at the same time. Dr. Oppenheimer's judgment was that several strikes would be feasible. General Groves, however, expressed doubt about this proposal and pointed out the following objections: (1) We would lose the advantage of gaining additional knowledge concerning the weapon at each successive bombing; (2) such a program would require a rush job on the part of those assembling the bombs and might, therefore, be ineffective; (3) the effect would not be sufficiently distinct from our regular Air Force bombing program.

IX. HANDLING OF UNDESIRABLE SCIENTISTS:

General Groves stated that the program has been plagued since its inception by the presence of certain scientists of doubtful discretion and uncertain loyalty. It was agreed that nothing could be done about dismissing these men until after the bomb has actually been used or, at best, until after the test has been made. After some publicity concerning the weapon was out, steps should be taken to sever these scientists from the program

and to proceed with a general weeding out of personnel no longer needed.

X. CHICAGO GROUP:

Dr. A. H. Compton outlined briefly the nature and size of the Chicago program. In line with directives from General Groves it was intended to limit the operations at Chicago to those useful in the prosecution of this war. Its activities fell into the following categories:

1. Aid to the Hanford project on plutonium development.
2. Aid to the Santa Fe group.
3. Research on a thorium using pile.
4. Preliminary investigations of the extension of uranium piles.
5. Studies of the health of personnel working with these materials.

It was pointed out that programs 3 and 4 above did not bear directly on current war use, but that they comprised only about 20 per cent of the work being carried on in Chicago and that it was considered desirable in terms of future development to continue this work.

It was the consensus of the meeting that the Committee should lean on the recommendations of Drs. Conant and Bush as to what should be done with the Chicago group. Dr. Bush, as seconded by Dr. Conant, recommended that the present programs, including

Chicago, should be continued at their present levels until the end of the war. It was agreed that this recommendation should be transmitted to the Secretary of War.

XI. POSITION OF THE SCIENTIFIC PANEL:

Mr. Harrison stated that the Scientific Panel had been called in at the suggestion of Drs. Bush and Conant and with the heartiest approval of all members of the Committee. It was considered a continuing Panel which was free to present its views to the Committee at any time. The Committee was particularly anxious to secure from the scientists their ideas of just what sort of organization should be established to direct and control this field. The Committee requested the Panel to prepare as speedily as possible a draft of their views on this subject. In this connection Dr. Bush pointed out that there would be no need at this time in drawing up a draft of an organization in this field to consider relationships with the Research Board for National Security. Dr. Karl T. Compton suggested that the organization could be tied in later to the Research Board for National Security through its section on nuclear physics.

The question was raised as to what the scientists might tell their people about the Interim Committee and their having been called before it. It was agreed that the four scientists should feel free to tell their people that an Interim Committee appointed by the Secretary of War and with the Secretary of War as Chairman

had been established to deal specifically with the problems of control, organization, legislation, and publicity. The identity of the members of the Committee should not be divulged. The scientists should be permitted to explain that they had met with this Committee and had been given complete freedom to present their views on any phase of the subject. The impression should definitely be left with their people that the Government was taking a most active interest in this project.

XIII. NEXT MEETING:

The next meeting of the Committee was scheduled for Friday, 1 June 1945, at 11:00 A.M. in the office of the Secretary of War. The purpose of this meeting was to secure the views of four representatives from industry.

The meeting adjourned at 4:15 P.M.

R. Gordon Arneson

R. GORDON ARNESON
2nd Lieutenant, A.U.S.
Secretary

NOTES OF THE INTERIM COMMITTEE MEETING
FRIDAY, 1 JUNE 1945
11:00 A.M. - 12:30 P.M., 1:45 P.M. - 3:30 P.M.

PRESENT:

Members of the Committee

Secretary Henry L. Stimson, Chairman
Hon. Ralph A. Bard
Dr. Vannevar Bush
Hon. James F. Byrnes
Hon. William L. Clayton
Dr. Karl T. Compton
Dr. James B. Conant
Mr. George L. Harrison

Invited Industrialists

Mr. George H. Bucher, President
of Westinghouse - manufacture
of equipment for the electro-
magnetic process.

Mr. Walter S. Carpenter, President
of Du Pont Company - construction
of the Hanford Project.

Mr. James Rafferty, Vice President
of Union Carbide - construction
and operation of gas diffusion
plant in Clinton.

Mr. James White, President of Tennessee
Eastman - production of basic chemicals
and construction of the RDX plant at
Holston, Tennessee.

By Invitation

General George C. Marshall
Major Gen. Leslie H. Groves
Mr. Harvey H. Bundy
Mr. Arthur Page

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DATE 6/2/72

For Atomic Energy Commission

Jack H. Kalinowski

Chief, Declassification Branch
DIVISION OF CLASSIFICATION

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I. OPENING STATEMENT OF THE CHAIRMAN:

In opening the meeting Secretary Stimson praised the unique contribution of American industry in the prosecution of the war. He expressed his thanks to the industrialists present for their special contributions and for their coming to meet with the Committee to offer the benefit of their views.

The Secretary introduced the members of the Committee and explained that it had been established by him with the approval of the President in order to assist the Secretary and General Marshall in making recommendations to the President concerning control of this weapon during the war period and organization for post-war control.

The Secretary assured the group that both General Marshall and he were fully cognizant of the implications of our discoveries in the field of nuclear energy. They realized that its potentialities extended far beyond the immediate military uses which of necessity in war time were their first concern. This development held tremendous potentialities for the welfare of mankind and any consideration directed toward control of the field had to take these implications into account.

The Secretary expressed the hope that the industrialists present might offer suggestions with regard to the problem of international relations. He pointed out that a most important factor in making decisions concerning the problem of international cooperation

was the question of how long it would take other nations to catch up with the United States. Accordingly, the Secretary was anxious to secure their estimates on this time factor.

II. COMPETITIVE LAG:

Mr. Carpenter pointed out that it had taken his company twenty-seven months to complete the Hanford project from the date of receipt of the basic plans. In carrying forward the job of industrial design, construction and actual operation, the Du Pont Company enlisted the assistance of from 10,000 to 15,000 other concerns. By being able to call on these other concerns for assistance the Du Pont Company was able to complete construction much more quickly than would otherwise have been the case. He estimated that it would take Russia at least four or five years to construct this type of plant even assuming that they had the basic plans. Russia's greatest difficulty would be in securing the necessary technicians and adequate production facilities. If Russia were able to secure the services of a large number of German scientists — I. G. Farbenindustrie or Siemens — they would be able to proceed much more rapidly.

Mr. White, whose primary concern in the program has been the operation of the Y-12 electro-magnetic plant, discussed the great complexity of equipment required in production. He stressed the advantage held by the United States in standardized mass production. Spécial ceramics, a great number of vacuum tubes,

special stainless steels, and a great variety of special products were needed in his plant, and he doubted whether Russia would be able to secure sufficient precision in its equipment to make this operation possible. Mr. White stated that in his operation that they were using more than 2,000 college graduates and nearly 1500 men of approximate college level, and more than 5,000 skilled workers. In many cases it had been necessary to establish special training schools to train the personnel in the operation of special equipment. With regard to Russia potentialities he felt that one of the greatest problems would be to secure the necessarily large number of skilled workmen and technicians at the college level. In this connection Mr. Clayton expressed the view that we would have to assume that Russia would probably have access to German resources, scientists, and technicians.

Mr. Bucher estimated that if Russia had the services of the technicians and scientists of Siemens and I. G. Farbenindustrie she might be able to produce a sample of the electro-magnetic plant in approximately nine months, but that it would take a total of three years to get into operation. He pointed out that major problems in this type of operation were replacement parts and extremely accurate precision tools. He estimated that Germany, on the assumption of their having the basic information, would require from 15 to 18 months to arrive at the production stage; Italy (Fiat) 15 to 18 months; and England possibly one year.

The meeting recessed for luncheon at 12:30
and resumed at 1:45 P.M.

III. POST-WAR ORGANIZATION - VIEWS OF THE INDUSTRIALISTS:

Mr. Byrnes asked the group for their views concerning the type of organization that should be established after the war to carry on the program. In supplementing this question, Dr. Karl T. Compton pointed out that a very real problem was how best to organize so as to realize all the potentialities of the field with due regard for the industrial aspects.

Mr. Rafferty thought that the present partnership of industry, the universities, and Government should be continued.

Mr. Bucher recommended that the present organization be kept in being for at least another year. He stressed the need for more fundamental research with some provision whereby the results of such research, particularly with regard to power, could be made available to industry. In this connection, Dr. Karl T. Compton suggested that it would be desirable for particular companies to retain a nucleus of research people to evaluate the potentialities in this field as they were uncovered by government-sponsored fundamental research.

Mr. Carpenter pointed out that industrial participation in this endeavor had been, and probably would continue to be, at the operating level. He stressed the need for a great deal more

fundamental research. Industry was not in a position to conduct research on an adequate scale; therefore, the government should assume responsibility for fundamental research with adequate provision for the encouragement of practical research in industry. He was deeply convinced that the all-encompassing nature of this development was so vast that it could not be left to industry. In the national interest it was imperative that the government assume the preponderant role. He held that it was necessary not only for the government to sponsor and control a large-scale program of fundamental research but also that it assume responsibility for securing controlling supplies of uranium. He recommended the following program:

1. Accumulate a stock pile of bombs.
2. Put the plants in a stand-by status.
3. Concentrate on fundamental research.
4. Secure controlling supplies of uranium.

With regard to 2 above, Dr. Bush pointed out that it would be necessary to continue some production of material for use in fundamental research and that access to operating plants would be necessary for the carrying on of certain experiments.

As the representatives of industry were leaving the meeting, Mr. Carpenter expressed on behalf of the industrial group very great appreciation for the excellent job done by General Groves

in carrying the current program forward.

The Committee reassembled at 2:15 P.M. in Mr. Harrison's office.

IV. POST-WAR ORGANIZATION - COMMITTEE DISCUSSION:

Dr. Conant reported that the four scientists had completed their memorandum on post-war organization and were submitting it to the Secretary of War through Mr. Harrison. Dr. Conant stressed the great complexity of this problem and the need for securing as members of the board of directors men of the highest competence and wisdom.

Dr. Bush stated that the organization proposed by the four scientists need not be concerned at this time with the problem of an over-all post-war research organization for national security. He said that one of the problems with which the board of directors would have to concern itself was the question of the allocation of material, such as loans to universities and other research groups. He pointed out that the universities not only would want access to certain quantities of material for research purposes, but also access to pilot plants.

Dr. Compton expressed the conviction, which was agreed to by Dr. Conant, that the Interim Committee was not competent to decide upon these detailed questions, but rather that it was responsible for recommendations leading to the establishment of a permanent organi-

zation which would be competent to deal with these questions.

It was agreed that the organization paper from the scientists, when received, should be considered a basis for the drafting of the necessary legislation.

V. CURRENT APPROPRIATIONS:

General Groves reported that current appropriations for the project would run through June of 1946. Mr. Byrnes pointed out, however, that in the event that the war ended before the end of June 1946 Congress would be disposed to cancel all outstanding authorizations. In this event the Committee would be faced with the immediate problem of taking up with Congress the question of continuing appropriations and in so doing it would be necessary to furnish an estimate of the costs involved.

General Groves reported that the five Congressmen whom he recently took on a visit to the project in Tennessee were very much impressed with the plant and appeared to be most appreciative of the magnitude and national importance of the program.

VI. USE OF THE BOMB:

Mr. Byrnes recommended, and the Committee agreed, that the Secretary of War should be advised that, while recognizing that the final selection of the target was essentially a military decision, the present view of the Committee was that the bomb should be used against Japan as soon as possible; that it be used on a war plant

surrounded by workers' homes; and that it be used without prior warning. It was the understanding of the Committee that the plut small bomb would be used in the test and that the large bomb (gun mechanism) would be used in the first strike over Japan.

VII. PUBLICITY:

Mr. Harrison pointed out that the discussions and tentative conclusions of yesterday's meeting had already rendered obsolete the draft Presidential statement prepared by Arthur Page. In the past few days the Secretary had held discussions with Generals Marshall and Arnold concerning targets and would probably discuss this question further with Admiral King and General Marshall. This Committee was not considered competent to make a final decision on the matter of targets, this being a military decision. Accordingly, Mr. Harrison suggested that he be empowered by the Committee to confer with those members of the Committee who would be available as the situation with regard to targets developed and to have prepared new draft statements for the consideration of the full Committee at its next meeting.

VIII. LEGISLATION:

Mr. Harrison urged that prompt consideration be given to the problem of drafting the necessary legislation. It was suggested that the memorandum of the four scientists could be used as a basis for the draft. The Committee agreed that Mr. Harrison should proceed,

with the assistance of those members of the Committee who were available, with the preparation of an outline of major points to be included in a bill for study by the Committee at its next meeting.

IX. NEXT MEETING:

It was agreed that the next meeting should be held at 9:30 A.M. Thursday, 21 June 1945, the place of meeting depending upon the schedule of the Secretary of War.

It was agreed that the Committee should consider organization proposals and the requirements for legislation. The Committee would also consider at that time the situation with regard to publicity.

The meeting was adjourned at 3:30 P.M.

R. Gordon Arneson

R. GORDON ARNESON
1st Lieutenant, A.U.S.
Secretary

NOTES OF THE INTERIM COMMITTEE MEETING
THURSDAY 21 JUNE 1945
9:30 A.M.-1:15 P.M.; 2:00 P.M.- 4:15 A.M.

PRESENT:

Members of the Committee

Hon. Ralph A. Bard
Dr. Vannavar Bush
Hon. James F. Byrnes
Hon. William L. Clayton
Dr. Karl T. Compton
Dr. James B. Conant
Mr. George L. Harrison, Acting Chairman

By Invitation

Maj. Gen. Leslie R. Groves
Mr. Harvey H. Bundy (discussion of item III)
Mr. Arthur W. Page

I. DRAFT STATEMENTS OF PUBLICITY:

The Committee went over in detail three sets of statements of publicity designed for use (1) at the time of the test; (2) by the President; and (3) by the Secretary of War. It was agreed that a sub-committee consisting of Mr. Page and a representative from General Groves' Office should redraft the statements on the basis of the detailed suggestions made by the members of the Committee at the meeting and that the redrafts should be transmitted to the Secretary of War for his approval and transmitted, in turn, by him to the President for his approval.

With regard to timing it was agreed that the President's statement should be followed immediately by the release of the

Secretary of War and the next day by the historical scientific statement. Copy of all three statements should be released to the press at the same time with the proviso that the scientific statement be withheld until 24 hours after the simultaneous release of the other two statements.

General Groves reported that Dr. H. D. Smyth of Princeton was in charge of preparing the scientific release and that it was in the final stages of completion. It was now being cleared with the major participants in the project to insure accuracy. He explained that carefully drawn criteria had been established by which to determine what information could properly be included in the report.

a. Statements to be issued after the test.

In view of the time lag between the test and actual use of the weapon the Committee felt that as little information as possible should be released at the time of the test and that the release should be confined to the local press. It was agreed that draft "A" should be the basic form used whatever the extent of the damage, with the understanding that reference to exploded gas shells should be made if it was necessary to evacuate and that a list of the dead should be added if any fatalities occurred. The Committee realized that the final decision as to the exact content of the statement would, subject to the above considerations, have to be decided on the spot at the time of the test.

b. Statement of the President.

The Committee considered the draft in detail and suggested a number of changes for the guidance of the sub-committee in rewriting the statement. It was agreed that the substance of the last paragraph was a policy matter which the President alone could decide and would have to be held in suspense pending the outcome of the "Big Three" Conference.

In any event, it was felt that it would have to be re-written so as not to make any commitment concerning the establishment of international control.

c. Statement of the Secretary of War.

Detailed suggestions were made concerning changes to be made. Particular emphasis was placed on making proper acknowledgment of the activity of American scientists in this field before the war, of the assistance of the Navy Department on the project, and of General Groves' outstanding contribution to the prosecution of the work. It was agreed that all specific reference to the Quebec Agreement, the Combined Development Trust, and negotiations and agreements with respect to the acquisition of ore, particularly with reference to thorium, should be deleted.

II. POLICY WITH REGARD TO GENERAL AND CONTINUING PUBLICITY AFTER USE:

Mr. Harrison raised the question of the welter of publicity which would arise from the release of the initial

statements and pointed out that the nature and volume of this publicity would be such that the Committee would not be prepared to handle it. He suggested, and the Committee agreed, that the responsibility for the preparation of future releases should be turned over to General Groves and Arthur Page. General Groves said he would prepare a list of general rules to be followed in handling future publicity and present them to the Committee for approval.

III. CLAUSE TWO OF THE QUEBEC AGREEMENT:

At this point, Mr. Bundy entered the meeting and raised the question of Clause Two of the Quebec Agreement which provides that the signatories may not use the weapon against a third country except by mutual consent. After some discussion Mr. Bard made the motion that the Secretary of War be advised that the Interim Committee favored revocation of Clause Two by appropriate action. The motion was unanimously carried.

The Committee recessed for luncheon at 1:15 P.M. and reassembled at 2:00 P.M. All who were at the morning meeting were present except Dr. K. T. Compton and Mr. Bundy.

IV. PETITION THAT DR. UREY BE ADDED TO THE SCIENTIFIC PANEL:

Mr. Harrison explained that he had received a petition from certain members of the Chicago Group at the Metallurgical

Laboratory in Chicago and at the Clinton Laboratories requesting that Dr. Urey be made a member of the Scientific Panel. The Committee agreed that Dr. Urey should not be added to the Panel and that in replying to the petition Mr. Harrison should state that the Scientific Panel would consult with Dr. Urey from time to time with regard to his views in his special field of competence.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SCIENTIFIC PANEL:

The recommendations of the Scientific Panel, transmitted to the Secretary of War under date of 16 June, were received and read by the members of the Committee. These recommendations were in three parts: (1) future policy with regard to research, development, and control; (2) immediate use of the weapon; and (3) interim program.

a. Future Policy with regard to Research, Development, and Control.

It was the consensus of the Committee, as expressed by Dr. Bush, that consideration of the over-all post-war research and development program should be deferred and that the Committee at this time could properly consider only the problem of establishing a Post-War Commission. Dr. Bush pointed out that any organization for control in this field would have to be integrated with the general organization which was being recommended in his report to the President to have charge of all governmental research and development. Mr. Byrnes felt that the research aspects of this

field should be tied in with the general governmental research body but that a Post-War Control Commission would have to be established in addition. Dr. Bush thought that the Commission should not itself serve as an operating agency but should be a policy and control body which would farm out operations under contract. The Committee was in agreement with this view. In discussing the membership of the Commission the Committee took the position that civilian members should comprise a majority, perhaps five out of nine, with two Army and two Navy members. At the suggestion of Mr. Harrison, the Committee agreed that a small sub-committee should be set up to work immediately to study this problem in all its ramifications and prepare draft legislation. It was further agreed that Mr. W. L. Marbury, Brigadier General Royall and a representative from General Groves' Office should constitute the sub-committee.

b. Immediate use of the weapon.

Mr. Harrison explained that he had recently received through Dr. A. H. Compton a report from a group of the scientists at Chicago recommending, among other things, that the weapon not be used in this war but that a purely technical test be conducted which would be made known to other countries. Mr. Harrison had turned this report over to the Scientific Panel for study and recommendation. Part II of the report of the Scientific Panel stated that they saw no acceptable alternative to direct military

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use. The Committee reaffirmed the position taken at the 31 May and 1 June meetings that the weapon be used against Japan at the earliest opportunity, that it be used without warning, and that it be used on a dual target, namely, a military installation or war plant surrounded by or adjacent to homes or other buildings most susceptible to damage.

c. Interim Program.

The Committee approved the third recommendation of the Scientific Panel to the effect that the directive to the Manhattan Engineer District be extended to include work of post-war importance, such work not to exceed an annual budget of \$20,000,000.

VI. POSITION OF THIS SUBJECT AT THE "BIG THREE" CONFERENCE:

In considering what might be said by the President concerning the project at the "Big Three" Conference, the Committee discussed at length the many ramifications that had to be taken into account. In the hope of securing effective future control and in view of the fact that general information concerning the project would be made public shortly after the Conference, the Committee unanimously agreed that there would be considerable advantage, if suitable opportunity arose, in having the President advise the Russians that we were working on this weapon with every prospect of success and that we expected to use it against Japan.

The President might say further that he hoped this matter

might be discussed some time in the future in terms of insuring that the weapon would become an aid to peace. The Committee felt that, should the Russians press for more details, they should be told that we were not ready to furnish more information at present. The Committee agreed that under the provisions of the Quebec Agreement this whole problem should be discussed with the Prime Minister in advance of the Conference.

The Committee asked Mr. Harrison to make known its position, as stated above, to the Secretary of War.

VII. NEXT MEETING:

The next meeting was tentatively scheduled for Friday, 6 July 1945, at 9:30 A.M., the place of meeting to be determined later.

The meeting adjourned at 4:15 P.M.

R. Gordon Arneson
R. GORDON ARNESON
1st Lieutenant, A.U.S.
Secretary.

NOTES OF THE INTERIM COMMITTEE MEETING

FRIDAY 6 JULY 1945

9:30 A. M. - 12:45 P. M.

PRESENT:

Members of the Committee

Dr. Vannevar Bush

Dr. Karl T. Compton

Dr. James B. Conant

Mr. George L. Harrison, Acting Chairman

By Invitation

Maj. Gen. Leslie R. Groves

I. SWEDISH DEPOSITS OF URANIUM:

A memorandum prepared by the British dealing with the situation arising from the discovery of large deposits of uranium in Sweden was read by the Committee members. Mr. Harrison explained that the Combined Policy Committee at its 4 July meeting had voted unanimously that prompt action should be taken to enter into a political agreement with the Swedish Government with the object of securing the fullest possible control over the deposits in Sweden. Mr. Harrison reported further that the Secretary of State, on being informed of this situation, favored prompt action along the lines of a political agreement and stated to Mr. Harrison that the resources of the State Department were available to that end, and that he hoped action could be initiated at once.

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II. DRAFT STATEMENTS OF PUBLICITY:

With regard to the draft Presidential statement the British suggestions were accepted by the Committee in toto.

Mr. Harrison reported that the British manifested some concern about mentioning in the draft statement of the Secretary of War the various processes employed and the fact that all of the several processes had proven successful. In view of this objection the Committee agreed that specific reference to processes should be omitted but felt that there was no point in avoiding reference to the fact that several processes were being successfully employed, for this would be realized by any competent physicist as soon as the use of the bomb was made public. It was reported that the British felt that the Section I dealing with a resume of scientific discoveries leading to the development of the bomb was misleading because it was incomplete. In view of this, the Committee agreed that this Section should be abbreviated so as to make only very general reference to the universality of knowledge in the field of nuclear physics before the war without making any mention of the contributions of particular scientists.

With regard to the scientific statement now in process of clearance with the scientists of the project, Dr. Bush reported that at the 4 July CPC meeting he had argued strongly that no useful purpose would be served by withholding from the public the general scientific history of the project. At Dr. Bush's suggestion, the—

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Combined Policy Committee had agreed (1) that it should approve a set of principles and conditions governing the release of information on this subject and (2) that the scientific release should be prepared in line with these principles, with Sir James Chadwick being authorized to clear the statement on behalf of the British.

III. DR. UREY:

As a matter of information, Mr. Harrison read his letter of 27 June to Dr. A. H. Compton which stated that the Interim Committee felt it could not enlarge the Scientific Panel at this time, but that the Scientific Panel should obtain from Dr. Urey and others such views on any phase of the project as they might care to express, and that the Panel should decide whether such views as are obtained should be passed on to the Committee for consideration.

IV. THE BIG THREE CONFERENCE:

Mr. Harrison reported that the position taken by the Committee at its last meeting concerning discussion of this subject at the "Big Three" Conference had been communicated to the Secretary of War, and that the Secretary was in complete agreement with the Committee's recommendation, particularly in view of the short time between the Conference and the actual use of the weapon. The Secretary of War had strongly endorsed the recommendation in speaking to the President about it.

V. LEGISLATION:

After considerable discussion of legislation to establish a post-war Control Commission, it was evident that there were many unsolved problems which would have to be given careful consideration, particularly as regards the relationship of such a Commission to the organization for general research proposed in Dr. Bush's forthcoming report to the President. Mr. Harrison reported that in their thinking thus far General Royall and Mr. Marbury tended to favor a proprietary status for the Commission inasmuch as this status would provide greater power and freedom of action. Mr. Harrison expressed the view that the present organization, namely the Manhattan District, should be kept in being until the new organization established by law could begin to function. The first emphasis should be to get the Commission established with full constitutional power to act and then take up the details of internal organization and the question of relationships with the proposed general research agency.

The Committee agreed that Dr. Bush, with the assistance of Dr. Conant, should draw up a set of principles which should be furnished to General Royall and Mr. Marbury as a guide in drafting legislation.

VI. NEXT MEETING:

Since it was felt that the time of the next meeting would be dependent upon the date of the test, it was agreed that the next

meeting should take place sometime between the 18th and 21st of July, at which time the Committee would consider a report from the sub-committee on legislation.

The meeting adjourned at 12:45 P. M.

R. Gordon Arneson

R. GORDON ARNESON
1st Lieutenant, A.U.S.
Secretary.

NOTES OF INTERIM COMMITTEE MEETING

Thursday, 19 July 1945

10:00 A.M. - 1:15 P.M.

PRESENT:

Members of Committee

Dr. Vannevar Bush
Dr. Karl T. Compton
Dr. James B. Conant
Mr. George L. Harrison, Acting Chairman

By Invitation

Maj. Gen. Leslie R. Groves	
Brig. Gen. Kenneth C. Royall)
Mr. William L. Marbury) Consideration
Lt. George S. Allan) of IV.
Lt. George M. Duff, Jr.)

I. RECOMMENDATIONS FROM SCIENTIFIC PANEL:

The Committee considered a memorandum prepared by Dr. Bush in consultation with Dr. Conant which they proposed should be sent by the Committee to the Scientific Panel. The memorandum requested the Panel to study in some detail the future program of research and development in this field with particular reference to the scale of effort that should be planned for in terms of scientific and technical personnel and financial outlay. Dr. Bush explained that it was thought desirable to secure at this time the recommendations of the Panel in detail so that the Committee might gain a more specific understanding of the dimensions of this subject and its implications to the scientific resources

of the nation and thus be in a position to consider the balance that must be struck between this program and other fields of scientific research in the post-war period. The Committee agreed that, subject to minor verbal changes, the memorandum should go forward from Mr. Harrison to the Scientific Panel.

II. BUSH-CONANT MEMORANDUM CONCERNING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:

Drs. Bush and Conant placed before the Committee a memorandum dealing with the question of establishing in the United Nations organization some mechanism for international control in this field. They pointed out in the discussion which followed that the memorandum constituted only a tentative proposal designed simply to raise the issue. In receiving the memorandum the Committee felt, as did Drs. Bush and Conant, that consideration of this question should be deferred until after the Potsdam Conference when the full Committee membership would be available.

III. EXCHANGE OF CABLES WITH THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

As a matter of information, Mr. Harrison read to the Committee his exchanges of cables with the Secretary of War regarding the outcome of the test. In this connection Mr. Harrison raised the question whether a letter of congratulations should be sent on behalf of the Secretary of War to Dr. Oppenheimer. The Committee unanimously agreed this should be done.

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Dr. Bush reported that Senator Magnuson of Washington was that day introducing a bill which followed closely the recommendations made to the President in Dr. Bush's report "Science - The Endless Frontier." Senator Kilgore probably would also introduce a bill which would not follow the report so closely.

At this point General Royall and Mr. Marbury, and two lawyers from the Manhattan District, Lt. Allen and Lt. Duff, joined the meeting to go over the draft bill which had been drawn up by General Royall and Mr. Marbury. It was learned that Lts. Allen and Duff had been working for some time in New York in gathering together materials pertaining to such legislation and had compiled a most comprehensive document. It was felt that they would be aided in their work by having the benefit of the Committee's discussion of the Royall/Marbury draft.

Mr. Harrison suggested that the Committee should not concern itself at this time with a line by line consideration of the bill but should confine its discussion to general principles.

a. Name of Organization. It was agreed that the organization established by legislation should be known as the "Commission on Atomic Energy."

b. Compensation. With regard to the members of the Commission it was felt that they should not receive a salary but rather a per diem so as to avoid making the

positions susceptible to political pressure. With regard to the administrator and deputy administrator it was agreed that salaries should be on the order of \$15,000 and \$12,000 respectively.

c. Composition. While it was agreed that no member should be named as a representative of any particular agency or interest, some divergence of view developed concerning the provision in the draft for two Army and two Navy officers out of a total of nine members. Dr. Bush favored a commission composed only of civilians, as did Dr. Conant; while General Royall pointed out that in view of the preponderance of the military aspect of this field and the greater likelihood of prompt Congressional action if this fact were reflected in the composition of the Commission, he felt that strong military representation was desirable. Mr. Harrison suggested that the military interest would probably be adequately protected by the existing provision for a Military Board plus a new proviso to the effect that the President should be empowered to turn this field over to the military in time of war or threatened emergency. General Groves expressed the view that it would be desirable to provide that some members should have military experience but not that such members necessarily serve as representatives of the Services.

in general agreement with this view.

f. Censorship. Dr. Bush felt that the censorship and security provisions of the bill were too broad. He suggested that the law should permit any publication of information in this field which did not endanger national security and should require the Commission to draw up rules which would implement this principle. It was generally agreed that the advantage which the United States has in this field might be lost if publication were too narrowly restricted.

g. Patents. It was generally agreed that the section on patents should empower the Commission to impose secrecy orders on patents and prevent issue if and when the Commission determined such action was necessary in the national interest.

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(1) General Groves. -- In addition to the four Boards named in the bill the Commission should be empowered to name "such other boards" as in its discretion appear necessary.

(2) General Groves. -- The Administrator should operate under general rules laid down by the Commission; he should not be required to secure specific approval from the Commission for individual decisions.

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NOTES OF INTERIM COMMITTEE MEETING

Thursday, 19 July 1945

10:00 A.M. - 1:15 P.M.

PRESENT:

Members of Committee

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Dr. Karl T. Compton
Dr. James B. Conant
Mr. George L. Harrison, Acting Chairman

By Invitation

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d. Control Over Research in the Universities.

Dr. Conant expressed concern about the sweeping powers given to the Commission over research. While he recognized the need for control of the material, he felt that it should be possible to devise some quantitative measure whereby university laboratories could use material and conduct experiments in this field without endangering national security while at the same time preserving considerable freedom to pursue basic research. Dr. Compton suggested that such a measure might be devised in terms of energy release. The Committee agreed that the bill should make some positive statement requiring the Commission to define some quantitative borderline. All agreed that the emphasis should be in the direction of freedom of research in universities to an extent not incompatible with national security.

e. Basic Research. Dr. Bush strongly urged that the bill should contain a positive statement of intent to the effect that the Commission should normally depend on the universities to carry forward the basic research program in this field. He pointed out that unless this were done the bill would be in direct conflict with his Foundation bill, and would be a serious deterrent to the healthy advance of fundamental knowledge in this field. The Committee was

in general agreement with this view.

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
technical, and legal personnel should be exempt.

General Royall pointed out that the bill did not give the Commission any quasi-judicial power. The Committee agreed that it should not have such powers. The Committee also agreed with General Royall's view that no power need be given the Commission in the bill over exports and imports. It was agreed that the language of the law should permit the Commission to make payments for local taxes when circumstances so warranted.

It was agreed that Lts. Allan and Duff should redraft the bill so as to reflect the suggestions brought out at the meeting as well as the more extended comments which Dr. Bush and General Groves would prepare in writing.

V. NEXT MEETING:

No definite time was set for the next meeting. Dr. Conant suggested that 2 August would be desirable from his point of view.


R. GORDON ARNESON
1st Lieutenant, AUS
Secretary to the Committee.

HARRY S. TRUMAN
INDEPENDENCE, MISSOURI

August 5, 1963

Dear Kup:

I appreciated most highly your column of July 30th, a copy of which you sent me.


I have been rather careful not to comment on the articles that have been written on the dropping of the bomb for the simple reason that the dropping of the bomb was completely and thoroughly explained in my Memoirs, and it was done to save 125,000 youngsters on the American side and 125,000 on the Japanese side from getting killed and that is what it did. It probably also saved a half million youngsters on both sides from being maimed for life.

You must always remember that people forget, as you said in your column, that the bombing of Pearl Harbor was done while we were at peace with Japan and trying our best to negotiate a treaty with them.

All you have to do is to go out and stand on the keel of the Battleship in Pearl Harbor with the 3,000 youngsters underneath it who had no chance whatever of saving their lives. That is true of two or three other battleships that were sunk in Pearl Harbor. Altogether, there were between 3,000 and 6,000 youngsters killed at that time without any declaration of war. It was plain murder.

I knew what I was doing when I stopped the war that would have killed a half million youngsters on both sides if those bombs had not been dropped. I have no regrets and, under the same circumstances, I would do it again - and this letter is not confidential.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature of Harry Truman in dark ink, written in a cursive style. The signature is positioned below the typed name and the word "Sincerely yours".

Mr. Irv Kupcinet
Chicago Sun-Times
Chicago, Illinois



At the meeting of June 18, '45
the invasion plan for Japan
was discussed. General Marshall's
plan was approved.

We were approaching an experi-
ment with the atom explosion.
I was informed that great
would take place within a possi-
ble thirty days.

I then suggested that after that
experimental test of the fission
of the atom, that we give Japan
a chance to stop the war by a
surrender. That plan was followed.
Japan refused to surrender
and the bomb was dropped on
two targets after which great
the surrender took place.

June 7, 1954


Following the decision ^{referred to} in the last
memo, when the message arrived
informing us of the successful
explosion of the experimental atom
bomb at Los Alamos, Sec. Stimson,
Gen. Marshall, Adm. Leahy, Sec. Byrnes,
Gen. Arnold and one or two others
came into my office at the Potsdam
White House and we discussed
the proposed ultimatum talked
about on June 18th.

After some discussion it was
decided to send the message from
Potsdam. Of course Chiang had to
be informed and asked to join
with Mr. Min. Churchill and myself.
The message was sent both by air
and through Sweden and Switzerland
I'm sure. We had nothing in reply

but the radio statement re-
fusing to surrender.

I am not informed at all
on the last question. It is proba-
bly a Monday morning quarter-
back affair ~~after~~ after the game
was over.

H.D.



Mr. Romagosa:—
anything to add to the high-price investigation?"

Q. Oh yes.

THE PRESIDENT. That's the investigation of high prices, not the high-price investigation! [Laughter]

Q. Mr. President, do you think that the Attorney General's investigation can actually check the rise of prices, or will it merely point the finger as to who is responsible for it?

THE PRESIDENT. I think the second part of your question is probably what would happen.

Q. That that in itself would probably not check—

THE PRESIDENT. Have to wait and see what the results would be.

Q. Mr. President, do you believe that it's the violations of the Sherman Anti-Trust law that are responsible for high prices?

THE PRESIDENT. I can't answer that until the investigation has found the answer. That is what the investigation is for.

[8.] Q. Mr. President, have you any comment on the state of the world a year after V-J Day?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, I was thinking when the press conference was called that it was—accidentally happened to be on the anniversary of the surrender of the Japanese. I think the announcement was made to you, as I remember, about 7 o'clock in the afternoon, and I had anticipated at that time that we would have arrived at a peaceful settlement of affairs in the world. I regret to say that we have not arrived at that situation. I am still hopeful that we will have peace in the world that will be for the benefit of all the peoples of the world, as I stated, I think, in my V-J Day announcement.

[9.] Q. Mr. President, there has been a lot of afterthinking, and recently Colonel Fellers, who was a brigadier general under

MacArthur out there, had a piece in which he insisted that the dropping of the atomic bomb was unnecessary, that the war had been won before that time.

THE PRESIDENT. When I was going to school we were discussing the battle of Gettysburg, and a very bright young man got up and stated the maneuvers that should have been made by General Lee and those that should have been made by General Meade, in order to make a complete victory at that point. And the old professor made the statement that any schoolboy's afterthought is worth more than all the generals' forethought. And that is true in the case you state. [Laughter]

Q. So far as you are concerned, you have never had any doubt that it was necessary?

THE PRESIDENT. I have never had any doubt that it was necessary, and I didn't have any doubt at the time. I hated very much to have to make that decision. Anybody would. But I thought that decision was made in the interest of saving about 250,000 American boys from getting killed, and I still think that was true.

[10.] Q. Mr. President, would you be in favor of Secretary Anderson for Democratic National Chairman, if Mr. Hannegan doesn't stay on?

THE PRESIDENT. Well now, Tony,¹ I can't answer a question like that. [Laughter] The next time the Democratic Committee meets, they will probably decide on a chairman. I think very highly of Secretary Anderson, of course, but I am not naming him as Chairman of the Committee, Tony. A trick question like that! [More laughter]

Q. I just wanted to clarify my thinking.

THE PRESIDENT. That's all right, Tony. [To another reporter] Go ahead.

Q. Could I ask this? Mr. President, there has been a report that if Mr. Anderson does

¹ Ernest B. Vaccaro of the Associated Press.

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Remembrances of the War and the Bomb

The Ending of the War

ON THE morning of Aug 6, 1945, an awesome explosion destroyed the city of Hiroshima in the south of the island of Honshu, Japan. Blast and heat devastation from the *pikadon* were followed by an all-consuming firestorm (*pika* [bright flash of light]; *don* [loud sound]; *pikadon* came to mean to the people of Hiroshima an explosion consisting of a flash and a boom). There had been severe bombing of many cities in Japan earlier, especially by incendiary bombs, and many sweeping fires had destroyed large areas of cities. The people of Japan were told only that the destruction of Hiroshima was caused by a new kind of bomb.

See also pp 617, 620, 640, and 645.

In 1945, I was the only physician studying nuclear physics at the Institute of Physical and Chemical Researches in Tokyo. Dr. Yoshio Nishina was our professor. We at the institute immediately surmised that the Hiroshima explosion may have been an atomic bomb, and Professor Nishina went to Hiroshima to investigate. He discovered that he could tell from the pattern of destruction that it had probably been caused by an atomic bomb. He was even able to pinpoint the center of the explosion (Figure). He picked soil, metals, and bones from the central crater and sent them to us for analysis. At 5 PM on Aug 8, using a crude method of analysis by radioscope, I determined that there was 2,500 times greater radiation in bones from victims of the Hiroshima bomb than the natural background radiation. This confirmed our belief that the weapon that destroyed Hiroshima was an atomic bomb.

I went to see Mr. Inosuke Furuno, the head of the Domei news agency, at 5 PM on Aug 8 to tell him about the atomic bomb. He handed me a typewritten sheet that contained a speech made by President Harry Truman of the United States. On return to the institute, we studied the speech and found out that our analysis and results were verified

completely by President Truman. The speech warned that the next bomb would be dropped on Tokyo, so I feared that Japan would be wiped out. When I showed the data about the atomic bomb to Count Makino, he became gravely concerned and immediately asked for an audience with the Emperor to tell his Majesty of the danger of the threat of bombing Tokyo. The Count was afraid that there would be no chance for peace talks if the atom bomb was indeed dropped on Tokyo. His Majesty listened to the Count for one hour and 40 minutes and indicated his decision to accept the Potsdam Declaration. At 10 PM the same night, at his sole discretion, Mr. Furuno cabled the dispatch over the broadcasting station to French Indochina about Japan's acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration. At 10.15 PM, London and New York broadcast Japan's acceptance.

Before the War

As background information, please understand that before World War II, Count Makino, the grandfather of my wife, was on extremely good terms with Mr. Joseph C. Grew (US Ambassador to Japan) and also with Mr. Shigeru Yoshida (later the Prime Minister of Japan) and his wife. Mr. Grew, Count Makino, and Mr. Yoshida protested plans for war between the two countries. But the military in Japan overrode their opposition, and war resulted. After the war began, Mr. Grew was under watch by Japanese military police, so he could not very well go to any of the places he liked. However, Mr. Grew very much wanted to see Count Makino again before he returned to the United States. Mr. Grew was allowed to go to his physician, so he visited his ophthalmologist, whose medical services he shared with Count Makino. Count Makino went to this doctor's office before Ambassador Grew's appointment to speak to him. The Count told the Ambassador that he regretted the situation very much. He said that although he had told the Ambassador many times that he would prevent the military from fighting, his efforts had failed and he felt very embarrassed to face the Ambassador. However, he said that when the war ended he hoped they could resume their friendship. Ambassador Grew told the Count that he knew there was a limit to what any individual could do and that he also hoped they could be friends after the war. The Count further asked the Ambassador to appreciate the fact that "the Emperor

From the Takemi Office, Tokyo
Reprint requests to Takemi Office, Hon-Kamagome 2-chome 28-8, Bunkyo-ku,
112 Tokyo, Japan (Dr. Takemi).



Center of atomic bomb blast, Hiroshima, August 1945. Photograph courtesy of Dr Takemi, former president, Japan Medical Association

system" was essential to Japan. Ambassador Grew agreed entirely on this view. The Count further requested that the United States refrain from bombing Kyoto and Nara, since they were the ancient capitals of Japan and they contained treasures of the whole of mankind as well. Mr Grew stated that he would do his best to realize this despite what he anticipated to be extreme difficulties. Count Makino said that he firmly believed that Japan would lose this war. He told me that he knew empirically that winning the initial phases of the war would invariably result in losing the war and that the war would be waged by military forces but lacking the support of the nation. Although the Emperor indicated his opposition to the war at every point, the military not only didn't listen, they even conspired to have him abdicate. The discussion at this meeting between Mr Grew and Count Makino lasted about 15 minutes, and I was its only witness. I became keenly aware that the war between the United States and Japan was turning into a irretrievable misfortune.

Alternatives to the Hiroshima Bomb

The atomic bomb was the result of scientists of America making efforts to develop industry and new sources of energy. It was most regrettable that the bomb was used for war. The military had driven Japan to a stage that if it could not win, it would not surrender. It surely would have

lost the war and many people would have starved if the atom bomb had not been dropped. When one considers the possibility that the Japanese military would have sacrificed the entire nation if it were not for the atomic bomb attack, then this bomb might be described as having saved Japan. This is what I currently think, although I did think differently at the time of the bomb. It seems to me that the attitude of Japanese toward the atomic bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima has changed dramatically since that day. I believe that the majority of Japanese people now agree with my current position. However, I was surprised that the United States brought the same bomb to Nagasaki.

As Ambassador Grew and Count Makino had discussed, Japan was able to maintain its "Emperor system." This system and the policies of General MacArthur during the occupation were in the best interest of the Japanese people and brought about the prosperity of today. As a Japanese proverb says, "After a storm comes a calm." There still remains among us an apprehension about nuclear war. That the confrontation of the USSR and the United States of America should center around nuclear weapons is a grievance common to mankind. Japanese and American physicians should join together to prevent the use of nuclear bombs.

TARO TAKEMI, MD

Minutes of Meeting held
at the White House
on Monday, 18 June 1945 at 1530

PRESENT

The President —
Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy —
General of the Army G. C. Marshall —
Fleet Admiral E. J. King —
Lieut. General I. O. Eaker
(Representing General of the —
Army H. H. Arnold) —
The Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson —
The Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Forrestal —
The Assistant Secretary of War, Mr. McCloy —

SECRETARY

Brig. General A. J. McFarland —

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By 8-3-91
NARA Date

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JUN 20 1945



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General Marshall	2 & 5
Admiral King	3 & 6
General Arnold	4
Secy, JCS	7

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R&A SECTION, ROOM 2-C-934
THE PENTAGON

C.C.S. FILE COPY

334 Gen (2-2-45)
JCS 186-66-194/27

1. DETAILS OF THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST JAPAN

THE PRESIDENT stated that he had called the meeting for the purpose of informing himself with respect to the details of the campaign against Japan set out in Admiral Leahy's memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff of 14 June. He asked General Marshall if he would express his opinion.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that the present situation with respect to operations against Japan was practically identical with the situation which had existed in connection with the operations proposed against Normandy. He then read, as an expression of his views, the following digest of a memorandum prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for presentation to the President (J.C.S. 1388):

Our air and sea power has already greatly reduced movement of Jap shipping south of Korea and should in the next few months cut it to a trickle if not choke it off entirely. Hence, there is no need for seizing further positions in order to block Japanese communications south of Korea.

General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz are in agreement with the Chiefs of Staff in selecting 1 November as the target date to go into Kyushu because by that time:

a. If we press preparations we can be ready.

b. Our estimates are that our air action will have smashed practically every industrial target worth hitting in Japan as well as destroying huge areas in the Jap cities.

c. The Japanese Navy, if any still exists, will be completely powerless.

d. Our sea action and air power will have cut Jap reinforcement capabilities from the mainland to negligible proportions.

Important considerations bearing on the 1 November date rather than a later one are the weather and cutting to a minimum Jap time for preparation of defenses. If we delay much after the beginning of November the weather situation in the succeeding months may be such that the invasion of Japan, and hence the end of the war, will be delayed for up to 6 months.

An outstanding military point about attacking Korea is the difficult terrain and beach conditions which appear to make the only acceptable assault areas Fusan in the southeast corner and Keijo, well up the western side. To get to Fusan, which is a strongly fortified area, we must move large and vulnerable assault forces past heavily fortified Japanese areas. The operation appears more difficult and costly than assault on Kyushu. Keijo appears an equally difficult and costly operation. After we have undertaken either one of them we still will not be as far forward as going into Kyushu.

The Kyushu operation is essential to a strategy of strangulation and appears to be the least costly worth-while operation following Okinawa. The basic point is that a lodgement in Kyushu is essential, both to tightening our

strangle hold of blockade and bombardment on Japan, and to forcing capitulation by invasion of the Tokyo Plain.

We are bringing to bear against the Japanese every weapon and all the force we can employ and there is no reduction in our maximum possible application of bombardment and blockade, while at the same time we are pressing invasion preparations. It seems that if the Japanese are ever willing to capitulate short of complete military defeat in the field they will do it when faced by the completely hopeless prospect occasioned by (1) destruction already wrought by air bombardment and sea blockade, coupled with (2) a landing on Japan indicating the firmness of our resolution, and also perhaps coupled with (3) the entry or threat of entry of Russia into the war.

With reference to clean-up of the Asiatic mainland, our objective should be to get the Russians to deal with the Japs in Manchuria (and Korea if necessary) and to vitalize the Chinese to a point where, with assistance of American air power and some supplies, they can mop out their own country.

Casualties. Our experience in the Pacific war is so diverse as to casualties that it is considered wrong to give any estimate in numbers. Using various combinations of Pacific experience, the War Department staff reaches the conclusion that the cost of securing a worthwhile position in Korea would almost certainly be greater than the cost of the Kyushu operation. Points on the optimistic side of the Kyushu operation are that: General MacArthur has not yet accepted responsibility for going ashore where there would be disproportionate casualties. The nature of the objective area gives room for maneuver, both on the land and by sea. As to any discussion of specific operations, the following data are pertinent:

<u>Campaign</u>	U.S. Casualties		Jap Casualties	Ratio
	<u>Killed, wounded, missing</u>		<u>Killed and Prisoners</u> (<u>Not including wounded</u>)	<u>U.S.</u> <u>to Jap</u>
Leyte	17,000		78,000	1:4.6
Luzon	31,000		156,000	1:5.0
Iwo Jima	20,000		25,000	1:1.25
Okinawa	34,000 (Ground)		81,000	1:2
	7,700 (Navy)		(not a complete count)	
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(1st 30 days)	42,000		- - -	- - -

The record of General MacArthur's operations from 1 March 1944 through 1 May 1945 shows 13,742 U.S. killed compared to 310,165 Japanese killed, or a ratio of 22 to 1.

There is reason to believe that the first 30 days in Kyushu should not exceed the price we have paid for Luzon. It is a grim fact that there is not an easy, bloodless way to victory in war and it is the thankless task of the leaders to maintain their firm outward front which holds the resolution of their subordinates. Any irresolution in the leaders may result in costly weakening and indecision in the subordinates. It was this basic difficulty with the Primo

Minister which clouded and hampered all our preparations for the cross-channel operation now demonstrated as having been essential to victory in Europe.

An important point about Russian participation in the war is that the impact of Russian entry on the already hopeless Japanese may well be the decisive action levering them into capitulation at that time or shortly thereafter if we land in Japan.

In considering the matter of command and control in the Pacific war which the British wish to raise at the next conference, we must bear in mind the point that anything smacking of combined command in the Pacific might increase the difficulties with Russia and perhaps with China. Furthermore the obvious inefficiencies of combined command may directly result in increased cost in resources and American lives.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he had asked General MacArthur's opinion on the proposed operation and had received from him the following telegram, which General Marshall then read:

"I believe the operation presents less hazards of excessive loss than any other that has been suggested and that its decisive effect will eventually save lives by eliminating wasteful operations of nondecisive character. I regard the operation as the most economical one in effort and lives that is possible. In this respect it must be remembered that the several preceding months will involve practically no losses in ground troops and that sooner or later a decisive ground attack must be made. The hazard and loss will be greatly lessened if an attack is launched from Siberia sufficiently ahead of our target date to commit the enemy to major combat. I most earnestly recommend no change in OLYMPIC. Additional subsidiary attacks will simply build up our final total casualties."

GENERAL MARSHALL said that it was his personal view that the operation against Kyushu was the only course to pursue. He felt that air power alone was not sufficient to put the Japanese out of the war. It was unable alone to put the Germans out. General Baker and General Eisenhower both agreed to this. Against the Japanese, scattered through mountainous country, the problem would be much more difficult than it had been in Germany. He felt that this plan offered the only way the Japanese could be forced into a feeling of utter helplessness. The operation would be difficult but not more so than the assault in Normandy. He was convinced that every individual moving to the Pacific should be indoctrinated with a firm determination to see it through.

ADMIRAL KING agreed with General Marshall's views and said that the more he studied the matter, the more he was impressed with the strategic location of Kyushu, which he considered the key to the success of any siege operations. He pointed out that within three months the effects of air power based on Okinawa will begin to be felt strongly in Japan. It seemed to him that Kyushu followed logically after Okinawa. It was a natural setup. It was his opinion that we should do Kyushu now, after which there would be time to judge the effect of possible operations by the Russians and the Chinese. The weather constituted quite a factor. So far as preparation was concerned, we must aim now for Tokyo Plain; otherwise we

~~TOP SECRET~~
will never be able to accomplish it. If preparations do not go forward now, they cannot be arranged for later. Once started, however, they can always be stopped if desired.

GENERAL MARSHALL agreed that Kyushu was a necessity and pointed out that it constituted a landing in the Japanese homeland. Kyushu having been arranged for, the decision as to further action could be made later.

THE PRESIDENT inquired if a later decision would not depend on what the Russians agree to do. It was agreed that this would have considerable influence.

THE PRESIDENT then asked Admiral Leahy for his views of the situation.

ADMIRAL LEAHY recalled that the President had been interested in knowing what the price in casualties for Kyushu would be and whether or not that price could be paid. He pointed out that the troops on Okinawa had lost 35 percent in casualties. If this percentage were applied to the number of troops to be employed in Kyushu, he thought from the similarity of the fighting to be expected that this would give a good estimate of the casualties to be expected. He was interested therefore in finding out how many troops are to be used in Kyushu.

ADMIRAL KING called attention to what he considered an important difference in Okinawa and Kyushu. There had been only one way to go on Okinawa. This meant a straight frontal attack against a highly fortified position. On Kyushu, however, landings would be made on three fronts simultaneously and there would be much more room for maneuver. It was his opinion that a realistic casualty figure for Kyushu would lie somewhere between the number experienced by General MacArthur in the operations on Luzon and the Okinawa casualties.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that the total assault troops for the Kyushu campaign were shown in the memorandum prepared for the President as 766,700. He said, in answer to the President's question as to what opposition could be expected on Kyushu, that it was estimated at eight Japanese divisions or about 350,000 troops. He said that divisions were still being raised in Japan and that reinforcement from other areas was possible but it was becoming increasingly difficult and painful.

THE PRESIDENT asked about the possibility of reinforcements for Kyushu moving south from the other Japanese islands.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that it was expected that all communications with Kyushu would be destroyed.

ADMIRAL KING described in some detail the land communications between the other Japanese islands and Kyushu and stated that as a result of operations already planned, the Japanese would have to depend on sea shipping for any reinforcement.

ADMIRAL LEAHY stressed the fact that Kyushu was an island. It was crossed by a mountain range, which would be difficult for either the Japanese or the Americans to cross. The Kyushu operation, in effect, contemplated the taking of another island from which to bring increased air power against Japan.

THE PRESIDENT expressed the view that it was practically creating another Okinawa closer to Japan, to which the Chiefs of Staff agreed.

~~TOP SECRET~~
THE PRESIDENT then asked General Eaker for his opinion of the operation as an air man.

GENERAL EAKER said that he agreed completely with the statements made by General Marshall in his digest of the memorandum prepared for the President. He had just received a cable in which General Arnold also expressed complete agreement. He stated that any blockade of Honshu was dependent upon airdromes on Kyushu; that the air plan contemplated employment of 40 groups of heavy bombers against Japan and that these could not be deployed without the use of airfields on Kyushu. He said that those who advocated the use against Japan of air power alone overlooked the very impressive fact that air casualties are always much heavier when the air faces the enemy alone and that these casualties never fail to drop as soon as the ground forces come in. Present air casualties are averaging 2 percent per mission, about 30 percent per month. He wished to point out and to emphasize that delay favored only the enemy and he urged that there be no delay.

THE PRESIDENT said that as he understood it the Joint Chiefs of Staff, after weighing all the possibilities of the situation and considering all possible alternative plans were still of the unanimous opinion that the Kyushu operation was the best solution under the circumstances.

The Chiefs of Staff agreed that this was so.

THE PRESIDENT then asked the Secretary of War for his opinion.

MR. STIMSON agreed with the Chiefs of Staff that there was no other choice. He felt that he was personally responsible to the President more for political than for military considerations. It was his opinion that there was a large submerged class in Japan who do not favor the present war and whose full opinion and influence had never yet been felt. He felt sure that this submerged class would fight and fight tenaciously if attacked on their own ground. He was concerned that something should be done to arouse them and to develop any possible influence they might have before it became necessary to come to grips with them.

THE PRESIDENT stated that this possibility was being worked on all the time. He asked if the invasion of Japan by white men would not have the effect of more closely uniting the Japanese.

MR. STIMSON thought there was every prospect of this. He agreed with the plan proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as being the best thing to do, but he still hoped for some fruitful accomplishment through other means.

THE PRESIDENT then asked for the views of the Secretary of the Navy.

MR. FORRESTAL pointed out that even if we wished to besiege Japan for a year or a year and a half, the capture of Kyushu would still be essential. Therefore, the sound decision is to proceed with the operation against Kyushu. There will still be time thereafter to consider the main decision in the light of subsequent events.

SECRET

MR. McCLOY said he felt that the time was propitious now to study closely all possible means of bringing out the influence of the submerged group in Japan which had been referred to by Mr. Stimson.

THE PRESIDENT stated that one of his objectives in connection with the coming conference would be to get from Russia all the assistance in the war that was possible. To this end he wanted to know all the decisions that he would have to make in advance in order to occupy the strongest possible position in the discussions.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he could not agree with those who said to him that unless we obtain the unconditional surrender of the Japanese that we will have lost the war. He feared no menace from Japan in the foreseeable future, even if we were unsuccessful in forcing unconditional surrender. What he did fear was that our insistence on unconditional surrender would result only in making the Japanese desperate and thereby increase our casualty lists. He did not think that this was at all necessary.

THE PRESIDENT stated that it was with that thought in mind that he had left the door open for Congress to take appropriate action with reference to unconditional surrender. However, he did not feel that he could take any action at this time to change public opinion on the matter.

THE PRESIDENT said he considered the Kyushu plan all right from the military standpoint and, so far as he was concerned, the Joint Chiefs of Staff could go ahead with it; that we can do this operation and then decide as to the final action later.

The conversation then turned on the situation in China.

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that General Wedemeyer's operations were pointing towards Canton. He thought it was already evident that the Japanese would hold fortress troops there and in other places. It might be necessary to go around these fortress troops as had been done in France or to take other courses with respect to them.

In reply to a question from the President, GENERAL MARSHALL outlined the present status of Chinese divisions as to completeness of personnel and equipment. He said the military ability of the Chinese generals was not very good. He had already asked General Wedemeyer whether it would be possible to use with the Chinese troops one or more of the U.S. Army commanders with their staffs, who were now returning from France. General Wedemeyer's reply, while not conclusive, had been, in general, favorable. General Marshall thought that if the Generalissimo would accept the use of these commanders for control of Chinese groups, it would be a very excellent thing.

THE PRESIDENT then inquired as to the possibility of getting an over-all commander in the Pacific.

GENERAL MARSHALL and ADMIRAL KING both agreed that under the circumstances existing in the Pacific there was little prospect of it. ADMIRAL KING pointed out that it was undesirable to accept divided command with the British and that we would lose more than we would gain if we brought about in the Pacific the situation that had existed in France.

GENERAL MARSHALL stated the American commander would always have to think of his government's policies. In connection with this, he recounted the difficulty experienced in Malta in obtaining British agreement to General Eisenhower's plan for the invasion of Germany. Their reluctance in the matter was due to their belief that General Eisenhower was influenced by the American commanders.

THE PRESIDENT said he was simply interested in finding out whether an over-all commander for the Pacific would be an advantage or a liability.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that from the large point of view there was no question about its being a liability.

In connection with British participation in the Pacific, General Marshall said that the President would find the Prime Minister very articulate. He is interested in showing that the British Government has played a full part in the defeat of Japan and that it had not been necessary for them to wait for the United States to recapture Singapore for them. The Americans, of course, were glad to have any real help or any assistance that would result in striking a real blow, but that British participation in some ways would constitute an embarrassment. However, the British were under American over-all command in the Pacific.

THE PRESIDENT referred to the Portuguese participation in the Southwest Pacific and stated that he wished to get the air program definitely settled with the Portuguese before we do anything more about Timor.

THE PRESIDENT reiterated that his main reason for this conference with the Chiefs of Staff was his desire to know definitely how far we could afford to go in the Japanese campaign. He had hoped that there was a possibility of preventing an Okinawa from one end of Japan to the other. He was clear on the situation now and was quite sure that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should proceed with the Kyushu operation.

With reference to operations in China, GENERAL MARSHALL expressed the opinion that we should not seek an over-all commander in China. The present situation in which the Generalissimo was supporting General Wedemeyer, acting as his Chief of Staff, was entirely satisfactory. The suggestion of the appointment of an over-all commander might cause some difficulty.

ADMIRAL KING said he wished to emphasize the point that, regardless of the desirability of the Russians entering the war, they were not indispensable and he did not think we should go so far as to beg them to come in. While the cost of defeating Japan would be greater, there was no question in his mind but that we could handle it alone. He thought that the realization of this fact should greatly strengthen the President's hand in the forthcoming conference.

THE PRESIDENT and the Chiefs of Staff then discussed certain other matters.

2. REINSTATEMENT OF LEND-LEASE SUPPLIES TO THE FRENCH

ADMIRAL LEAHY read a telegram in which General McNarney recommended that Lend-Lease supplies to the French be reinstated after the French withdrawal from northern Italy had been completed. He asked the President's views.

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE PRESIDENT stated that he agreed with General McNarney's recommendations and felt that he should be supported.

THE PRESIDENT expressed his appreciation of the results of his conference with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He said it cleared up a great many points in his mind and that he now felt satisfied and reassured.

Minutes of Meeting held at 1500.
The White House on 18 June 1945 at 1530.

DECLASSIFIED PURSUANT
TO E.O. 12958

Date: 16 Nov 1970

PRESENT

The President

~~Fleet~~ Admiral William D. Leahy
~~of the Army~~
General G. C. Marshall

~~Fleet~~ Admiral E. J. King
~~Lieut~~ General I. C. Baker
(Acting for General Arnold)

~~The Secretary of War~~ Mr. ~~Henry~~ Stimson
~~The Secy of the Navy~~ Mr. ~~James~~ A. Forrestal
~~The Asst Secy of War~~ Mr. ~~J.~~ F. McCloy

Secretary

Brig. General A. J. McFarland

TOP SECRET

Details of The Campaign against Japan

had called the meeting
THE PRESIDENT stated that he ~~was interested in informing~~
for the purpose of informing himself with respect
~~himself in connection with the proposed operations against Japan~~
to the details of the Campaign against Japan
~~on the points raised in the memorandum which he had given to~~
to
the Joint Chiefs of Staff of 14 June.
Admiral Leahy
Admiral Leahy. He asked General Marshall if he would express
his opinion.

present
GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that the ~~situation existing~~
~~now~~ with respect to operations against Japan was practically
identical with the situation which had existed in connection with
the operations proposed against Normandy. He then read, *as an*
expression of his views, the
following digest of ~~the~~ memorandum prepared by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff for presentation to the President (JCS 1388):

~~The~~ Our air and sea power has already greatly reduced move-
ment of Jap shipping south of Korea and should in the next
few months cut it to a trickle if not choke it off entirely.
Hence, there is no need for seizing further positions in order
to block Japanese communications south of Korea.

General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz are in agreement with
the Chiefs of Staff in selecting 1 November as the target date
to go into Kyushu because by that time:

- a. If we press preparations we can be ready.
- b. Our estimates are that our air action will have
smashed practically every industrial target worth hitting
in Japan as well as destroying huge areas in the Jap cities.

c. The Japanese Navy, if any still exists, will be completely powerless.

d. Our sea action and air power will have cut Jap reinforcement capabilities from the mainland to negligible proportions.

Important considerations bearing on the 1 November date rather than a later one are the weather and cutting to a minimum Jap time for preparation of defenses. If we delay much after the beginning of November the weather situation in the succeeding months may be such that the invasion of Japan, and hence the end of the war, will be delayed for up to 6 months.

⑥ An outstanding military point about attacking Korea is the difficult terrain and beach conditions which appear to make the only acceptable assault areas Fusan in the southeast corner and Keijo, well up the western side. To get to Fusan, which is a strongly fortified area, we must move large and vulnerable assault forces past heavily fortified Japanese areas. The operation appears more difficult and costly than assault on Kyushu. Keijo appears an equally difficult and costly operation. After we have undertaken either one of them, we still will not be as far forward as going into Kyushu.

⑦ The Kyushu operation is essential to a strategy of strangulation and appears to be the least costly worth-while

operation following Okinawa. The basic point is that a lodg-
ment in Kyushu is essential, both to tightening our strangle
hold of blockade and bombardment on Japan, and to forcing
capitulation by invasion of the Tokyo Plain.

② We are bringing to bear against the Japanese every
weapon and all the force we can employ and there is no reduction
in our maximum possible application of bombardment and blockade,
(while at the same time we are pressing invasion preparations.

It seems that if the Japanese are ever willing to capitulate
short of complete military defeat in the field they will do it
when faced by the completely hopeless prospect occasioned by
(1) destruction already wrought by air bombardment and sea
blockade, coupled with (2) a landing on Japan indicating the
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the entry or threat of entry of Russia into the war.

③ With reference to clean-up of the Asiatic mainland, our
objective should be to get the Russians to deal with the Japn
in Manchuria (and Korea if necessary) and to vitalize the Chinese
to a point where, with assistance of American air power and
some supplies, they can mop out their own country.

④ Casualties. Our experience in the Pacific war is so
diverse as to casualties that it is considered wrong to give
any estimate in numbers. Using various combinations of

Pacific experience, the War Department staff reaches the conclusion that the cost of securing a worth-while position in Korea would almost certainly be greater than the cost of the Kyushu operation. Points on the optimistic side of the Kyushu operation are that: General MacArthur has not yet accepted responsibility for going ashore where there would be disproportionate casualties. The nature of the objective area gives room for maneuver, both on the land and by sea. As to any discussion of specific operations, the following data ^{are} ~~is~~ pertinent:

Campaign	U.S. Casualties		Jap Casualties	Ratio U.S. to Jap
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The record of General MacArthur's operations from 1 March 1944 through 1 May 1945 shows 13,742 U.S. killed compared to 310,165 Japanese killed, or a ratio of 22 to 1.

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② An important point about Russian participation in the war is that the impact of Russian entry on the already hopeless Japanese may well be the decisive action levering them into capitulation at that time or shortly thereafter if we land in Japan.

③ In considering the matter of command and control in the Pacific war which the British wish to raise at the next conference, we must bear in mind the point that anything smacking of combined command in the Pacific might increase the difficulties with Russia and perhaps with China. Furthermore the obvious inefficiencies of combined command may directly result in increased cost in resources and American lives.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he had asked General MacArthur's opinion on the proposed operation and ^{had received} ^{the following} received from him a telegram, which General Marshall ^{then} ~~proceeded to~~ read:

"I believe the operation presents less hazards of excessive loss than any other that has been suggested and that its decisive effect will eventually save lives by eliminating

wasteful operations of nondecisive character. I regard the operation as the most economical one in effort and lives that is possible. In this respect it must be remembered that the several preceding months will involve practically no losses in ground troops and that sooner or later a decisive ground attack must be made. The hazard and loss will be greatly lessened if an attack is launched from Siberia sufficiently ahead of our target date to commit the enemy to major combat. I most earnestly recommend no change in ^{OLYMPIC} ~~Olympic~~. Additional subsidiary attacks will simply build up our final total casualties."

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ADMIRAL KING agreed with General Marshall's ^{views} remarks and ^{said} stated that the more he studied the matter, the more he was

impressed with the strategic location of Kyushu, which he considered the key to the success of any siege operations. He

pointed out that within three months ~~more~~ the effects of air power based on Okinawa will begin to be felt strongly in Japan. It

seemed to him that Kyushu followed logically after Okinawa. *It was a natural setup.*
~~Okinawa, then Kyushu, with the possible action to be expected~~

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THE PRESIDENT then asked Admiral Leahy for his views of the situation.

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How much troops were to be used in Kyushu

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~~TOP SECRET~~
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and considering the situation, all ~~other~~ possible *alternatives* plans, all contingencies, *will* ~~still of~~ *opinion* ~~and a~~ ~~unanimous~~ ~~conclusion~~ that the

Kyushu operation was the best solution under the circumstances.

The Chiefs of Staff agreed that this was so.

THE PRESIDENT then asked the Secretary of War for his opinion.

MR. STIMSON stated that he agreed with the Chiefs of Staff that there was no other choice. He ~~said that he was personally acquainted with the terrain between Tokyo and Osaka and it was not in his opinion, suited for a war of movement.~~ He felt that he was personally more responsible to the President for political considerations than military considerations. It was his opinion that there was a large submerged class in Japan who do not favor the present war and whose full opinion and influence had never yet been felt. He felt sure that this submerged class would fight and fight tenaciously if attacked on *their own* ~~the~~ ground. He was concerned that something should be done to arouse them *and* ~~in order~~ to develop any possible influence they might have before it ~~came to become~~ *necessary to come to grips with them.* ~~grip on the ground.~~

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~~accomplishment through other means.~~
~~means to be found through efforts that could be made from the~~
~~outside.~~

~~THE PRESIDENT then asked for Mr. Forrestal's views. Mr.~~

~~MR. FORRESTAL pointed out that even if~~ ^{we wished to} ~~the decision were to~~
~~be a siege~~ ^{be a siege} of Japan for a year or a year and a half, ~~that~~ the
capture of Kyushu would still be essential. Therefore, the sound
decision is to proceed with the operation against Kyushu. There
will still be ~~time~~ ^{to consider} time thereafter ~~for~~ ^{in the} the main decision, ~~which~~
~~can be made in the~~ light of subsequent events.

MR. McCLOY said he felt that the time was propitious now to
study closely ~~what efforts could be brought to bear in bringing~~ ^{all possible means of}
out the influence of the submerged group in Japan which had been
referred to by Mr. Stimson.

THE PRESIDENT stated that one of his objectives in connection
with the ^{coming} conference would be to get all the assistance from
Russia in the war that was possible. To this end he wanted to know
all the decisions that he would have to make in advance in order
to occupy the strongest position possible in the discussions.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he could not agree with ~~the opinion~~ ^{those}

~~one~~ who said to him that unless we ^{obtain} ~~force~~ the Japanese into
unconditional surrender ^{of the Japanese} that we will have lost the war. He
feared no menace from Japan in the ^{foreseeable} ~~reasonable~~ future, even if we

were unsuccessful in forcing unconditional surrender. What he ~~did~~
fear ~~was~~ was that our insistence on unconditional surrender would ~~not~~

^{only} result in making the Japanese desperate and thereby ^{increase} ~~result in~~
~~our civility lists~~. He did not think that ^{this was at all} ~~such a result was~~

necessary. ~~The President~~

THE PRESIDENT stated that ^{it was with} ~~he had had~~ that thought in mind

~~that~~ ^{that} he had left the door open for Congress to take appropriate

action with reference to unconditional surrender. However, he

did not feel that ^{he could} ~~at this time it was possible for him to take~~

^{at this time to change} any action with ~~reference to~~ public opinion on ^{the} ~~this~~ matter. ^{TR The President} ~~He~~

^{considered} ~~said with reference to~~ the Kyushu plan ~~that he considered it all~~

right from the military standpoint and, ^{so} ~~as~~ far as he was concerned,

the Joint Chiefs of Staff could go ahead with it; that we ~~could~~ ^{could}

do this operation and then ^{decide} ~~make decision~~ as to the final action
later.

The conversation then turned on the situation in China.

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that General Wedemeyer's operations
were pointing towards Canton. He thought it was already evident
that the Japanese would hold fortress troops there and in other
places. It might be necessary to go around these fortress

troops as had been done in France, or to take other courses with ^{respect} reference to them.

In reply to a question from the President, GENERAL MARSHALL outlined the present status of Chinese divisions with ^{as} ~~respect~~ to completeness of personnel and equipment. He said ~~the prospect~~ with ~~respect to~~ ^{military} the ability of the Chinese generals ^{was} ~~was~~ not very good. He had already asked General Wedemeyer whether it would be possible to use with the Chinese troops one or more of the U.S. Army commanders with their staffs who were now returning from France. General Wedemeyer's reply, while not conclusive, had been, in general, favorable. General Marshall thought that if the Generalissimo would ^{accept} ~~accept~~ the use of these commanders for control of Chinese groups, ~~that~~ it would be a very excellent thing.

THE PRESIDENT then inquired as to the ^{possibility} ~~prospects~~ of ^{getting} ~~an~~ overall commander in the Pacific, ~~which he thought would be a good thing.~~

~~Both~~ GENERAL MARSHALL and ADMIRAL KING ^{both agreed that} ~~explained that under~~

^{under} the circumstances existing in the Pacific with ~~the variety of troops~~ to be operating there, with the number of nations involved, ~~that they thought there were no prospects for it.~~ ^{was little of} ~~it.~~ ^{Admiral King} ~~was~~ pointed out ^{that} it was undesirable to accept divided command with the British and that we would lose more than we would gain if we brought about

B-11 11-23

situation than

in the Pacific the ~~same conditions~~ as had existed in France.

GENERAL MARSHALL stated the American commander would always have to think of his government's policies. In connection with this, he recounted the difficulty *experienced in MacArthur* obtaining British agreement ~~to~~ *to* General Eisenhower's plan for the invasion of Germany.

Their reluctance in the matter was due to their belief that General Eisenhower ~~was~~ *was* influenced by the American commanders.

THE PRESIDENT said *he was simply interested in* ~~that it was simply his idea to find out~~ whether an over-all commander for the Pacific would be an advantage or a liability.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that from the large point of view there was no question about *its* ~~being~~ *TP* being a liability. In connection with ~~the~~ British participation in the Pacific, General Marshall said that the President would find the Prime Minister very articulate. He is interested in showing that the British Government has played a full part in the defeat of Japan and that it had not been necessary for them to wait for the United States to recapture Singapore for them. The Americans, of course, were glad to have any real help or any assistance that would ~~help~~ *result*

in strike *in* a real blow, but that British participation in some way would constitute an embarrassment. However, the British were under American over-all command in the Pacific. ~~He stated that the British wanted the Australians to take over as far as the Celebes. The Australians wanted to take over their own~~

~~Mandated Island/area (check with Planners). The Australian Deputy Prime Minister had recently conferred with the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the Australian role in the war and that the British had suffered some embarrassment because they have not yet been able to agree definitely with the Australians. The~~

X
~~From~~

THE PRESIDENT referred to the Portuguese participation in the Southwest Pacific and stated that he wished to get the air program definitely settled with the Portuguese before we do anything more about Timor.

THE PRESIDENT reiterated that his main reason for this conference with the Chiefs of Staff was his desire to know definitely how far we could afford to go into ~~this operation~~ *the Japanese Campaign*.

He had hoped that there was a possibility of preventing an Okinawa from one end of Japan to the other. He was clear on the situation now and was quite sure that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should proceed with the Kyushu operation.

With reference to operations in China, GENERAL MARSHALL expressed the opinion that we should not seek an over-all commander in China. The present situation in which the Generalissimo was supporting General Wedemeyer, acting as his Chief of Staff, was entirely satisfactory. The suggestion of the appointment of an over-all commander might cause some difficulty.

ADMIRAL KING said he wished to emphasize the point

that, regardless of the desirability of the Russians entering the war,

~~that~~ they were not indispensable and ~~that~~ he did not think we

should go *so far as to beg* ~~to any great lengths to beg~~ them to come in.

While the cost of defeating Japan would be greater, there was no

question in his mind but that we x could handle it alone. He

thought that the realization of this fact should greatly

strengthen the President's hand in *The forthcoming Conference* ~~discussing matters with the~~

~~Recommendations.~~

2. Reinstatement of Lend Lease Supplies to The Fr

ADMIRAL LEAHY read a telegram in which General McNarney

Lend Lease
~~was~~ recommended that ~~the reinstatement of~~ supplies to the French

be reinstated

~~take place~~ after the French withdrawal from northern Italy *had been completed. He asked the President's views.*

~~Thereafter~~ THE PRESIDENT stated that he agreed with General

McNarney's recommendations and felt that he should be supported.

THE PRESIDENT expressed his appreciation of the results

of his conference with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He said ~~that~~ *it*

cleared up a great many points in his mind and that he now felt

satisfied and reassured.

The President and the Chiefs of Staff then discussed certain other matters.

DECLASSIFIED PURSUANT
TO JCS 927/495-1

Date: 16 Nov 1970

PRESENT

The President

Admiral William D. Leahy

General G. C. Marshall

Admiral E. J. King

General I. C. Eaker
(Acting for General Arnold)

Mr. Henry L. Stimson

Mr. James R. Forrestal

Mr. J. J. McCloy

Secretary

Brig. General A. J. McFarland

JUN 20 1945



RECEIVED JUN 20 1945

THE PRESIDENT stated that he was interested in informing himself in connection with the proposed operations against Japan on the points raised in the memorandum which he had given to Admiral Leahy. He asked General Marshall if he would express his opinion.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that the situation existing now with respect to operations against Japan was practically identical with the situation which had existed in connection with the operations proposed against Normandy. He then read the following digest of the memorandum prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for presentation to the President:

1. Our air and sea power has already greatly reduced movement of Jap shipping south of Korea and should in the next few months cut it to a trickle if not choke it off entirely. Hence, there is no need for seizing further positions in order to block Japanese communications south of Korea.

2. General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz are in agreement with the Chiefs of Staff in selecting 1 November as the target date to go into Kyushu because by that time:

- a. If we press preparations we can be ready.

- b. Our estimates are that our air action will have

smashed practically every industrial target worth hitting in Japan as well as destroying huge areas in the Jap cities.

c. The Japanese Navy, if any still exists, will be completely powerless.

d. Our sea action and air power will have cut Jap reinforcement capabilities from the mainland to negligible proportions.

Important considerations bearing on the 1 November date rather than a later one are the weather and cutting to a minimum Jap time for preparation of defenses. If we delay much after the beginning of November the weather situation in the succeeding months may be such that the invasion of Japan, and hence the end of the war, will be delayed for up to 6 months.

3. An outstanding military point about attacking Korea is the difficult terrain and beach conditions which appear to make the only acceptable assault areas Pusan in the southeast corner and Keijo, well up the western side. To get to Pusan, which is a strongly fortified area, we must move large and vulnerable assault forces past heavily fortified Japanese areas. The operation appears more difficult and costly than assault on Kyushu. Keijo appears an equally difficult and costly operation. After we have undertaken either one of them we still will not be as far forward as going into Kyushu.

4. The Kyushu operation is essential to a strategy of strangulation and appears to be the least costly worth-while.

operation following Okinawa. The basic point is that a lodgment in Kyushu is essential, both to tightening our stranglehold of blockade and bombardment on Japan, and to forcing capitulation by invasion of the Tokyo Plain.

5. We are bringing to bear against the Japanese every weapon and all the force we can employ and there is no reduction in our maximum possible application of bombardment and blockade, while at the same time we are pressing invasion preparations.

It seems that if the Japanese are ever willing to capitulate short of complete military defeat in the field they will do it when faced by the completely hopeless prospect occasioned by

(1) destruction already wrought by air bombardment and sea blockade, coupled with (2) a landing on Japan indicating the firmness of our resolution, and also perhaps coupled with (3) the entry or threat of entry of Russia into the war.

6. With reference to clean-up of the Asiatic mainland, our objective should be to get the Russians to deal with the Japanese in Manchuria (and Korea if necessary) and to vitalize the Chinese to a point where, with assistance of American air power and some supplies, they can mop out their own country.

7. Casualties. Our experience in the Pacific war is so diverse as to casualties that it is considered wrong to give any estimate in numbers. Using various combinations of

Pacific experience, the War Department staff reaches the conclusion that the cost of securing a worth-while position in Korea would almost certainly be greater than the cost of the Kyushu operation. Points on the optimistic side of the Kyushu operation are that: General MacArthur has not yet accepted responsibility for going ashore where there would be disproportionate casualties. The nature of the objective area gives room for maneuver, both on the land and by sea. As to any discussion of specific operations, the following data is pertinent:

Campaign	U.S. Casualties		Jap Casualties	Ratio U.S. to
	Killed, wounded	missing	Killed and prisoners (Not including wounded)	
Leyte:	17,000		78,000	1:4.6
Luzon	31,000		156,000	1:5.0
Iwo Jima	20,000		25,000	1:1.25
Okinawa	34,000 (Ground) 7,700 (Navy)		81,000 (not a complete count)	1:2
Normandy (1st 30 days)	42,000		- - -	- - -

The record of General MacArthur's operations from 1 March 1944 through 1 May 1945 shows 13,742 U.S. killed compared to 310,165 Japanese killed, or a ratio of 22 to 1.

There is reason to believe that the first 30 days in Kyushu should not exceed the price we have paid for Luzon. It is a grim fact that there is not an easy, bloodless way to victory in war and it is the thankless task of the leaders to maintain their firm outward front which holds the resolution of

their subordinates. Any irresolution in the leaders may result in costly weakening and indecision in the subordinates. It was this basic difficulty with the Prime Minister which clouded and hampered all our preparations for the cross-channel operation now demonstrated as having been essential to victory in Europe.

8. An important point about Russian participation in the war is that the impact of Russian entry on the already hopeless Japanese may well be the decisive action levering them into capitulation at that time or shortly thereafter if we land in Japan.

9. In considering the matter of command and control in the Pacific war which the British wish to raise at the next conference, we must bear in mind the point that anything smacking of combined command in the Pacific might increase the difficulties with Russia and perhaps with China. Furthermore the obvious inefficiencies of combined command may directly result in increased cost in resources and American lives.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he had asked General MacArthur's opinion on the proposed operation and received from him a telegram, which General Marshall proceeded to read:

"I believe the operation presents less hazards of excessive loss than any other that has been suggested and that its decisive effect will eventually save lives by eliminating

wasteful operations of nondecisive character. I regard the operation as the most economical one in effort and lives that is possible. In this respect it must be remembered that the several preceding months will involve practically no losses in ground troops and that, sooner or later a decisive ground attack must be made. The hazard and loss will be greatly lessened if an attack is launched from Siberia sufficiently ahead of our target date to commit the enemy to major combat. I most earnestly recommend no change in Olympic. Additional subsidiary attacks will simply build up our final total casualties."

GENERAL MARSHALL said that it was his personal view that the operation against Kyushu was the only course to pursue. He felt that air power alone was not sufficient to put the Japanese out of the war. It was unable to do it in Germany. General Baker and General Eisenhower both agreed to this. In operations against the Japanese living in scattered mountainous country the problem would be much more difficult than it had been in Germany. He felt that this plan promised the only way in which the Japanese could be forced into that feeling of utter helplessness in the face of the might against them and which could result in surrender. The operation would be difficult but not more so than the assault in Normandy. He was convinced that every individual moving to the Pacific should be filled with the determination to see the plan through.

ADMIRAL KING agreed with General Marshall's remarks and stated that the more he studied the matter, the more he was impressed with the strategic location of Kyushu which he considered the key to the success of any siege operations. He pointed out that within three months more the effects of air based on Okinawa will begin to be felt strongly in Japan. It seemed to him that Kyushu followed logically after Okinawa, Okinawa, then Kyushu, with the possible action to be expected from the Russians and from the Chinese seemed to be a natural setup. It was his opinion that we should decide now to do Kyushu, after which there would be time to judge the effect of possible operations by the Russians and the Chinese. The weather constituted quite a factor. So far as preparation was concerned, we must prepare now for the battle for Tokyo Plain; otherwise we will never be able to accomplish it. Unless all preparations go forward now, they cannot be arranged for later. Once started they can always be stopped if necessary.

GENERAL MARSHALL agreed that Kyushu was a necessity and pointed out that it constituted a landing in the Japanese homeland. Kyushu having been arranged for, the decision as to further action could be made later.

THE PRESIDENT inquired if a later decision would not depend on what the Russians agree to do. There was consensus that this would have considerable influence.

THE PRESIDENT then asked Admiral Leahy for his views of the situation.

ADMIRAL LEAHY pointed out that the President had been interested in knowing what the price in casualties for Kyushu would be and whether or not that price could be paid. He, Admiral Leahy, was interested in finding out how many troops will be used in Kyushu with a view to determining therefrom the number of casualties which might be expected. He pointed out that the troops on Okinawa had lost 35 percent in casualties. If this percentage were applied to the number of troops to be employed in Kyushu, he thought from the similarity of the fighting to be expected that this would give a good estimate of expected casualties.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out what he considered an important difference in Okinawa and Kyushu. There had been only one way to go on Okinawa. This meant a straight frontal attack on a highly fortified position. On Kyushu, however, landings would be made on three fronts simultaneously and there would be much more room for maneuver. It was his opinion that a realistic casualty figure for Kyushu would lie somewhere between the number experienced by General MacArthur in the operations on Iwo and the Okinawa casualties.

GENERAL MARSHALL ~~pointed out~~ called attention to the troops allotted to the Kyushu campaign as set out in the memorandum prepared for the President. The total combat troops was

766,000. In answer to the President's question as to what opposition could be expected on Kyushu, General Marshall said that there were eight Japanese divisions on Kyushu now or about 350,000 troops and 200 (?) aircraft. He said that reinforcement from other areas was possible but it was becoming increasingly difficult and painful. Divisions were still being raised in Japan.

(THE PRESIDENT said he was interested in the possibility of any reinforcement of Kyushu south from the other Japanese islands.

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that it was expected that all of the communications with Kyushu would be destroyed.

ADMIRAL KING described in some detail the land communications existing between the Japanese islands and Kyushu and stated that as a result of operations already planned, that the Japanese would have to depend on sea shipping for any reinforcement.

ADMIRAL LEAHY stressed the fact that Kyushu was an island crossed by a mountain range, which was difficult for either the Japanese or for the Americans to cross. The Kyushu operation constituted in effect taking another island from which to bring increased air power against Japan.

THE PRESIDENT said, as he understood it, it was practically creating another Okinawa closer to Japan. The Chiefs of Staff agreed that this was so.

THE PRESIDENT then asked General Baker for his opinion of the operation as an air man.

GENERAL BAKER stated that he agreed completely with the statements made by General Marshall in his digest of the memorandum prepared for the President. He said that in addition he had just received from General Arnold a cable in which he also gave his agreement. He stated that any blockade of Honshu was dependent upon airdromes on Kyushu; that the air plan contemplated employment of 40 groups of heavy bombers against Japan and that these could not be deployed without the use of airfields on Kyushu. He said that those who advocated the use of air power alone against Japan overlooked the very impressive fact that air casualties are very much heavier when the air forces face the enemy alone and that these casualties never fail to drop as soon as the ground forces come in. He stated the present air casualties were averaging 2 percent per mission, or 30 percent per month. He wished to point out and to emphasize that delay favored only the enemy and he urged that there be no delay.

THE PRESIDENT then stated that as he understood it the Joint Chiefs of Staff had considered all other possibilities in

the situation, all other possible plans, all contingencies, and as a result had reached the unanimous conclusion that the Kyushu operation was the best solution under the circumstances.

The Chiefs of Staff agreed that this was so.

THE PRESIDENT then asked the Secretary of War for his opinion.

MR. STIMSON stated that he agreed with the Chiefs of Staff that there was no other choice. He said that he was personally acquainted with the terrain between Tokyo and Osaka and it was not, in his opinion, suited for a war of movement. He felt that he was personally more responsible to the President for political considerations than military considerations. It was his opinion that there was a large submerged class in Japan who do not favor the present war and whose full opinion and influence had never yet been felt. He felt sure that this submerged class would fight and fight tenaciously if attacked on the ground. He was concerned that something should be done to arouse them in order to develop any possible influence they might have before it came to grips on the ground.

THE PRESIDENT stated that this possibility was being worked on all the time. He was interested to know the extent to which the invasion of Japanese homeland by the white man in uniting the Japs (to be reworded)

MR. STIMSON thought there was a very large chance. He agreed with the plan proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that being the best thing to do, but he still hoped for some additional means to be found through efforts that could be made from the outside.

THE PRESIDENT then asked for Mr. Forrestal's views. Mr.

MR. FORRESTAL pointed out that even if the decision were to be a siege of Japan for a year or a year and a half, that the capture of Kyushu would still be essential. Therefore, the sound decision is to proceed with the operation against Kyushu. There will still be left time thereafter for the main decision, which can be made in the light of subsequent events.

MR. McCLOY said he felt that the time was propitious now to study closely what efforts could be brought to bear in bringing out the influence of the submerged group in Japan which had been referred to by Mr. Stimson.

THE PRESIDENT stated that one of his objectives in connection with the conference would be to get all the assistance from Russia in the war that was possible. To this end he wanted to know all the decisions that he would have to make in advance in order to occupy the strongest position possible in the discussions.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he could not agree with the opinion

of May who said to him that unless we force the Japanese into unconditional surrender that we will have lost the war. He feared no menace from Japan in the reasonable future, even if we were unsuccessful in forcing unconditional surrender. What he feared was that our insistence on unconditional surrender would simply result in making the Japanese desperate and thereby result in large casualties. He did not think that such a result was necessary. ~~THE PRESIDENT~~

THE PRESIDENT stated that he had had that thought in mind when he had left the door open for Congress to take appropriate action with reference to unconditional surrender. However, he did not feel that at this time it was possible for him to take any action with reference to public opinion on this matter. He said with reference to the Kyushu plan that he considered it all right from the military standpoint and, as far as he was concerned the Joint Chiefs of Staff could go ahead with it; that we could do this operation and then make decision as to the final action later.

The conversation then turned on the situation in China.

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that General Wedemeyer's operations were pointing towards Canton. He thought it was already evident that the Japanese would hold fortress troops there and in other places. It might be necessary to go around these fortress

troops as had been done in France or to take other courses with reference to them.

In reply to a question from the President, GENERAL MARSHALL outlined the present status of Chinese divisions with respect to completeness of personnel and equipment. He said the prospect with respect to the ability of the Chinese generals were not very good. He had already asked General Wedemeyer whether it would be possible to use with the Chinese troops one or more of the U.S. Army commanders with their staffs who were now returning from France. General Wedemeyer's reply, while not conclusive, had been, in general, favorable. General Marshall thought that if the Generalissimo would effect the use of these commanders for control of Chinese groups, that it would be a very excellent thing.

THE PRESIDENT then inquired as to the prospects of an overall commander in the Pacific, which he thought would be a good thing.

Both GENERAL MARSHALL and ADMIRAL KING explained that under the circumstances existing in the Pacific with the variety of troops to be operating there, with the number of nations involved, that they thought there were no prospects for it. As was pointed out, it was undesirable to accept divided command with the British and that we would lose more than we would gain if we brought about

in the Pacific the same condition as had existed in France.

GENERAL MARSHALL stated the American commander would always have to think of his government's policies. In connection with this, he recounted the difficulty obtaining British agreement in Malta to General Eisenhower's plan for the invasion of Germany. Their reluctance in the matter was due to their belief that General Eisenhower must be influenced by the American commanders.

THE PRESIDENT said that it was simply his idea to find out whether an over-all commander for the Pacific would be an advantage or a liability.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that from the large point of view there was no question about this being a liability. In connection with the British participation in the Pacific, General Marshall said that the President would find the Prime Minister very articulate. He is interested in showing that the British Government has played a full part in the defeat of Japan and that it had not been necessary for them to wait for the United States to recapture Singapore for them. The Americans, of course, were glad to have any real help or any assistance that would help strike a real blow but that British participation in some way would constitute an embarrassment. However, the British were under American over-all command in the Pacific. He stated that the British wanted the Australians to take over as far as the Celebes. The Australians wanted to take over their own

Mandated Island area (check with Planners). The Australian Deputy Prime Minister had recently conferred with the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the Australian role in the war and that the British had suffered some embarrassment because they have not yet been able to agree definitely with the Australians. ~~The~~

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~~Present~~

THE PRESIDENT referred to the Portuguese participation in the Southwest Pacific and stated that he wished to get the air program definitely settled with the Portuguese before we do anything more about Timor.

THE PRESIDENT reiterated that his main reason for this conference with the Chiefs of Staff was his desire to know definitely how far we could afford to go into this operation. He had hoped that there was a possibility of preventing an Okinawa from one end of Japan to the other. He was clear on the situation now and was quite sure that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should proceed with the Kyushu operation.

With reference to operations in China, GENERAL MARSHALL expressed the opinion that we should not seek an over-all commander in China. The present situation in which the Generalissimo was supporting General Wedemeyer, acting as his Chief of Staff, was entirely satisfactory. The suggestion of the appointment of an over-all commander might cause some difficulty.

ADMIRAL KING said he wished to emphasize the point that regardless of the desirability of the Russians entering the war, that ~~xx~~ they were not indispensable and that he did not think we should go to any great lengths in begging them to come in. While the cost of defeating Japan would be greater, there was no question in his mind but that we ~~x~~ could handle it alone. He thought that the realization of this fact should greatly strengthen the President's hand in discussing matters with the Russians.

ADMIRAL LEAHY read a telegram in which General McNarney had recommended that the reinstatement of supplies to the French take place after the French withdrawal from northern Italy.

~~THE PRESIDENT~~ THE PRESIDENT stated that he agreed with General McNarney's recommendations and felt that he should be supported.

THE PRESIDENT expressed his appreciation of the results of his conference with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He said this cleared up a great many points in his mind and that he now felt satisfied and reassured.

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

18 July 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

SUBJECT: The Test.

1. This is not a concise, formal military report but an attempt to recite what I would have told you if you had been here on my return from New Mexico.
2. At 0530, 16 July 1945, in a remote section of the Alamogordo Air Base, New Mexico, the first full scale test was made of the implosion type atomic fission bomb. For the first time in history there was a nuclear explosion.

And what an explosion!



The bomb was not dropped from an airplane but was exploded on a platform on top of a 100-foot high steel tower.

3. The test was successful beyond the most optimistic expectations of anyone. Based on the data which it has been possible to work up to date, I estimate the energy generated to be in excess of the equivalent of 15,000 to 20,000 tons of TNT; and this is a conservative estimate. Data based on measurements which we have not yet been able to reconcile would make the energy release several times the conservative figure. There were tremendous blast effects.

B File
B File

18 July 1945

For a brief period there was a lighting effect within a radius of 20 miles equal to several suns in midday; a huge ball of fire was formed which lasted for several seconds. This ball mushroomed and rose to a height of over ten thousand feet before it dimmed. The light from the explosion was seen clearly at Albuquerque, Santa Fe, Silver City, El Paso and other points generally to about 180 miles away. The sound was heard to the same distance in a few instances but generally to about 100 miles. Only a few windows were broken although one was some 125 miles away. A massive cloud was formed which surged and billowed upward with tremendous power, reaching the stratosphere at an elevation of 41,000 feet, 36,000 feet above the ground, in about five minutes, breaking without interruption through a temperature inversion at 17,000 feet which most of the scientists thought would stop it. Two supplementary explosions occurred in the cloud shortly after the main explosion. The cloud contained several thousand tons of dust picked up from the ground and a considerable amount of iron in the gaseous form. Our present thought is that this iron ignited when it mixed with the oxygen in the air to cause these supplementary explosions. Huge concentrations of highly radioactive materials resulted from the fission and were contained in this cloud.

4. A crater from which all vegetation had vanished, with a diameter of 1200 feet and a slight slope toward the center, was formed. In the center was a shallow bowl 130 feet in diameter and 6 feet in depth. The material within the crater was deeply pulverized dirt. The material within the outer circle is greenish and can be distinctly seen from as much as 5 miles away. The steel from the tower was evaporated. 1500 feet away there was a four-inch iron pipe 16 feet high set in concrete and strongly guyed. It disappeared completely.

B File
B File

18 July 1945

5. One-half mile from the explosion there was a massive steel test cylinder weighing 220 tons. The base of the cylinder was solidly encased in concrete. Surrounding the cylinder was a strong steel tower 70 feet high, firmly anchored to concrete foundations. This tower is comparable to a steel building bay that would be found in typical 15 or 20 story skyscraper or in warehouse construction. Forty tons of steel were used to fabricate the tower which was 70 feet high, the height of a six story building. The cross bracing was much stronger than that normally used in ordinary steel construction. The absence of the solid walls of a building gave the blast a much less effective surface to push against. The blast tore the tower from its foundations, twisted it, ripped it apart and left it flat on the ground. The effects on the tower indicate that, at that distance, unshielded permanent steel and masonry buildings would have been destroyed. I no longer consider the Pentagon a safe shelter from such a bomb. Enclosed are a sketch showing the tower before the explosion and a telephotograph showing what it looked like afterwards. None of us had expected it to be damaged.

6. The cloud traveled to a great height first in the form of a ball, then mushroomed, then changed into a long trailing chimney-shaped column and finally was sent in several directions by the variable winds at the different elevations. It deposited its dust and radioactive materials over a wide area. It was followed and monitored by medical doctors and scientists with instruments to check its radioactive effects. While ~~here~~ and there the activity on the ground was fairly high, at no place did it reach a concentration which required evacuation of the population. Radio-

B File
B File

18 July 1945

active material in small quantities was located as much as 120 miles away. The measurements are being continued in order to have adequate data with which to protect the Government's interests in case of future claims. For a few hours I was more comfortable about the situation.

7. For distances as much as 200 miles away, observers were stationed to check on blast effects, property damage, radioactivity and reactions of the population. While complete reports have not yet been received, I now know that no persons were injured nor was there any real property damage outside our Government area. As soon as all the voluminous data can be checked and correlated, full technical studies will be possible.

WEATHER
JEP

8. Our long range weather predictions had indicated that we could expect weather favorable for our tests beginning on the morning of the 17th and continuing for four days. This was almost a certainty if we were to believe our long range forecasters. The prediction for the morning of the 16th was not so certain but there was about an 80% chance of the conditions being suitable. During the night there were thunder storms with lightning flashes all over the area. The test had been originally set for 0400 hours and all the night through, because of the bad weather, there were urgings from many of the scientists to postpone the test. Such a delay might well have had crippling results due to mechanical difficulties in our complicated test set-up. Fortunately, we disregarded the urgings. We held fire and waited the night through hoping for suitable weather. We had to delay an hour and a half, to 0530, before we could fire. This was 30 minutes before sunrise.

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9. Because of bad weather, our two B-29 observation airplanes were unable to take off as scheduled from Kirtland Field at Albuquerque and when they finally did get off, they found it impossible to get over the target because of the heavy clouds and the thunder storms. Certain desired observations could not be made and while the people in the airplanes saw the explosion from a distance, they were not as close as they will be in action. We still have no reason to anticipate the loss of our plane in an actual operation although we cannot guarantee safety.

10. Just before 1100 the news stories from all over the state started to flow into the Albuquerque Associated Press. I then directed the issuance by the Commanding Officer, Alamogordo Air Base of a news release as shown on the inclosure. With the assistance of the Office of Censorship we were able to limit the news stories to the approved release supplemented in the local papers by brief stories from the many eyewitnesses not connected with our project. One of these was a blind woman who saw the light.

11. Brigadier General Thomas F. Farrell was at the control shelter located 10,000 yards south of the point of explosion. His impressions are given below:

"The scene inside the shelter was dramatic beyond words. In and around the shelter were some twenty-odd people concerned with last minute arrangements prior to firing the shot. Included were: Dr. Oppenheimer, the Director who had borne the great scientific burden of

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developing the weapon from the raw materials made in Tennessee and Washington, and a dozen of his key assistants -- Dr. Viskiatowsky, who developed the highly special explosives; Dr. Bainbridge, who supervised all the detailed arrangements for the test; Dr. Hubbard, the weather expert, and several others. Besides these, there were a handful of soldiers, two or three Army officers and one Naval officer. The shelter was cluttered with a great variety of instruments and radios.

For some hectic two hours preceding the blast, General Groves stayed with the Director, walking with him and steadying his tense excitement. Every time the Director would be about to explode because of some untoward happening, General Groves would take him off and walk with him in the rain, counselling with him and reassuring him that everything would be all right. [At twenty minutes before zero hour, General Groves left for his station at the base camp, first because it provided a better observation point and second, because of our rule that he and I must not be together in situations where there is an element of danger, which existed at both points.]

Just after General Groves left, announcements began to be broadcast of the interval remaining before the blast. They were sent by radio to the other groups participating in and observing the test. As the time interval grew smaller and changed from minutes to seconds, the tension increased by leaps and bounds. Everyone in that room knew the awful potentialities of the thing that they thought was about to happen. The scientists felt that their figuring must be right and

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that the bomb had to go off but there was in everyone's mind a strong measure of doubt. The feeling of many could be expressed by "Lord, I believe; help Thou mine unbelief." We were reaching into the unknown and we did not know what might come of it. It can be safely said that most of those present—Christian, Jew and Atheist—were praying and praying harder than they had ever prayed before. If the shot were successful, it was a justification of the several years of intensive effort of tens of thousands of people—statesmen, scientists, engineers, manufacturers, soldiers, and many others in every walk of life.

I
In that brief instant in the remote New Mexico desert the tremendous effort of the brains and brawn of all these people came suddenly and startlingly to the fullest fruition. Dr. Oppenheimer, on whom had rested a very heavy burden, grew tauter as the last seconds ticked off. He scarcely breathed. He held on to a post to steady himself. For the last few seconds, he stared directly ahead and then when the announcer shouted "Now!" and there came this tremendous burst of light followed shortly thereafter by the deep growling roar of the explosion, his face relaxed into an expression of tremendous relief. Several of the observers standing back of the shelter to watch the lighting effects were knocked flat by the blast. ✓

"The tension in the room let up and all started congratulating each other. Everyone sensed "This is it!" No matter what might happen now all knew that the impossible scientific job had been done. Atomic fission would no longer be hidden in the cloisters of the theoretical physicists' dreams. It was almost full grown at birth. It was a great

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new force to be used for good or for evil. There was a feeling in that shelter that those concerned with its nativity should dedicate their lives to the mission that it would always be used for good and never for evil.

an American and Harvard professor in many ways

"Dr. Kistiakowsky, the impulsive Russian, threw his arms around Dr. Oppenheimer and embraced him with shouts of glee. Others were equally enthusiastic. All the pent-up emotions were released in those few minutes and all seemed to sense immediately that the explosion had far exceeded the most optimistic expectations and wildest hopes of the scientists. All seemed to feel that they had been present at the birth of a new age—The Age of Atomic Energy—and felt their profound responsibility to help in guiding into right channels the tremendous forces which had been unlocked for the first time in history.

"As to the present war, there was a feeling that no matter what else might happen, we now had the means to insure its speedy conclusion and save thousands of American lives. As to the future, there had been brought into being something big and something new that would prove to be immeasurably more important than the discovery of electricity or any of the other great discoveries which have so affected our existence.

"The effects could well be called unprecedented, magnificent, beautiful, stupendous and terrifying. No man-made phenomenon of such tremendous power had ever occurred before. The lighting effects beggared description. The whole country was lighted by a searing light

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with the intensity many times that of the midday sun. It was golden, purple, violet, gray and blue. It lighted every peak, crevasse and ridge of the nearby mountain range with a clarity and beauty that cannot be described but must be seen to be imagined. It was that beauty the great poets dream about but describe most poorly and inadequately. Thirty seconds after the explosion came first, the air blast pressing hard against the people and things, to be followed almost immediately by the strong, sustained, awesome roar which warned of doomsday and made us feel that we puny things were blasphemous to dare tamper with the forces heretofore reserved to The Almighty. Words are inadequate tools for the job of acquainting those not present with the physical, mental and psychological effects. It had to be witnessed to be realized."

12. My impressions of the night's high points follow:

After about an hour's sleep I got up at 0100 and from that time on until about five I was with Dr. Oppenheimer constantly. Naturally he was nervous, although his mind was working at its usual extraordinary efficiency. I devoted my entire attention to shielding him from the excited and generally faulty advice of his assistants who were more than disturbed by their excitement and the uncertain weather conditions. By 0330 we decided that we could probably fire at 0530. By 0400 the rain had stopped but the sky was heavily overcast. Our decision became firmer as time went on. During most of these hours the two of us journeyed from the control house out into the darkness to look

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at the stars and to assure each other that the one or two visible stars were becoming brighter. At 0510 I left Dr. Oppenheimer and returned to the main observation point which was 17,000 yards from the point of explosion. In accordance with our orders I found all personnel not otherwise occupied massed on a bit of high ground.

At about two minutes of the scheduled firing time all persons lay face down with their feet pointing towards the explosion. As the remaining time was called from the loud speaker from the 10,000 yard control station there was complete silence. Dr. Conant said he had never imagined seconds could be so long. Most of the individuals in accordance with orders shielded their eyes in one way or another. There was then this burst of light of a brilliance beyond any comparison. We all rolled over and looked through dark glasses at the ball of fire. About forty seconds later came the shock wave followed by the sound, neither of which seemed startling after our complete astonishment at the extraordinary lighting intensity. Dr. Conant reached over and we shook hands in mutual congratulations. Dr. Bush, who was on the other side of me, did likewise. The feeling of the entire assembly was similar to that described by General Farrell, with even the uninitiated feeling profound awe. Drs. Conant and Bush and myself were struck by an even stronger feeling that the faith of those who had been responsible for the initiation and the carrying on of this Herculean project had been justified. I personally thought of Blondin crossing Niagara Falls on his tight rope, only to see this tight rope had lasted for almost

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three years and of my repeated confident-appearing assurances that such a thing was possible and that we would do it.

13. A large group of observers were stationed at a point about 27 miles north of the point of explosion. Attached is a memorandum written shortly after the explosion by Dr. E. O. Lawrence which may be of interest. ✓

XI * 14. While General Farrell was waiting about midnight for a commercial airplane to Washington at Albuquerque—120 miles away from the site—he overheard several airport employees discussing their reaction to the blast. One said that he was out on the parking apron; it was quite dark; then the whole southern sky was lighted as though by a bright sun; the light lasted several seconds. Another remarked that if a few exploding bombs could have such an effect, it must be terrible to have them drop on a city.

X 15. My liaison officer at the Alamogordo Air Base, 60 miles away, made the following report: 2

"There was a blinding flash of light that lighted the entire northwestern sky. In the center of the flash, there appeared to be a huge billow of smoke. The original flash lasted approximately 10 to 15 seconds. As the first flash died down, there arose in the approximate center of where the original flash had occurred an enormous ball of what appeared to be fire and closely resembled a rising sun that was three-fourths above a mountain. The ball of fire lasted approximately 15 seconds, then died down and the sky resumed an almost normal appearance. B-File

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76 Almost immediately, a third, but much smaller, flash and billow of smoke of a whitish-orange color appeared in the sky, again lighting the sky for approximately 4 seconds. At the time of the original flash, the field was lighted well enough so that a newspaper could easily have been read. The second and third flashes were of much lesser intensity.

78 We were in a glass-enclosed control tower some 70 feet above the ground and felt no concussion or air compression. There was no noticeable earth tremor although reports overheard at the field during the following 24 hours indicated that some believed that they had both heard the explosion and felt some earth tremor.

16. I have not written a separate report for General Marshall as I feel you will want to show this to him. I have informed the necessary people here of our results. Lord Halifax after discussion with Mr. Harriman and myself stated that he was not sending a full report to his government at this time. I informed him that I was sending this to you and that you might wish to show it to the proper British representatives.


17. We are all fully conscious that our real goal is still before us. The battle test is what counts in the war with Japan.

18. May I express my deep personal appreciation for your congratulatory cable to us and for the support and confidence which I have received from you ever since I have had this work under my charge.

Memorandum for Secretary of War

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19. I know that Colonel Ayle will guard these papers with his customary extraordinary care.


L. R. GROVES,
Major General, USA.

4 Inclosures:
Sketch
Picture
News Release
Statement by E. O. Lawrence

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16, 1945

LOUD
DRAWINGS

Just above
horizon
Explosion
Alamogordo, N.M.
State, from
3-79 flying at
30,000 ft. about
15 miles away.

170° course ave. y.

0 = 5:30 AM

Looking toward 80°

5:38 AM



about 24,000 ft.

undercast.



dark brown

light gray

150°
Looking toward 160°
5:42 AM

see through here

B File

B File

light gray

undercast

All above

